or, indeed, th a t it failed to have some effect.60 So dire was Egypt's economic predicam ent, th a t M ubarak and others around him accepted the necessity of economic reform; nevertheless, IMF and A m erican criticism s, backed up by lim ited financial sanctions, acted as a goad. It is w orth noting th a t the E gyptian governm ent began in 1986-87 to give far g rea ter priority to encouraging the p riv ate sector th a n had u n til th en been th e case.61 Moreover, M ubarak sought to involve both th e A m erican-Egyptian C ham ber of Commerce and th e US C ham ber of Commerce in b ilateral dealings; and since th e form er did not really constitute a unified pressure group in Egypt - being faction-ridden - th is policy can be seen as a conscious appeal to A m erican developm ent priorities.62
M ilita ry C o o p er a tio n
The question of arm s supplies surfaced very early in S ad at's dealings w ith the U nited S tates. H enry K issinger appreciated the symbolic value of A m erican arm s a t a tim e w hen E gypt w anted not only to secure an a ltern a tiv e source to th e Soviet Union, b u t also needed to m odernize its arm ed forces.63 Moreover, as S ad at moved closer to a settlem en t w ith Israel, it would be im p o rtan t for him to re ta in th e support of th e E gyptian m ilitary establishm ent.
Dennis Sullivan has argued ('The Political Economy of Reform in Egypt', p.328) that officials in the White House, State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Cairo were far less insistent than their AID counterparts 'on the elusive goal of economic development through policy reform.’ But it is also true that influential members of Congress, such as Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.) were deeply sceptical of Egypt's commitment to reform, and that the administration could not ignore such sentiment. Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt, pp.261-3.
See Amani Qandil, 'Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: A Study of the Role of Businessmen in Egypt', Paper presented to Second Pol. Studies Conference, Cairo, 3- 5 Dec. 1988, pp.9-11, 17-18; and also Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt, pp.71-2. American private investment in Egypt remained rather low; official figures indicated that it stood at $1.7 billion in 1987, of which $1.4 billion was in the petroleum sector. See Egyptian Economic Trends, U.S. Embassy, Cairo, March 1989, p.19.
E gypt's m ilitary relationship w ith the U nited S tates was b u ilt on the supply of an extensive range of m ateriel, jo in t exercises, the use of m ilitary facilities by A m erican forces and, to a m uch lesser degree, on jo in t planning. T here is little doubt th a t both sides derived benefits from the relationship: A m erican forces gained the opportunity to tra in in Middle E a s te rn conditions, for exam ple, w hilst Egypt's arm ed forces were able su b sta n tia lly to m odernise th e ir equipm ent. N evertheless, th e E gyptian governm ent was ham pered by public concern - and obsession am ongst leftists - for th e delicate issue of national sovereignty, and by the need to consider th e effect of th is cooperation on its ongoing Arab diplomacy. In co n trast to S ad at's a t tim es overenthusiastic em brace of A m erican m ilitary an d strateg ic in te rests, M ubarak attem p ted to protect his governm ent from th e charge of overt collaboration.
S a d a t in ten d ed to build a b ilateral relationship w ith the U nited S tates of the kind which Israel enjoyed: economic an d m ilitary aid would be provided on th e basis of sh ared in te rests and values. It h as been suggested, for exam ple, th a t he sought to underm ine Saudi plans to finance E gypt’s arm s p u rch ases because he did not w ish for an in term ed iary to come betw een C airo and W ashington.64 Very few supplies actually reached Egypt before th e Cam p David accords were concluded - deliveries were restricted to a n u m ber of C-130 tra n s p o rt a ircraft - b u t extensive funds became available after the peace treaty . S ad at's sig n atu re of the Camp David accords bro u g h t a prom ise of Foreign M ilitary Sales (FMS) credit w orth $1.5 billion, to be spread over th ree years; and C a rte r th en com m itted th e U nited S ta te s in principle to supplying a fu rth e r $1.15 billion for FY1981 and FY1982.65 In th e event, E gypt received slightly
64 See I. Karawan, 'Egypt', in S. Neuman (ed.), Defense Planning in Less-Industrialised
States: The Middle East and South Asia (Lexington & Toronto: Lexington Books,
1984), p.159.