La clasificación de los niños

In the late 1960s, all these frictions and problems abroad and the basic changes in Turkey's socio-political life outlined above w ere showing only one direction - the need

for a new and fresh foreign policy. But, as Ahmad pointed out, "throughout the sixties...the intelligentsia was able to inhibit the activities o f the governm ent by constant criticism but...never able to force the government to reformulate the p o lic y " .^ A lthough , after the Cyprus crises o f 1963-1964 and 1967, the signs o f reevaluation o f basic fundamentals o f Turkish foreign policy w ere evident even in the governmental circles,9^ soon the outcry that Cyprus and other problems created died out, or at least shadow ed, due to mounting pressure o f the domestic politics as a result o f growing violence and economic problems.

N evertheless, there w ere basic changes in Turkey's attitudes, if not in main directions, tow ards certain countries in an apparent attem pt to break her loneliness in the international forums and find support to her position on Cyprus. One o f the major changes in Turkish foreign policy in the late 1960's was the rapprochem ent with the Soviet Union. Although there had been a movement tow ards rapprochem ent with the Soviets as early as 1959 because o f economic needs, the real thaw in Turkish-Soviet relations started after 1964 and was undoubtedly influenced by American actions during the Cyprus crisis. But attempts by Turkey to better her relations with the Communist Bloc w ere motivated by other factors as well. The Turkish desire for Soviet economic

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assistance in view o f declining American economic and military aid; 1 the development o f a highly vocal political opposition; and growing anti-American sentiment in Turkey all contributed to Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

In his memoirs, Turkish Foreign M inister F. C. Erkin, claims that Turkey moved to normalize relations with the Soviet Union because the Soviet threat to Turkey had decreased due to the NATO alliance, the rise o f China as a balancing force, her econom ic difficulties on the domestic front, and demands for autonomy by the Soviet U nion's allies in Eastern Europe 92 Just as important w ere the signals from M oscow th at the Soviets had abandoned their harsh policy tow ard Turkey and that better relations betw een the tw o countries would not be contingent on Turkey loosening her N A TO bonds. Clearly, there w ere a variety o f factors dictating the desirability for

better relations, but just as clear is the fact that Cyprus was the catalyst for rapprochem ent.

Ulman/Dekmejian acknowledge three factors, related to Cyprus, that forced Turkey to consider rapprochem ent with the Soviet Union.9^ First o f all, the Turks probably felt that signs o f a Turkish-Soviet rapprochem ent w ould pressure the United States and NATO into inducing the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to accept a solution favourable to Turkey. Secondly, Turkey hoped to win positive Soviet support for her position on Cyprus, and therefore, secure the support o f the Communist Bloc in the U nited Nations. Finally, the least they could expect was a neutral Soviet position, thereby denying support for the Greek position. Taken into consideration with Turkey's isolation in the international arena, the lack o f W estern support, and the Soviet warning to Turkey during the 1964 Cyprus crisis about the integrity o f the island, this attem pt to secure Soviet support on Cyprus issue seemed all the more appropriate.

W hat began as a tactic to secure support for her position on Cyprus soon becam e a firm conviction o f Turkish foreign policy. Talks and visits betw een Turkey and the Soviet Union increased after 1965 and the dialogue was extended to other m atters o f mutual interest to the tw o countries. Perhaps most significant was the increase in trade and the beginning o f a Soviet aid program for Turkey. As a result, Turkish exports to and imports from the Soviet bloc rose rapidly and the share o f the Soviet bloc in Turkey's total trade increased from 7% in 1964 to 13% in 1967.9^

A basic tenet o f Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union w as the belief that the Soviets had abandoned their harsh, militarist policy and w ould accept, however unwillingly, Turkey's membership in NATO. Therefore, the Soviet's armed repression o f the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Brezhnev doctrine claiming the right o f intervention for the Soviets to uphold the socialist regime in any country must have had more than a sobering effect in Turkey. It was, according to H arris, "a blunt reminder that M oscow had not renounced force where its interests w ere concerned".95 The most immediate reaction to the Czech crisis w as the decision

o f the Demirel regime, in a reversal o f its previous position, to cooperate in a multilateral force to be created in the M editerranean under NATO auspices 96

Although Turkish- Soviet dialogue continued after a short break, tw o ominous developm ents outside the realm o f diplomatic relations caused growing apprehension in Turkey. The first o f these was the increased Soviet naval presence in the M editerranean and the other w as the growing ideological impact o f socialist doctrines within Turkey. These tw o developments w ere to impact on Turkey's foreign and domestic policies o f the 1970s in that the former again highlighted Turkey's strategic location, and the latter created instability in both the political and social life o f Turkey.

Concom itant with her rapprochem ent with the Soviet Union, Turkey also attem pted to improve and expand her relations with the non-aligned countries, especially those in the Middle East. Although many factors, such as obvious cultural, geographic and religious affinities; the idea that Turkey, for strategic political reasons, m ust becom e a bridge between East and West; and the commercial opportunities in the new m arkets in the Arab countries undoubtedly influenced this shift in Turkish foreign policy, Turkish-Third W orld relations in the 1960s, however, w ere conditioned above all by the Cyprus dispute.

The almost total lack o f Third World support in the U N for the Turkish position on Cyprus forced Turkey to realize that her policy tow ard the nonaligned nations in general and the M iddle East in particular had isolated her from the rest o f the world. As could be expected Turkey moved to break away from this isolation. Therefore, behind Turkey's new Arab policy was the desire to marshal support in the U N for her Cyprus stand, as well as to indicate to the United States that Turkish support on various issues could no longer be taken for granted.

D espite the fact that Turkey's rapprochement policy with the Third World initially ended with failure, as the 1965 UN vote showed,97 Turkey nevertheless went ahead with her multi-faceted foreign policy initiatives. Illustrative o f Turkey's new policy in the M iddle East was the diplomatic position taken by Turkey in the Arab- Israeli conflict. During the period following the 1964 Cyprus crisis up until the 1967

A rab-Israeli war, Ankara's position on the M iddle East dispute w as one o f guarded neutrality. It w as characterized by extreme caution designed to avoid antagonizing the U nited States, the Soviet Union and the Arab nations. In the aftermath o f the war, the new direction o f Turkey's foreign policy became evident in the UN. Mindful o f the im portance o f the thirteen potential Arab votes in the UN, as well as o f future Com m unist Bloc support for her position on Cyprus, Turkey voted for the Yugoslav resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from captured Arab territories. Y et at the same time, in an apparent attem pt to balance her interests with the W est, Turkey abstained on the Soviet resolution that labelled Israel an a g g re s s o r.^

A nother event manifesting the diversification o f Turkey's foreign policy was the creation by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, o f the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). It w as an economic and cultural agreement parallel to but separate from the W estern dominated Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and as Harris states, reduced the importance o f i t . ^ Although Turkey's leaders initially w ere not enthusiastic about turning back tow ards the East, on cultural and especially Islamic grounds, Pakistan's proposal for RCD was timely and caught the Turks in the moment o f their political isolation.

Thus Turkey, whose credit with the nonaligned bloc had been bankrupt in 1964, began to pursue a more independent foreign policy in the Third W orld designed to alleviate the impression created at Bandung that she was running errands for the West. H ow ever, at the end, there w ere few Third W orld countries who actually accepted Turkey's eagerness to improve relations with them. And despite the adoption o f the "multi-faceted" foreign policy, most o f the Third W orld states continued to act *in favour o f M akarios' position over the Cyprus issue in international forums.