Desobediencia

In the intercoup period, Turkish foreign policy changed its structure but not its foundations. While still resting upon the principles o f identification and alliance with the W est, it w as now marked by a trend which stressed the pursuit o f Turkey's national interests in her foreign relations and greater independence in decision making.

This new orientation was influenced by psychological factors introduced in the 1960s, such as the reversal o f the intimidating Soviet attitude tow ards Turkey; the Cuban crisis and subsequent removal o f the Jupiter missiles from Turkey; the American attitudes tow ards the continuous Cyprus crises; the formation o f the EEC; NATO's adoption o f the "flexible response" strategy; and the lack o f support in the U N for her Cyprus policy.

These psychological factors were exacerbated in the 1970s by such events as the 1973 M iddle E ast W ar and the ensuing oil crisis; a sharp deterioration in relations betw een Turkey and the United States, first on the poppy question and then on Cyprus; tension between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus and Aegean problems; Turkey's differences with the EEC; and, again, lack o f support in the U N for Turkey's Cyprus policy.

These significant international events parallelled domestic developments in Turkey. Increases in communication, education and social as well as physical mobility led to higher expectations and a greater politicalization o f the Turkish people. In turn these factors, together with the factors discussed earlier, resulted in ideological polarization and party fragmentation. The net result was w eak coalition governments,

which proved to be ineffective in the field o f foreign relations. Thus, at the time when international political and economic imperatives called for solutions to Turkey's outstanding foreign policy problems, such as Cyprus, the Aegean, her relations with the E E C and the US, Turkey did not have a government with enough political prestige to m ake com prom ises necessary for a lasting settlement to those problems.

On the other hand, the insistence on a more autonom ous Turkish foreign policy from both the Right and the Left was strengthened by international events, outlined above, particularly the energy crisis which had a devastating effect on Turkey; and the American arms embargo which brought into question Turkey's W estern defence alliance. Therefore, while little or no progress was made on the Cyprus and Aegean issues, Turkey exhibited strong moves in this period tow ard developing good pohtica- and econom ic relations with the nonaligned countries, particularly those in the Middle E ast and the Balkans, and the Soviet Bloc countries.

The emergence o f diversification in Turkey's foreign relations also coincided w ith Ecevit's rise to pow er in the RPP. His political philosophy, which was quite similar to that o f the European "social democrats", was most closely associated with pursuit o f

1 9 4

national interests and independence in foreign policy m a k i n g . T h e r e f o r e , it was clear w hen B. Ecevit won the 1973 election that his government w ould attem pt to exercise m ore independence in its foreign policy, Hence, on the eve o f the world-w ide energy crisis and the Cyprus intervention, with all its ramifications, the stage had already been set for a search to find new orientations for Turkish foreign policy. W here this search led Turkey is a question that the following chapters seek to answer.

N O T E S

R ustow , D .A ., Turkey. America's Forgotten Ally, (N ew York, London: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989), p. 84.

2

. The result based on my own calculation from the list o f Turkey's prime ministers in D irectorate General o f Press and Information, Turkey, An Official Handbook

(Ankara: Gaye M atbaasi, 1990), p. 57.

As foresighted by Celal Bayar, shortly after Ataturk's death, Cumhuriyet N ovem ber 17, 1938, cited in Ataov, T., "Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1938", The Turkish Y ear­ bo ok o f International Relations, Vol. 2, 1961, p. 142.

4 F o r the text o f the treaty, see Hurewitz, J.C., Diplomacy in the N ear and M iddle East, 2nd. volume, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 226-228. U nder the terms o f this tripartite pact, Turkey was obligated to enter the w ar only if it extended into the M editerranean, and w as exempt if the hostilities involved conflict w ith the Soviet Union. Turkey used these clauses for a long time as an excuse for not entering the war.

Turkey declared w ar against Japan and Germany on February 23, 1945, only after Y alta summit which announced that only states which w ere in w ar w ith Germany and Japan by M arch 1, 1945, would join the United Nations. H ence this declaration o f w ar w as only a token attem pt directed to join the United N ations as an associate member.

^.

F o r account o f Turkish war-time diplomacy, see Ataov, T., Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945, AU. SBF Publication No. 197-179, (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1965); Deringil, S., Turkish Foreign Policy During The Second W orld War; An "Active" Neutrality, LSE M onographs in International Studies (Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Weisband, E., Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-45, (Princeton: University Press, 1973).

2 Armaoglu, F., "Ikinci Dunya Harbinde Turkiye", (Turkey in the Second W orld W ar), SBF D ergisi. Vol. X III (2), 1958, p. 163.

8 . See Turkish Foreign Ministry note to German ambassador Von Papen on January 5, 1942, in D upont, P., (ed), Almanva Disisleri Bakanligi Arsivinden Almanva'nin Turkiye Politikasi, 1941-1943 (German Foreign Policy Documents on Turkey, 1941-1943), translated into Turkish by M uammer Sencer, (Istanbul: M ay Yayinlari, 1968), D ocum ent N o. 16, January 5, 1942.

9 Turkey had agreements with all the parties concerned during the war. The Friendship and N onaggression Pact o f 1925 with the Soviet Union; 1939 M utual A ssistance Treaty with G reat Britain and France; and 1941 Treaty o f Territorial Integrity and Frienship with Germany. For Treaties See Hurewitz, Qp„_ciL, vol. II, pp. 226-235.

10 Aron, R., Pftare and War- A Theory o f International Relations. (Garden City, N ew York: A nchor & Doubleday, 1973), pp. 125-127.

n Gonlubol, M. (et.al.), Olavlarla Turk P is Politikasi (Turkish Foreign Policy W ith Facts), (Ankara: AU.SBF Yayinevi, 1987), 6th ed., p. 149. H ereafter referred as

"OTDP". F o r extensive documents about the Berlin talks between H itler and M olotov, see Sonntag, R.J. and Beddie, J.S., Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941; Documents

Frnm the Archives o f the German Office. (New York: Didier, 1948), pp. 220-260; Also see H urewitz, op.ciL, Vol. n , pp. 228-230.

12. W eisband, op cit.. pp. 298-302 a n d 317-318; Q TBP, pp. 183-185 and 195-197.

1 ^

Foreign Relations of

the

United

States: M alta and Yalta Papers (W ashington D.C., 1955), p. 903, as quoted in Yapp, M E., The N ear East Since The First W orld W ar (London, N ew York: Logman, 1991), p. 395.

^4 . A t the time, Soviet territorial adjustments meant a return to the Soviet U nion o f the E astern Turkish provinces o f Kars and Ardahan, captured from the O ttom an E m pire in the nineteenth century and returned to Turkey by the 1920 Treaty o f Alexandropol, which w as confirmed by the 1921 Friendship Treaty. There were, m oreover, hints that the territorial demands would include a larger area on the Black Sea cost southw est o f Batum; for on December 20, 1945, M oscow newspapers published an article by tw o Georgian proffesors, claiming Ardahan, Artvin, Trabzon and Gumushane. See Vere-Hodge, E.R., Turkish Foreign Policy, 1918-1948, (Geneve: Ambilly-Annemasse, 1950),

p.

171; Golan, G., The Soviet Policies in the M iddle E ast, (Cam bridge, N ew York, Sdney, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 32; Kilic, A., Turkey and the W orld, (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), pp.

125-126.

B oth statem ents quoted by Rustow, D.A., "The Foreign Policy o f Turkish Republic" in M acridis, R.C. (ed.), Foreign Policy in W orld Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N .J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958), p. 307. Turkish reactions to Soviet pressures are also described in Kilic, ibid., pp. 116-133.

16. H arris, G.S., Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971 _ A EI-Hoover Policy Studies, No. 2, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Reasearch, 1972), pp. 17-18.

17 Golan, op_ciL, p. 32.

F o r example, Churchill made no remarks about Turkey in his talks w ith Stalin in M oscow in 1945, whereas he specifically told to him that G reece w as in the UK's sphere o f interest. See Churchill, W., The Second W orld W ar. (London, Toronto, M elbourne, Sydney, Wellington: Cassel & Co. Ltd., 1954), Vol. VI, pp. 198-199, 204 and 2 1 1 .

19. H ow ard, H ., The Problem o f the Turkish Straits. D epartm ent o f State Publication N o.2752, N ear Eastern Series N o.5, (Washington: U SA Government Printing Office,

1947), p.’ 47.

2 0 . In January 1946, Truman warned Secratary o f State James F. Byrnes in his m em orandum that there was "no doubt that the Soviets intend to attack Turkey . Q uoted by Harris, op.cit.. p. 19 from Truman, H.S.,

Memories,

V ol.

—

1;

Years

o f Decision (G arden City, 1955), p. 522.

2 V Ibid.

22 F o r the Soviet N ote See Hurewitz, op^tiL , vol. II, pp.268-271. 2 3 . Golan, o px iL , p. 33.

2 4 . Y app, op cit.. p. 395; Harris, opjciL, p. 22.

2 5 . See Harris, opjiiL; and VaU, F., Bridge Across the Bosporus; The Foreign PDlicy

o f Turkey. (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971). They put the American and British diplomatic support back to early 1946 and even late 1945.

26 See for example, Avcioglu, D., Turkiyenin Duzeni (Social Order o f Turkey),(Ankara, 1969), and Ataov, T., Amerika, NATO ve Turkiye, (Ankara: SBF Yayinlari, 1969).

27

'• Y a PP> GfLciL, P- 396. H e seems to give more credit to the loss o f Soviet will to follow her claims up. H e argues that if the Soviet Union had chosen to use force, she could have succeeded since there was "no pow er could or would have resisted Soviet force in that region", for Britain had no strength to resist and the United States did ever give "unequivocal support" to Turkey.

2 8 . Harris, op.cit., pp. 25-28. 29

B. Lew is emphasized the importance o f Turkey's long experience in the liberal and constitutional movement and general change in the climate o f opinion in Turkey during the Second W orld W ar, and dismissed the idea that the rulers o f Turkey changed the form o f governm ent merely to please foreign states. See his The Em ergence o f M odem

Turkey, (London, N ew York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 306-309. 30

. T hough Inonu always resisted such implications that foreign pressure was instrum ental in his decision, this was quite evident in that Inonu instructed his delegation to the United N ations conference in San Francisco to announce Turkey's transition to a multi-party system. See Harris, op.cit., p. 16. R ustow further quotes an anecdote from his interview with Inonu in 1954 in which Inonu, after categorically denying any organic relations between foreign pressure and his decision, remarked "...suppose I had been swimming with the stream; that, too, is a virtue". See Rustow, D .A ., "Turkey's Travails", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 58, Fall 1979, p. 87.

31. See Karpat, K.H., Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a M ulti-Party System (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 188-192; and Tamkoc, M., The W arrior Diplomats: Guardians o f the National Security and M odernization o f Turkey (Salt Lake City: University o f U tah Press, 1976), p. 225.

32 Hale, W ., The Political and E conomic Development o f M odem Turkey (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 74 quoted from Lingemann, E.R., Turkey: Econom ic and Commercial Conditions in Turkey (London: HMSO, 1948), p. 159.

3 3 .The first Turkish attem pt to obtain an international loan w as the request from Export-Im port B ank credit o f $500 million in O ctober 1945, o f which Turkey subsequently received only $25-50 million in O ctober 1946 with

4%

interest. See

QTDP, p. 12.

3^. I b i d pp. 439-447; and Harris, op. cit., pp. 25-28.

3^. U nited States General Accounting Office, United States Econom ic Assistance to Turkey, (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 55.

36. F or economic policies o f M enderes Government and their impacts on Turkey see B ar an, T., "External Financing o f the Turkish Econom y and its Foreign Policy Implications" in K arpat, K., (ed.), Turkey's Fordg a P.Qlicy in lT a nsition (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), p p.2 1 1-213; Keyder, C., State and Class in Turkey (London, N ew York: Verso, 1987), pp.127-130; and Harris, op. cit., pp.31-35,71-76.

37 F o r the background and impact o f the 1958 stabilization program see Harris, ihidL, pp.74-76.

38. F o r the statements o f D P leaders see Ulman, A.H. & Sander, O,, "Turk Dis Politikasina Y on Veren Etkenler(1923-1968)-II", (Factors Influencing TFP.-II), Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi. Vol. 27(1), 1972, p. 6 .

39 K arpat, K., "Turkish-Soviet Relations", in his (ed.), pp. 83-84.

40 Text in the C urrent D igest o f the Soviet Press, 1953, V. 5, No. 29, pp. 21-22. For an analysis o f Soviet note and Turkish respond see Vali, F., Turkish Straits and N A T O , (Stanford,California: H oover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 77-78.

4 ^. F o r statem ents from President Bayar and other Turkish leaders on Soviet efforts see O T D P- pp. 311-313.

4 ^. H arris, G.S., "The Soviet Union and Turkey", in Lederer, I.J., & Vucinich, W .S., (eds.), The Soviet U nion and The M iddle East (Stanford: H oover Institution Press,

1974), pp. 35-43.

4 3 . K arpat, "Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations"in his (ed.) Foreign Policy in

Transition, p. 114.

44 IhifL, pp. 115-116; QTDE, pp. 255-261.

4 5 . K arpat, Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations, pp. 114-115. 46 Ibid.

4 7 . Aykan, M .B., Ideology and National Interest In Turkish Foreign Policy Tow ard The M uslim World, 1960-1987. PhD Thesis, University o f Virginia, 1988, p. 62.

48 Q TDP, pp. 273-276.

4 9 . Turkish Foreign M inister's speech at B andung,quoted in ihisL, p. 274.

50 Ahmad, F., The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975 (Boulder, Colorado: W estview Press, 1977), p. 396.

Foreign policy philosophy o f DP leaders summarized by Ulman/Sander, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

See Prem ier M enderes' statement shortly after the Bandung Conference, quoted in O TDP. p. 276.

53. Q uoted in Ahmad, op. cit, p. 409. See also, Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 158. 54 F or a discussion o f the reasons for the coup and the period o f military rule, see K arpat, K., Social Change and Politics in Turkey (Leiden; E.J. Brill, 1973), pp. 227- 262, and W eiker, W.F., The Turkish Revolution. 1960-1961 (Broookings Institution,

1963).

55. In fact, in its first communique, the military junta emphasized that the new regime w ould honor Turkey's foreign policy commitments and expressed its believe in NATO and CENTO. See, Resmi G azete. July 30, 1960, quoted in Ahmad, op. £iL, p. 399. 56 As a result o f this drive, for the first time in history Turkey voted w ith the Afro- Asian bloc in the United N ations on the issue o f Algerian independence.

57 K arpat, K., "The Military and Politics In Turkey, 1960-1964", American Historical Review, Vol. 75 (6), O ctober 1970, p. 1667.

58 The decision itself w as taken by a small group, consisting o f President Bayar, the Prim e M imister, the Chief o f Staff, the Commander o f the Army, and M enderes had consulted neither the opposition nor the Turkish Grand National Assembly, w here he enjoyed overwhelming majority. In fact, he informed the TG N A and to o k necessary mandate from it only after Turkish troops dispached to Korea. See Ahmad, op. cit ,, pp.

390-391.

59. Nftw Y nrk Times. M arch 6, 1959, cited in Ulman,. A.H., & Dekmejian, R.H., "Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1959-1967", Qrhis, Vol. X I (3), Fall 1967, pp. 773-774; Ahmad, ihiiL, p. 399.

. This view was expressed by Bulent Ecevit, a spokesman for the RPP, who pointed out the important resemblance between the agreement and 1958 American intervention in Lebanon, which was based on President Chamoun's invitation on the face o f internal opposition. For actual speech see Cumhuriyet, 6 February 1960, cited in Ulman/Dekmejian, ib id , p. 774.

^ ^. Ulman/Dekmejian further speculate about proximity o f the military coup o f May 27, 1960 that ousted Menderes regime and the ratification o f the aggrement by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on May 14, 1960. See ib id , p. 773.

62

. For affects o f the 1960 Military Coup and new constitution on subsequent Turkish politics, and for political developments during the 1960s and early 1970s see Ahmad,

OP- Cit , pp. 147-389, Karpat, Social Change and Politics in Turkey; Hale, W. M. (ed.),

Aspects_of M odem Turkey (London: Bowker, 1976); Ellis, E.D., "Post-Revolutionary Politics in Turkey", Current History, April 1962.

Between 1961 and 1980, only one party, Justice Party o f Suleyman Demirel, formed a majority government, first in 1965 and then in 1969. All other times, however, Turkey governed by either coalition or minority governments, except military-supported above-party governments after both 1960 and 1971 interventions.

In Western constitutional thinking it would have been obscure to write fundamental rights down in the constitution since they are attached to human existence. In Turkish tradition, however, there seem to be an "unwritten custom" to suppose that all the things - rights etc. - which are not specifically mentioned in the law are forbidden or its lawfullnes is, at least, in question.

On the Turkish Left, see Tachau, F. & Ulman H.A. "Dilemmas o f Turkish Politics", The Turkish Yearbook o f International Relations, Vol. 3, 1962; Karpat, K.H., "Socialism and the Labor Party o f Turkey", The Middle East Journal, April 1967; Samim, A., "The Tragedy o f The Turkish Left", N ew Left Review, No. 126, March-April 1981; Lipovsky, I., "The Legal Socialist Parties o f Turkey, 1960-1980", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27 (1), January 1991; and Avcioglu, op. cit,

See Ahmad, op. cit., p. 190; and Barchard D., "The Intellectual Background to Radical Protest in Turkey in the 1960s" in Hale, Aspects o f M odem Turkey, pp. 30- 31.

67 Both sides in the conflict were deeply divided. On the right the ultra-nationalistic "Grey Wolves" were challenged by the Islamic ideology o f the "Akincilar". On the left, a multiplicity o f groups all broadly adhering to Soviet Marxism faced pierce attacts from extremely radical Maoist groups. For an account o f extreme radical groups in

Turkey see Yayla, A., "Terrorism in Turkey", Turkish-Yearbook of International

Relations, Vol. 10, Summer 1982, pp. 65-82; also Munir, M., "Turkey's Student

Uprising; The Deeper Implications", The Middle East, April 1977.

68. In April 1978 riots in the southeastern town o f Maras turned into an armed

In document La gubernamentalidad de la infancia en riesgo en México : 1977-2010 (página 158-164)