Deng’s governance was characterised by his focus on development. Unlike Mao, Deng did not envision an immediate war (F. Zhong 2015, 121). He believed that the most urgent crisis that the CCP was facing was not a physical war, but a legitimacy crisis caused by economic backwardness. This means that Deng was relatively less radical in terms of identifying and eliminating the “enemies”. Instead, he was more concerned with economic development which gives legitimacy to the CCP. The class struggle as an ideological concept of the Mao era is officially over (Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova 2018), but the friend/enemy distinction based on class remains, as exemplified by Deng’s crackdown ofnbourgeois liberalists.
As underdevelopment was considered to be a more urgent security threat, Deng shifted the security paradigm from “war and revolution” to “peace and development” (Jianhui Liu 1995, 74). This transition can be clearly seen through the shifting focus of the CCP’s national strategy and its attempts to redefine the relationship with other countries. In a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Eduard Shevardnadze, Deng said that in order to create a peaceful international environment to enable development, China must improve its relations with some important
countries (Party Literature Research Center of the CPC Central Committee 1998, 419). Beginning in 1978, together with the reform and opening-up policy, the CCP
committed to focusing on economic development and modernisation without
producing a new bourgeoisie (Deng 1993a). The following 12th Congress that followed in 1982 is seen as a historic turn of the CCP to turn towards economic development
(CPC News n.d.). In a speech in 1987, Deng (1993b, 232) confirmed the “correctness” of the focus on to economic development.
The shift from “revolution” to “development” under Deng laid the foundation for the understanding of security centred on development. Zhong Feiteng (2015, 105) calls it a “developmental approach to security”, which entails several premises. 38
First, development is at the core of Deng’s theories on governance. Economic
development, according to Deng (1993c, 3), is the “foundation to solve international and domestic problems”. Because it provides solutions for political problems,
“development is not only an economic issue, in fact, it is a political issue“ (Deng 1993c, 354).
Second, development is the source of legitimacy. Deng acknowledged that the legitimacy of the CCP not only comes from “thought work”, but also the speed of economic growth. His slogan “development is the absolute principle” reflects his approach to security, which focuses on economic development (Cheng and Li 2000; D. Li 2000).39 The key to surviving under hegemonism “is whether we could achieve our
developmental strategy by gaining rapid economic growth” (Deng 1993c, 356). Learning lessons from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Revolutions of 1989, Deng (1993c, 345) further affirmed the centrality of development: “the
problems took place in some of the countries in the world, in essence, are caused by economic backwardness…why do the people support us? It is very clear that it is because of the development in the recent decade”.
Third, development is the primary task for the CCP. National defence should be subordinated in favour of economic development (F. Zhong 2015, 117) (Deng 1993c, 355–56). The purpose of national defence is to serve the “overall situation” of economic construction (Deng 1993c, 99). 40
Fourth, to allow China to develop, the CCP must make peace with the international community. “To concentrate on domestic construction, China needs at least twenty years of peace” (Deng 1993c, 50). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Deng made great efforts to ease the tensions and normalise the relations between China and the Soviet Union and improved relations with neighbouring countries (J. Tang 2011). Deng played an important role in toning down the friend/enemy distinction that had been hyped during the Mao era and made efforts to avoid war (J. Tang 2011). He was optimistic about the prospect of long-term peace. “We must not scare ourselves and
38 A researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 39 development is the absolute principle: 发展才是硬道理 40 overall situation: 大局
deliberately cause tensions. If we always emphasise that a war is about to occur immediately, and devote all our energy to the war, then it will affect the Four Modernisations”. 41
Deng’s developmental approach to security is essential to understanding the CCP’s rationale for dealing with the alleged terrorist threat in Xinjiang. Political elites (C. Zhang 2015) consider development the “foundation and key to solving all the problems“ in Xinjiang. However, the oversimplification of the causes and the
subsequent solutions to the political unrest in Xinjiang resulted in some controversial policies, which have had mixed consequences for ethnic relations. On the one hand, actual improvements in wellbeing prevent those who have benefited from
development policies from resorting to violence. On the other hand, some well- intended policies may result in entrenching existing ethnic divisions due to the assimilationist assumptions embedded in China’s political context.
Although Deng disagreed with Mao and shifted the focus of the CCP from revolution to development, he did not deny Mao’s assumptions about the enemy. He agreed with Mao on the existence of ideological enemies and their intentions to undermine the foundation of the legitimacy of the CCP by peaceful means. Although Deng emphasised democracy, as opposed to Mao’s focus on centralism, he agreed with Mao that China should never follow the Western model of democracy which represents the capitalist class (K. Yu 2002, 184). His concerns about the peaceful evolution of the West against China can be seen from the following quote.
America, and some other countries in the West is carrying out peaceful evolution against socialist countries. Now there is a proposal in America: to fight a war without gunpowder. We must remain vigilant. Capitalism wants to defeat socialism eventually. In the past, it uses weapons such as the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb, which was opposed by the people of the entire world. Now they are carrying out peaceful evolution (Deng 1993c, 325–26).
Deng developed Mao’s idea of enemy by focusing on a domestic tendency of bourgeois liberalisation. The term “bourgeois liberalists” refers to those who were influenced by the West through peaceful evolution. Deng considered their call to democratise China as being influenced and supported by the US. For example, the Tian’anmen Square protest in 1989 was considered the result of the all-round US hegemony in the political, economic, cultural and ideological realms (Z. Liang 2014, 23). Deng worried that these people would take advantage of the economic reform
41 The Four Modernisations were national strategy set forth by Deng Xiaping to encourage the modernisation in four areas – agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology.
that started in 1978 and gradually turn China into a Western capitalist society that is subordinated to the West (Z. Liang 2014, 23). To Deng (1989, 1993c, 207), the real aim of the rebels who participated in the Tian’anmen Square protest was not anti-
corruption as they claimed, but to “subvert our country and our party… they have two slogans, one is to bring down the Communist Party, the other is to overthrow the socialist system”. He stated that their goal was to “establish a capitalist republic that is subordinated to the West” (Deng 1989, 1993c, 207).
Deng was cautious about labelling the protesters. Whereas he maintained a hard-line attitude towards anti-government activists, he was also trying to win over some of the students by showing some tolerance. He (1993d, 327) clarified that those who had participated in the hunger strikes and demonstrations and signed petitions were not to blame. Only those leaders who had “ulterior motives” and violated the law should be investigated (Deng 1993d, 327).
For those who participated in the protest and signed the petition, including overseas student, we adopt a forgiving attitude and do not call them to account. We gave necessary punishment to only a few people who had the ambition and attempt to subvert the Chinese government. We cannot tolerate turbulence… I am not talking about Western
governments, but at least some people in the West are seeking to subvert socialism in China. (Deng 1993c, 331)
The above quote conflicts with other speeches and writings by Deng in that he
avoided attributing the blame directly to “Western governments”. This quote is taken from the transcript of Deng’s meeting with Richard Nixon. He put the blame on the media, especially the Voice of America, for lying about the Tian’anmen Square protest (Deng 1993c, 331). This reflects Deng’s insistence on improving China’s relations with other countries, and shows that he did not want to risk a deterioration in Sino-US relations, which were vulnerable at the time.
The tactic of attributing the blame to only a small number of people who have “ulterior motives” is also seen frequently in today’s political discourse, as is evident from the customary use of the phrase “the masses who are ignorant of the truth” to avoid antagonising the majority of those who participate in large-scale
demonstrations.42 As Chapter 6 will demonstrate, the state media used the same
tactic to portray the Uyghurs who fled China as victims who were deceived by real terrorists.
The shift towards a market economy undermined the socialist ideology that Mao committed to adhering to. Worrying that the confusion in the ideological realm would
result in instability, Deng stated that “stability overrides everything” (1993c, 284–87). He was concerned that adopting the Western democracy would plunge China into chaos and result in a “full-scale civil war” (1993c, 285). The following quote explains his rejection of adopting Western democracy characterised by multi-party elections.
China must not allow demonstration at will. If people demonstrate for 365 days a year, then nothing can be done, foreign investment will not come into China…We must make it clear to domestic and foreign audiences that strengthening control is for the purpose of stability, it is for better reform and opening-up and making ways for modernisation. (Deng 1993c, 287) Deng’s idea of stability maintenance remains a central theme of China’s political discourse, particularly in Xinjiang. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, political elites have created a number of slogans that extend the scope of stability maintenance to every aspect of life. The chapter will show how the theme of stability maintenance
securitised a number of ethnic issues, such as marriages and divorces, halal food, and wearing full-face veil.