Recent years have seen a resurgence of the discussion over ideology infiltration, which underpins the friend/enemy distinction in the current counter-terrorism discourse. Since the economic reform, the theme of development and modernisation has toned down the confrontation between different ideologies, and the boundary between capitalism and socialism has been blurred. Xi’s governance marks a return to the primacy of politics after years of focus on economic performance (Brown and Bērziņa- Čerenkova 2018). Economic slow-down, accompanied by other issues such as
corruption and pollution, has forced political elites and intellectuals to re-emphasise the concept of the enemy. Ren Jie (2012), a researcher at the Marxism Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that Western hostile forces have not given up their cultural infiltration and are seeking to undermine communism by means of “cultural propaganda”. He identifies a number of new enemies - neo-liberalism, liberal democracy, and historical nihilism – that distort and defame historical figures and leaders in Party history and pose threats to people’s identification with the mainstream authoritative ideology.
Since the re-emphasis of ideology during the Hu Jintao era, as Holbig (2013, 2009) observes, Xi Jinping has further consolidated the importance of ideology. On 18 August 2013, not long after he took over the administration, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the National Conference on Propaganda and Ideological Work, in which he re-emphasised the importance of ideology after focusing on economic development for almost four decades. According to Xi, “ideology work is extremely important” (Jingyue Xu and Hua 2013). “It is essential to the future and fate of the CCP, long-term security of the state, national solidarity and cohesiveness” (CPC News 2013b). By linking ideology with core national interests, Xi prioritised the “ideology work” in China’s security agenda. Associating ideology with security, he has established a regime of truth that dismisses alternative ideas as “wrong”. This way of framing is
evident from his proposal to “help the cadres and the masses to distinguish between right and wrong and clarify vague understanding” (CPC News 2013a).
Under Xi, “Western” values are less tolerated due to their potential to lead to
democratisation in a way that might threaten the legitimacy of the CCP. Those values are identified as “wrong”. The CCP is acutely aware of the risks posed by Western values, particularly in an era when China is exposed to various intensified social contradictions, and the Chinese people are exposed to various ideologies via the internet (Commentator of People’s Daily 2013b). In this context, the CCP considers it necessary to “firmly grasp the leadership, management and the discourse of ideology work” (Commentator of People’s Daily 2013b). The CCP frames Marxism, communism and socialism as the “correct direction of ideology”. The emphasis on distinguishing between the “correct” and “wrong” ideologies make it possible to group those who follow the “wrong” ideology as the enemies.
In the context of the concentration of personal power, Xi’s speech has led to a nation- wide political movement to re-focus on ideological work. His speech has been
repeatedly studied and cited by Chinese officials and intellectuals and disseminated to all levels of government. The following quote by Lu Yan, a lecturer at Shandong
Provincial Party Committee, indicates a full alignment of intellectuals with the framing of the threat by the CCP.
The collapse of a regime usually starts from the realm of ideology. Political instability and regime change can happen overnight, but the evolution of ideas is a long-term process, which needs our special attention to prevent. Once the defence of ideas is breached, other defence will hardly hold up (Yan Lu 2016).
Academics joined Xi Jinping in identifying the ideological enemy. Zhang Guozuo (2015, 1) relies on the Marxist assumption of ideology as the superstructure of society. According to his interpretation of this assumption, an economic base is an objective reality; therefore, the ideology determined by the economic base is also an objective reality. He (2015, 1) warns against the “ideological warfare” waged by “some Western political forces” who
flaunt Western values, subvert traditional ideological system, demonise the history and current situation of some authorities, confuse right and wrong, provoke ideological disputes, upset social psychological balance, to achieve the ultimate goal of creating political turmoil in order to subvert the regimes they dislike or the regimes they conceive as political rival of their own.
negate China’s development model and development path, advocate to capitalise China, make judgements based on Western criteria, fight China’s ideology with Western ideology, replace China’s regime with a Western regime, deny the revolution history and the regime legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.
Similarly, Zhang’s (2015, 1) definition of the “wrong social ideologies and views” covers a wide range of alternative interpretations of history and politics. He identifies those who “advocate extreme ‘democracy’ and absolute ‘freedom’” as ideological enemies, which is particularly relevant to China’s counter-terrorism discourse. Articles on the state media demonstrate that Chinese political elites and intellectuals consider many human rights activists as ideological enemies because of their criticism based on the Western model of democracy and freedom (see for example Pang 2016; Chen 2016; Pang 2015; Xinhua 2012).
It can be seen from the above academic interpretations of ideological enemies that Xi’s focus on ideology has entrenched the existing friend/enemy distinction between China and the “West”. The concept of the enemy has been broadened to include various kinds of dissent. In doing so, academics have reproduced the morality that the CCP has created based on the assumption of the threat to the regime. They have reinforced the necessity of maintaining legitimacy through ideological means (A. Tang 2016).
The re-emphasis of ideological enemies under Xi is framed differently. As China grows into an important actor in the international community, the CCP has begun to adjust its language when framing the enemy to cater for the international audience. Li Zhiguo (2013) observes that the theoretical framework has been preserved by using the words of “the masses”, “contradiction”, “struggle”, and “hard work”, while the notion of the enemy has been de-emphasised. According to an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the translation of official documents has been adjusted deliberately to tone down the discourse of ideology for a foreign audience (Zhiguo Li 2013).44
However, although political elites avoid directly using the language of Mao and Deng, their assumptions regarding the intentions of the enemy remain fundamental to the policies on ideological security. These assumptions enables Xi to further require the loyalty of the Party media – the “Party media must use the Party as its surname” (People’s Daily Online Forum 2016). 45 Based on the assumption of Western discourse
hegemony, Xi considers it necessary to have China’s own discourse power, as is
44 the masses: 群众; contradiction: 矛盾; struggle: 斗争; hard work: 奋斗 45 Party media must use the Party as its surname: 党媒必须姓党
evident from his report at the 19th National Congress in 2017 (Y. Long 2017).46 He
proposed to improve the competitiveness of China’s discourse so that it tells convincing “Chinese stories” (Jingyue Xu and Hua 2013).
By controlling the state media, the CCP promotes the “correct” ideology and China’s security discourse to counter-balance the dominance of the Western security discourse in the international community (A. Tang 2016). Xi inherited Deng’s ethos that “stability overrides everything”, prioritising social stability and long-term peace as the “overall goal of Xinjiang work” (Xinhua 2014a). He frames solidarity and stability as a “blessing”, and separation and turmoil as a “curse” (Research Centre on the
theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 2017).47 The Party media frames the minzu regional autonomy
policy as a perfect policy. The following quote from Xinjiang Daily, the Party media of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, shows how the Party media demonstrates loyalty by uncritically praising China’s ethnic policy.
[minzu regional autonomy policy is] a perfectly correct good system that respects history, suits national conditions, complies with the aspirations of the people, which realised the fundamental interests of all ethnic groups and gained sincere support from all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. (Xinjiang
Daily 2015b)
Emphasising that such a perfect policy must be adhered to and implemented “without any hesitation” (Xinjiang Daily 2015b), the Party media contributes to the monopoly of the CCP in the security discourse in China, further marginalising alternative
narratives from the Uyghur community. The Party media wrote the “correct” version of the history of Xinjiang, which assumes that “Xinjiang is an integral part of Chinese territory” (People’s Daily Online 2017a), rendering all those who challenge this assumption “wrong”. This categorisation precludes alternative interpretations of Xinjiang history in China, as the CCP endeavours to “eliminate the influence of the wrong ideas in the aspects of history, culture, ethnicity and religion” (People’s Daily
Online 2017a).