Some of Mao’s views of security seem to have faded away with time, and no longer frequently appear in the current political discourse, but in essence, they remain the foundation upon which the current security discourse is constructed. Some ideas have been internalised and the users of the narratives are aligned with Mao’s underlying assumption without being fully conscious of such an alignment. This section focuses on Mao’s idea of “peaceful evolution”, which still influences China’s behaviour as an international actor (Gong 1994, 268–70).
34 five black categories: 黑五类
Formulated by United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at the onset of the Cold War in the 1950s, peaceful evolution entails a series of peaceful tactics to weaken the Sino-Soviet bloc and undermine socialism (Ong 2007, 717–18). Since the Mao era, peaceful evolution has been considered a major threat to the regime (Z. Wu 2012). After the Second World War, the conflict in the ideological sphere intensified as the Soviet Union and the US sought to expand communism and capitalism.
Mao’s anxiety about peaceful evolution can be traced back to the time when John Foster Dulles was encouraged by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Sino- Soviet split of the 1960s (Z. Liang 1992, 2). Mao’s speech at a small conference in Hangzhou in November 1959 reflected his concern that the US would not give up its plan to expand capitalism, but instead, it has turned to peaceful means to convert socialists into capitalists (L. He, Yao, and Xiao 1995, 10). On 8 August 1966, the 8th
Central Committee passed the Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP
Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which quoted Mao’s comment
from the 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee that addressed the
importance of ideology in peacefully winning over the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. Mao believed that it is a general rule that in order to overthrow a political power, it is necessary to start from the ideological sphere, and manipulate public opinion (Central Committee 1966). To resist this ideological threat, Mao emphasised the importance of adhering to Marxism (P. Wang 2006, 13). Mao’s perception of an ideological threat is closely relevant to the ideological control under the current leadership. The anxiety about the impact of “Western values” on the legitimacy of the CCP has resulted in a cascade of criticism of them (S. Li 2009; Wenlin Tian 2017; J. Dong 2012; J. Guo 2012; S. Ling, Hu, and Chen 2017).
Peaceful evolution is the linchpin of how Chinese political elites and intellectuals understand Sino-Western relations. In the context of the ideological conflict between communist China and the capitalist West, “terrorism” is understood as an extreme manifestation and the legacy of the confrontation in the Cold War. During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the US pursued a hegemonic expansionist policy, supporting the opposing sides and engaging in a proxy war (Mastanduno 1997; Hong Zhang 2004, 19). The US was accused of supporting the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and anti-Socialist movements that used terrorism as a tactic (J. Sun 2010, 6–8; Hong Zhang 2004, 10). The numerous attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro are considered as an example of the US’ engagement in terrorist attacks against communist countries (Sen Yang and Hu 1990). On the other hand, the Soviet Union was also accused of supporting left-wing terrorism in West Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southern Africa (Hong Zhang 2004, 19).
Chinese scholars see terrorism in the post-Cold War era as a continuation of the ideological confrontation in the Cold War (S. Wang and Hu 1998b, 31). Wang and Hu attribute terrorism to the changing world order and the ensuing instability. In
particular, they blame the US’ involvement in the Revolutions of 1989 and its military intervention to promote democracy, linking them with regime instability, unrest and civil war in some Third World countries (S. Wang and Hu 1998a, 63). The expansion of democracy, the enlargement of the NATO towards the East, as well as the plans to transform the Middle East have convinced Chinese scholars and officials that China will be the next target of the “colour revolution” (Jianming Huang 2013, 126; H. Dong 2001, 1; Aimin Li 2015, 59; 61), as the collapse of the Soviet Union has left China as the biggest Socialist country (Y. Gu 2009, 304), inviting the “end-game of the historic capitalist-communist struggle” (G. Wang 2014, 217).
In this context, Chinese scholars believe that Islamic fundamentalism is a ramification of the tensions in Islamic societies that resulted from Western expansion in the form of direct or indirect interventions accompanied by the output of Western cultural values (Gou, Xiao, and Shen 2014, 239). The US’ failure to prove the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq undermined the credibility of its counter- terrorism agenda (M. Yu et al. 2003, 133), and convinced Chinese scholars of the hegemonic nature of its War on Terror (M. Yu et al. 2003, 133).
Mao’s argument about friends and enemies is at the core of China’s quest for legitimacy. He differentiates between two types of social contradictions: the “contradictions among the people”, which is in essence are the contradictions with friends, which should be dealt using soft measures, such as education and persuasion; and the “contradictions between ourselves and the enemy”, which are essentially irreconcilable, and should be treated with more radical measures such as deprivation of political rights and coercion (Z. Mao 1957, 1949).36 Those who were deemed “one
of us” (people) would have democratic rights, whereas those who were deemed the “enemy” would be the object of dictatorship (K. Yu 2002, 182).
We have always advocated adopting two different methods – dictatorship and democracy – to solve different types of contradictions… Against our enemies, we should adopt methods of dictatorship, meaning when necessary, depriving them of political participation, forcing them to obey the law of the people’s government, forcing them to engage in labour work, and transforming them into a new person through labour. On the contrary, as for the people, [we should] use democratic methods… do not
36 contradictions among the people: 人民内部矛盾; contradictions between ourselves and the enemy: 敌我矛盾
coerce them to do this or that, but educate and persuade them using democratic methods (Z. Mao 1957).
Mao’s categorisation of friends and enemies is particularly problematic in the context of his black-and-white view of Imperialism and Socialism. In a time when the
ideological conflict was intensifying, he considered it necessary to choose sides between imperialism and socialism (Z. Mao 1949). “There is no third way” (Z. Mao 1949). The radical friend/enemy distinction underwrites other writings by Mao himself and his followers.
Mao (1957) admitted that it is very easy to mistake good people for bad, and it is the very policy of drawing a sharp line between ourselves and the enemy that helps rectify mistakes from the past. He realised the risks of “making mistakes” by labelling someone as an enemy; however, he insisted giving excessive power to those who are making the decision of who is the enemy. Although he did emphasise the importance of making the correct decision and rectifying the mistakes of the past, he did not specify the criteria for making these decisions. The decisions regarding “who is our enemy” justify the use of extraordinary measures against the designated enemies. Combining the label “hostile forces” and “contradictions” and two types of
contradictions, the official counter-terrorism discourse attributes right and wrong, links attacks to the broader ideological conflict between China and the West, and justifies extraordinary measures against the designated enemy. After several terrorist attacks in Xinjiang in 2013, Ismail Tiliwaldi, former vice-chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, made the following statement on the nature of the attacks.
Several consecutive violent terrorist attacks took place in Xinjiang once again revealed the insidious nature of the violent terrorists – they split the country, endanger the society, kill innocent people, and plan crimes. Once again, they proved that domestic colluded with foreign hostile forces colluded. They never gave up their intentions to put China into demise or turmoil. They do everything they can to cause trouble and stir up unrest. Once again, the attacks show that violent terrorism challenges the common bottom line of human civilisation, and endangers the common order of human society. Our struggle with the violent terrorist forces is by no means a contradiction among the people, but an irreconcilable life-and- death contradiction between ourselves and the enemy. It is by no means a question of ethnicity or religion, but a serious political struggle between separatism and anti-separatism, between infiltration and anti-infiltration, between subversion and anti-subversion (Tianshanwang 2013).
A commentary on the Huanqiu clearly demonstrates how individuals aligned with the CCP frame the problem of “terrorism” as a “contradictions between ourselves and the enemy”. 37 The writer calls for more decisive actions against China’s ”enemies”, and
bluntly encourages the CCP to learn from “our old opponent America”, and to “blast off” “hostile forces” and the organisations protected by anti-Communist governments or those governments that are hesitant to disavow “terrorism” (X. Gao 2014). “It is time to ask the entire world to declare their position, you are either with us, or against us!” (X. Gao 2014). The second half of this sentence is a direct quote from the English version of Bush’s speech on terrorism, indicating the applause for the US’ resolute crackdown on the supporters of terrorism abroad. This shows how the friend/enemy distinction underpins the antagonism that encourages hard approach.
4.2.2 Deng Xiaoping: developmental approach to security and bourgeois