FORMATO DEL PAQUETE IP
Ejercicio 4-2: Completar la Configuración de Red
Rarely in history has an old regime ruled like an
"unregenerate tyranny", completely disregarding the need for reform and social adjustment and thus finally collapsing at the end of its rule in a climax of "despotic indifference" to the agitation and demands of the discontented populace.^ In nearly every society where revolution has occurred, the
ruling class, in order to palliate popular disaffection, has introduced changes and reforms before it was overthrown. Reforms usually precipitate revolution because they are either too little and too late or because the people doubt the government's sincerity, thus further discrediting it. Such reforms add to the growing tension in society by the new forces they set in motion, and lead to revolutions when
fundamental social developments occur in the class structure as well as in the economy and the system of values. The
paradox, as one author poses it, is that measures designed to
2
restore equilibrium always upset it in the end.
The Chinese Revolution of 1911 occurred in a decade of reform, not stagnation. For since the turn of the century, far-sighted officials had been pressing for reforms, and the imperial government, though acting slowly, did initiate a
3 series of reforms to change various aspects of society. 1
Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York, 1956), p . 40.
2
Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution", World Politics, XVIII, 2 (January 1966), 165.
3
There is a vast literature on this subject. A
comprehensive account is Cameron, The Reform Movement in
China. Other works include, for example, Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912; Chu, Reformer in Modern China; Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization; and various Chinese books listed in the bibliography.
These reforms led to changes in almost every facet of Chinese life, and the impact was deeply felt in places where
government officials were men of progressive tendencies,
genuinely and actively concerned with promoting the interests of the country.
The previous chapter has described the various reforms instituted in Hupeh's social and economic life, and it has also noted that these changes contributed to making modern Hupeh a progressive province. What has not been described is the important change in the province's military
establishment. This chapter is therefore designed to give special treatment to Hupeh's military reforms, the
significance of which can be seen in the fact that they created the forces which eventually unseated the reigning dynas t y .
Since the process of military reform, particularly under Yüan Shih-k'ai, has been well studied,'*' it is not intended here to retrace it. Instead, this chapter emphasizes the developments in Hupeh, the nature of the new-style troops, their social composition and their relationships with other social groups. Above all, it examines the crucial factors which contributed to the infiltration and subversion of the army and its receptivity to revolutionary ideas.
I
The earliest troops which brought the Manchus to power 2
were the Eight-Banner troops (P a - c h 'i-ping) . After
capturing Peking, they were mainly stationed at the capital and other strategic points in Chihli, while the remainder were distributed throughout most of the provinces, with strong contingents in Manchuria to defend the "ancestral
1
See Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895- 1912,, 2
This sketch of the military forces of the dynasty before 1895 is based on Powell, chapter I.
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land". Shortly after establishing itself, the dynasty created an auxiliary force called the Army of the Green Standard (Lü-ying) to help preserve order in the provinces, and it became the instrument which the Manchus used to
control the Chinese. When the bannermen began to decline and lost their fighting power in the eighteenth century, the Army of the Green Standard became the basic military force of the dynasty. However, this force also deteriorated subsequently, and was challenged by the Miao tribes and the White Lotus Sect in the 1810's. Three decades later, it proved impotent against a foreign foe in the Opium War (1839-1842). Even in dealing with internal revolts, its weakness was reflected in the Taiping Rebellion which probably could not have been crushed without the assistance of semi-private local militia like the Hunan Army (Hsiang- chiin) of Tseng Kuo-fan.
After the Rebellion, there were attempts to strengthen national defence by using Western arms and Western methods. The s e 1f-strengthening movement of the T'ung-chih reign
(1862-1874) saw the adoption of Western technology, the
training of officers abroad, and the establishment of military schools and arsenals. Yet the attempts to modernize the
Chinese army were in a large measure impeded by deep-seated conservatism and vested interests. It was not until after the war with Japan that a real effort was made.
China's ignominious defeat in 1894-95 was not merely a national humiliation but also an exposure of her helplessness to the powers. It was a lesson to China what a modernized army could accomplish. The Chinese leaders now reacted quickly, convinced that it was imperative to reorganize and train troops on Western lines if China was to become capable of resisting external aggression. The imperial government had become more alive to the needs of the situation.
Consequently, 1895 inaugurated a period of military development, which brought into existence the new-style armies in modern China.
The first new army to be formed in China was the Pacification Army (Ting -wu-chiin) created in 1895 by a