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The best known school in Wuchang was the Civil School for Higher Education (Wen kao-teng hsiieh-t'ang) reconstructed from the former Liang-hu College (Liang-hu shu-ytian). The College was founded in 1890, offering courses in classics, history, science, literature, mathematics and finance. The academic staff members who were distinguished scholars in their own fields, included Yang Jui, one of the "six martyrs" of the Reform Movement of 1898, and Wang K'ang-nien, one of the pioneers of modern Chinese journalism. The students were recruited from Hupeh and Hunan, each having a quota of one hundred recommended by the respective provincial authorities. A further quota of forty was reserved for the sons of the tea merchants who had contributed to its founding. These

students had already obtained hsiu-ts'ai degrees, and had

1

H u-pei t'ung-chih, hsüeh-hsiao-chih, I, 1589-96, gives a list of these schools.

2

Cameron, "The Public Career of Chang Chih-tung, 1837-1909", p .207.

proved their "integrity, diligence, introspection and

superior quality". They resided in a dormitory and each

received three taels a month. Supervision was close and

regulations were strict, since it was envisaged that the students "would some day achieve distinction either as officials or as scholars" . ^

When the College was transformed into a modern school, the students ceased to receive stipends, and it was planned that they were to pursue a general course in the first year, followed by three years of specialized studies and one year

of field work in a foreign country. Apart from classics, the

curriculum consisted of history, geography, mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, law, finance and military

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arts. A good number of revolutionary leaders such as Huang

Hsing were educated there, and, of course, many of the Hupeh

revolutionaries. In 1906 it became the Liang-hu Chief Normal

3 School (Liang-hu t s u n g -s h ih- fan h s U e h - t 'a n g ).

Educational reform in Hupeh had produced two significant

consequences. The first was that it fostered an enlightened

cultural spirit which prevailed throughout the decade before

1911. A fair proportion of local intellectuals, who were

concerned with national development from which the idea of reform stemmed and were influenced by some knowledge of Western ways and institutions, developed radical tendencies and dedicated themselves to the overthrow of the existing

order. Historians who emphasize the role of returned

students in the revolutionary movement tend to overlook the fact that local students were equally nationalistic and equally, if not more, important in organizing local

activities. In Hupeh it was the local intellectuals who

decided to infiltrate the army and showed the way to seize

1

CWHK, kung-tu, 12:16a-19b, HK 17:1:1 (February 9, 1891). 2

C W H K , t s o u - i , 4 7 : 21b-22b, KH 24:reap 3:15 (May 5, 1898); also Chang Chi-hsii, comp., Chang We n-h s i ang - kung chih-Q chi (Taipei, 1966), p.33.

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power from within. The second consequence of educational reform was that the provincial government's liberal attitude towards promoting cultural activities facilitated the setting up of study societies by the revolutionaries. These

societies claimed that their objective was to promote cultural pursuits, but they were in fact used to cover subversive activities.

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This chapter has suggested the strategic importance of Hupeh in the centre of China between North and South, as well

as between the Lower and the Upper Yangtze. It has also indicated that Hupeh was difficult to control from the north and, at the same time, difficult to defend from the Lower Yangtze. Its strategic importance was augmented by the economic role it played in Central China, a role which was sufficient to affect the national economy and trade relations with foreign powers. This situation would be an advantage to the revolutionaries, for if they were able to take possession of the ironworks, the arsenal, the provincial treasury, the

mints and the banks, they would have sufficient war materials and funds to consolidate the new government. In such a case, they could also enhance their bargaining position while

maintaining the revolutionary campaigns until the solid backing of neighbouring provinces was secured.

For more than a decade before 1911, Hupeh had been an enlightened and advanced province by contemporary Chinese standards. The type of modernization that Hupeh experienced was also evident in other provinces in varying degrees. That Hupeh had been able to achieve more was due to the fact that Chang Chih-tung's term as Viceroy of Hu-kuang lasted for eighteen years with only two brief interruptions, thus

enabling him to carry out his policies consistently. In the shaping of modern Hupeh, personal factors played an important part, for Chang took a personal interest in Hupeh and treated

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it as his second native province, ^ He left matters in

Changsha to the governor of Hunan, and spent all his time in Wuchang, where the governor was both theoretically and

practically subordinate to him. This explains why the pattern of development was different in Hupeh and Hunan during the same period.

In Hupeh, reforms and economic projects had been largely promoted by the government, and it was the official

initiative that evoked enthusiasm from the people. Because of Chang Chih-tung's progressive tendencies, Hupeh acquired a progressive character. On the other hand, Hunan emerged as a different province because of the different mentality of the governor. Hunan was renowned for a reform movement in 1897-

2 1898 under the progressive Governor Ch'en Pao-chen. However, Ch'en was succeeded by a line of conservative governors, who were influenced by a powerful gentry. As a result, the Hunanese gentry outdid the government in the initiation- of economic and educational reforms. They took advantage of foreign encroachments to expand their own economic activities, such as mining, railways and

manufacturing. However, due to their mismanagement and

corruption, they had failed to advance the provincial economy to the same extent as in Hupeh. At the same time, they used their wealth and prestige to control educational reforms and took whatever measures seemed necessary to prevent dissident intellectuals from generating unorthodox ideas and to

3

suppress the new student nationalism in the schools. In a 1

Chang Chi-hsti, comp., Chang Wen-hs iang - kung , p „ 8 .

2

Ch'en Pao-chen (1831-1900) was the sponsor of a rejuvenated provincial government, which hoped to make Hunan the

starting-point of a modernized administration in South China. For a general account of the Hunanese reform movement, see Charlton M. Lewis, "The Reform Movement in Hunan (1896-1898)", Papers on China, XV (December 1961), 62-90.

3

See Charlton M. Lewis, "Foreign Encroachment, Reform and Revolution, 1900-1907: The Response of the Hunan Gentry", paper prepared for the 1965 Conference on the Revolution of

1911 sponsored by the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the ACLS and SSRC.

similar way, reform efforts in most other provinces had been somewhat impeded by conservative forces as well as by the short term of office of the respective viceroy or governor.

Chang Chih-tung had been one of the chief props of the faltering imperial regime, and had hoped to perpetuate it by modernizing various aspects of the traditional society.

Chang's efforts led on the contrary to the creation in Hupeh of a situation conducive to the growth of radical ideas. It was against the background of a progressing society that more

radical changes were demanded. Local intellectuals, not the poor peasants or urban workers, provided the leadership for more rapid historical change. It was through their influence

in Chang's new-style army that these intellectuals proved instrumental in overthrowing the government.

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CHAPTER II