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CONÓCETE POR TU CUENTA Y RIESGO

In document Phillips, Christopher - Sócrates Café (página 164-170)

What cannot be so easily deduced [are] the formal and institutional process by which the main opportunities of Russian strategy are identified, and the process of decision-making that sets them in motion. Closely related to this are the organizations and organizational processes that define, organize, coordinate, and set in motion the various tactical steps in each concrete situation. Here, too, the reason is obvious: these are matters of the utmost secrecy. Indeed, the entire mechanism by which strategy is translated into tactics in Putin’s Russia is protected by the same shield of secrecy that surrounded high tactics in the U.S.S.R. The one thing that can be asserted beyond doubt is that the process is highly centralized in Putin’s own office and that he has been involved in every stage of that process. Putin, a product of the late Soviet KGB, simply assumes that this [is] all a natural and key element of his personal leadership. To compromise tactical secrecy would be to compromise the entire enterprise.176

Despite this secrecy and the extent that the Russians employ deception to help mask their efforts, three general strategic themes can be deduced from their actual practices: 1) Ensure the continuity of the central government, 2) Ensure that Russia maintains its dominant position in the former Soviet space, and 3) Restore Russia’s status as a major power on the global stage. As was true during the Soviet-era, Putin’s immediate concern is with ensuring the continuity and stability of his government. “Protecting the regime” sounds much more pejorative, although it is nonetheless accurate. Putin believes in a strong central state and he sees competing internal political mechanisms as a deficiency in that strength. Any measures taken to crack down on

175 Starr and Cornell, Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and its Discontents, 5. 176 Starr and Cornell, Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and its Discontents, 9–10.

dissent are therefore justified as defending the central authority of the state and subsequently as necessary to the defense of the nation.

Putin views Russia’s preeminence in the former Soviet space, or the near-abroad, as a Russian version of Manifest Destiny.177 His secondary general objective is to ensure

that the states of the former USSR remain politically, economically and militarily aligned with (and subordinate to) Moscow, regardless of the desires of the affected populations. “Events between the invasion of Georgia and the armed seizure of Ukrainian territory in 2014 forced policy makers and international affairs specialists worldwide to acknowledge the possibility that the Russian Republic under Vladimir Putin has reorganized its entire foreign and domestic policy in order to pursue a single objective, namely, the establishment of a new kind of union comprised of former Soviet republics and headed by Russia itself.”178 Whether the debate between Russian Nationalists and Imperial Nationalists regarding a future Russia whose boundaries have been redrawn around ethnic Russian populations or whose influence includes the complete domination of former Soviet neighbors is ever settled, the result of either disregards the sovereign desires of the affected countries. “Today the invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea confirm that the Putin regime openly believes that its’ system can only survive if Russia is an empire, a situation that ab initio puts the sovereignty and integrity of other CIS members at risk.”179

The first two strategic themes are related to the extent that Putin fears a stable, liberal democracy on Russia’s border will debunk his assertions regarding Eurasians’ need for authoritarian governments and serve as a model for domestic opposition in Moscow, and that any movement toward liberalism is the result of Western meddling in Russia’s sphere of influence. The third theme is Russia’s renewed position of importance on the world stage. Russia has been the seat of a powerful empire, twice. Its preferred

177 Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History

(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1935). Manifest Destiny was the mid-19th Century American belief in a divine mandate for territorial expansion of the United States, which served as the moral justification for western settlement and wars with native tribes and Mexico.

178 Starr and Cornell, Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and its Discontents, 6.

179 Stephen Blank, The Intellectual Origins of the Eurasian Union Project, eds. S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 2014), 18.

position is to be a principle player on the international stage once again, but so far this desire has not been realizable due to Russia’s diminished economic and diplomatic capabilities. Russia will likely continue to try to promote its importance through its seat on the UN Security Council and by conducting just enough saber rattling to remind the world that it still has the world’s largest stock pile of nuclear weapons.

Putin’s strategy hinges on maintaining internal legitimacy, advancing a narrative of Russian greatness, manipulating nationalism, and protecting sources of revenue. He seizes opportunities to improve his position by controlling the media and the wealth of the elite class. Additionally, he maintains government control of large sectors of the Russian economy and industry, while engaging in energy politics abroad to advance its national interests. Finally, Putin is determined to keep former Soviet bloc countries oriented politically and economically toward Russia. In this, he espouses distinctly anti-Western rhetoric, casting NATO and the United States as Russian adversaries.180

In document Phillips, Christopher - Sócrates Café (página 164-170)