DIPLOMATIC WARFARE
Not only was Russia heavily involved in undermining the democratic processes in Georgia prior to the 2008 invasion, but the Russians used the subsequent political resolution of the conflict as a means to demonstrate the impotence of the European Union and to exploit fissures between the Europeans and the Americans, further alienating not just Georgia but other western leaning countries as well. The E.U., under French leadership, was very determined to take the lead role in negotiating the ceasefire that marked the end of the Russian offensive in Georgia, yet failed to take determinative action when the Russians violated the cease-fire.247 Russia demonstrated the value of its
positions on both the U.N. Security Council where it could veto any determined international effort to counter its dominant position in the Caucasus. Conflicts that were “frozen” tended to lose any determined European initiatives for a final resolution, resulting in the conditions at the time of the freezing becoming the new status quo.248
Russia and its Abkhaz and South Ossetian proxies made numerous unsubstantiated claims about Georgian oppression of ethnic minorities, military buildup and plans for Georgian military action against the two breakaway provinces. These claims included the supposed massing of Georgian forces in the Abkhazian Kodori Gorge, the stockpiling of large numbers of arms and materiel imported from Turkey
247 Blank, From Neglect to Duress: The West and the Georgian Crisis before the 2008 War, 112. 248 Ibid., 114.
(NATO), and the alleged conduct of unannounced large-scale military rehearsals and exercises.249 Russia flew approximately fifty Russian reporters to Tskhinvali just days before the August 7th invasion.250 The presence of these reporters and the lack of
Western war correspondents enabled Putin to control the narrative that was disseminated through Western news media outlets, and subsequently shape the opinions of the Western public and policy makers. The Russian narrative of Georgian aggression against South Ossetians, who were conveniently now Russian citizens due to the liberal issuance of Russian passports in the years prior to 2008, and Russian steps to stop “genocide” in progress is still the Russian version of the start of the war. This narrative, carefully managed by Russian reporters, and personally delivered to U.S. President George W. Bush by Vladimir Putin, the freshly appointed Russian Prime Minister, at the opening ceremony to the Beijing Olympic Games, largely succeeded in minimizing any outcry from the West.251 The Russian narrative dismisses claims that the Russians deliberately
invaded Georgia, by countering that the requisite approval for military action had not been passed by the Duma, and that Putin was highly upset that a military clash had been instigated by the Georgians and the defensive response had occurred without his
249 David J. Smith, “The Saakashvili Administration’s Reaction to Russian Policies before the 2008 War,” in The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, eds. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 133–135.
250 Cornell and Starr, The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, 3. See also the description of this seeding of Russian reporters into the conflict zone days before the invasion as described by Johanna Popjanevski in The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, 149.
251 Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism, 60. It should be noted that Putin had officially stepped down from the Russian Presidency at the end of his constitutionally mandated term limit. He was officially replaced by his protégé, Dmitry Medvedev, only three months before the invasion. Putin was then appointed by Medvedev as Russia’s Prime Minister. Many in the West chose to believe this “stepping aside” was demonstrative of Putin’s intent to abide by international expectations for leaders to relinquish power through popular elections. All indications are that this entire process was orchestrated theater to play to just such expectations. Putin was still the real power in Russia and his policies for Georgia were executed at his direction regardless of his official title at the time of the invasion.
approval.252 As late as the afternoon of August 7th, Georgian media was reporting that
talks between the Georgian government and the South Ossetians were underway to diffuse the situation.253
In 1999, Ludvig Chibirov, the leader of South Ossetia, signed a deal with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze that laid the ground work for a settlement where South Ossetia would cease armed opposition and submit to Georgian sovereignty in exchange for an increased degree of autonomy. While this settlement seemed the most likely path to peace and a lasting agreement between the Georgians and South Ossetians (an outcome that a legitimate mediator and peacekeeper would have supported) the Russians realized that it would complicate any future efforts to control South Ossetia. Russian operatives helped engineer the electoral defeat of Chibirov and promoted a pro- Russian candidate, Eduard Kokoity, a former wrestling champion with ties to organized crime.254 As soon as Kokoity won, he began promoting South Ossetian independence
through war with Georgia, eliminating local elites who disagreed with his militant position, and ultimately maneuvering the South Ossetian parliament to declare independence and petition the Russian Federation for membership.255 Russian
intelligence officers quickly assumed leadership roles in a number of South Ossetia’s ministries under Kokoity, and Russia began providing a large part of the budget for both of the breakaway regions.256
252 Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism, 60. See also: Pavel K. Baev,
Russian “Tandemocracy” Stumbles into a War, (Moldova.org, 2008). http://www.moldova.org/analysis-
russian-tandemocracy-stumbles-into-a-war-141638-eng/. Putin regime critic Pavel K. Baev takes the presence of Putin in Beijing and Medvedev at a resort in Volga as an indicator of Russian confusion and a lack of control over the Southern military that led to the Russians “stumbling” into the war with Georgia. In his effort to criticize what he sees as confusion among the Russian political-military elite, Baev doesn’t see this apparent confusion for what it was, the deliberate masking of the dynamic shift to the overt military nature of the conflict that was betrayed by the coordinated dominance of the information domain, the crippling cyber-attacks on the Georgian command and control networks, and the naval blockades of the Georgian ports.
253 Johanna Popjanevski, “From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali: The Path to War in Georgia,” in The Guns of
August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, eds. Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, 2009), 151.
254 Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West, 73. 255 Illarionov, The Russian Leadership’s Preparation for War, 1999–2008, 52.
In November of 2003, the so-called “Rose Revolution” was in full swing, and Eduard Shevardnadze was in danger of being ousted. The former Soviet-minister-turned- Georgian-patriot was a far less dangerous proposition for Vladimir Putin than the sudden success of a populist, pro-Western democratic movement taking root outside of Western Europe. Moscow offered to “help” Shevardnadze again in exchange for similar demands imposed during the 1993 resolution of the Abkhaz War where Georgia would again have to “accept Russian hegemony, abandon its pro-Western orientation, forget about [joining] NATO and the EU, and appoint Russian nominees to key security positions.”257
Shevardnadze was ultimately unwilling to use force to put down the opposition movement and he resigned on November 23rd. Following NATO’s retreat from extending membership to Ukraine and Georgia in early 2008, the Russians correctly interpreted a lack of European commitment to rush to the defense of either. The Russian Foreign Minister went so far as to send a telegram to his Georgian counterpart to inform him that Russia was dealing directly with Abkhazia to transfer Russian citizens held in Abkhazian prisons directly to Russian authorities, a blatant violation of international respect for Georgian’s sovereignty.258