There are two traditions regarding the relationship between conflict and politics: realism and liberalism. “For the realist, the central problem of international politics is war and the use of force, and the central actors are states.”52 The realist is pragmatic in
that he expects that others will try to take what he is unable to defend so he must demonstrate strength to ensure his sovereignty. By maximizing one’s own power, one minimizes the ability of other states to threaten one’s security.53 At a certain point
however, the realist becomes strong enough that he begins considering what he might be able to take from a weaker neighbor. The “offensive realist” does not even think there is a choice; the only way he can better his odds of survival is to have more relative power than his potential enemies, a gulf he can widen by physically reducing his adversary’s strength.54 Realists see the contemporary international system as anarchic—there is no
central or governing power- so the only things that enforce order are the individual states’ ability and willingness to fight to maintain the status quo.55
52 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 4th ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2003), 4.
53 Ibid., 5.
54 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 21. 55 Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 3.
Neo-liberalism envisions “a global society that functions alongside the states and sets part of the context for the states.”56 Liberalism promotes the view not just of
international governing bodies and legal restraint, but also that interdependent trade, monetary systems, and cross border communication have evolved into a transnational society where conflict is less likely. This is the essence of globalization, and is the preferred view of the world generally held in the West. Realists counter that there will always be a potential for a future state of war and one had better be ready to protect against it. Offensive realism is not a popular concept in the liberal-minded West because it tends to be at odds with our traditionally optimistic values.57 It is the difference in
world view of relation power that explains why a country like Russia would suddenly seize Crimea, or why China would rapidly expand into its neighbors’ territorial waters. If a state views the world through the realist lens, specifically from the position of offensive realism, that state’s actions often appear irrational to liberal outsiders as those actions undermine the best interests of the international community. They appear much more pragmatic when they are seen to increase the relative power, and therefore the chances of survival, of the aggressor state. While this realist perspective might be depressing, “it behooves us to see the world as it is, not as we would like it to be.”58
It would be a mistake for a weaker power, or the international community, to assume that an aggressor shares a similar view of the strategic options that are available to each side. If the weaker state prefers the position of power liberalism, he would be inclined to look for cooperative strategies that would yield the best result for both parties. If the aggressor is an offensive-realist, the parties of liberalism would continuously be confounded as the realist regularly made and then broke agreements or pursued strategies that were painful for both sides. The realist views international competition as zero-sum; there is a winner and a loser. Pursuing a win-win strategy for a realist only makes sense if
56 Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 5. The term “liberalism” will be used through the rest of this study in keeping with the sources referenced. Classical liberalism involves the freedom of the individual, and neo-liberalism is the inter-relations of states through an agreed upon context.
57 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 23. 58 Ibid., 4.
his gains are greater than and outpacing his opponent’s, because the result is the realist’s greater relative power. For the same reason, the realist is also willing to accept a loss, so long as the opponent’s loss is greater and the gap is increasing.
One useful definition of power is described by the ability a nation can exert to positively (attract) or negatively (coerce) influence another entity in order to reach a preferred outcome.59 States that employ a mix of hard and soft power approaches
employ what Joseph Nye calls “smart power” as a means of converting available resources into desired outcomes.60 Nye uses the analogy of disaster relief to demonstrate
how military forces can be used in a “soft” manner to engender good will. A basic premise of hybrid warfare is that the inverse is also possible and that normally benign instruments of soft power can be weaponized to coerce and inflict harm. When the desired outcome is the breaking of an adversary’s ability or will to resist the imposition of the aggressor’s will, then smart power is synonymous with hybrid warfare.
Power projection is the ability to exercise force relative to distance. Historically, those who are most vulnerable to an aggressor are those along its contiguous borders, making armies, or land-power, the traditional yardstick for measuring a nation’s existing strength.61 Adversaries separated by bodies of water require naval forces to control the
intermediate maritime domain, exert force on maritime vessels and ports, transport invading forces and sustain those forces through a campaign.62 Stephen Biddle offers a
definition of military power that promotes the importance of the land domain by emphasizing the military’s primary mission of controlling territory during mid to high intensity “continental warfare.” A military’s power is measured in its ability to
59 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011): 10. 60 Ibid., 23.
61 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 43–44.
62 Ibid., 44. Mearsheimer addresses the value of naval and air forces to projecting power and
deterrence. He fundamentally disagrees with the notion that air or naval power alone constitutes a valuable measure of national power. Those forces can play a critical role in degrading or destroying an enemy but it is ultimately the role of the land force to be decisive. Mearsheimer did address the 1999 NATO air war against Yugoslavia, which is often used to make the case that airpower alone can determine the outcome of a conflict. He finds that this conflict was an exception rather than a rule, and that Milosevic’s capitulation was likely due to a number of domestic socio-political factors rather than the capitulation of an entire national system as a result of the aerial bombardment.
accomplish this mission through “the destruction of hostile forces while preserving one’s own, the ability to take and hold ground, and the time required to do so.”63 In the age of
an interdependent global economy, Internet based banking and mass communications systems there are increasingly innovative possibilities for exerting coercive force on a state that is not immediately adjacent to an aggressor through cyber-attack, propaganda saturation, and economic or financial disruption. While hybrid warfare is not contingent upon any of these, or any future innovation, its practitioner will recognize the possibilities that these domains provide to increase his options for action that would have once been beyond the reach of his land forces.