Concepto material del delito

12.5.1 The Hazard Identification Process

A Hazard Identification (HAZID) workshop was conducted at SSPA Sweden process on 12-13 September 2011. In addition to the consultant team, 19 representatives from IKC organisations, authorities and other organisations also took part. See Appendix 12 for more details on the HAZID process.

12.5.2 Objectives and methodology of the HAZID

The objectives of the HAZID workshop were as follows:

• To identify hazards associated with LNG handling and distribution in the port and with the bunkering process;

• To rank the identified hazards in order to identify areas to be subjected to specific consideration and further analysis for the LNG bunker infrastructure development.

The workshop was conducted as a structured brainstorming where a number of operational phases and potential accident scenarios were discussed from a “what-if” perspective. A generic port, accommodating different port activities and ship traffic ranging from small passenger boats and RoRo ferries to large container vessels and tankers, was considered in order to cover different types of bunkering ports. For the purposes of this study, risks related to aspects of human life and health were primarily considered and hazards and accident scenarios that may lead to release of LNG were specifically addressed.

The scope of the HAZID was divided into three different operational phases:

• Loading and unloading of the bunker feeder vessel at an intermediate storage facility; • Transit of feeder tanker or bunker boat in the port area;

• Bunkering operations.

12.5.3 Output of the Hazard Identification Phase

For each of the operational phases addressed, a number of possible accident scenarios with potential release of LNG were identified. Based on estimations of the probability of occurrence and the severity of the consequences for the identified accidents, a relative risk ranking was compiled by combining the probabilities and the consequences into risk index figures and plotting them into a risk matrix as illustrated in Table 45.

12.5.4 Risk Index and Ranking of Identified Hazards

Based on the estimated probability and consequence rankings in the completed HAZID forms, a combined risk index is derived by adding the probability and consequence ranking figures. The ranking figures roughly represent logarithmic scales and thus the risk index sum represents the product of the probability for and the severity of the consequences of the respective accidental events.

The ranking by use of estimated risk index figures is primarily intended to generate a relative ranking, but the scales may also be used to provide an indicative classification in terms of tolerable, broadly acceptable and unacceptable risks according to the established ALARP concept. ALARP means As Low As Reasonably

Practicable and is the main guiding principle for how to handle risk scenarios identified in the broadly acceptable zone between tolerable and unacceptable risks. For this study it was considered relevant to define the yellow ALARP area as hazards attributed with risk index figures > 4 but ≤ 6.

Table 45 Plotted ID tags of identified hazards and their respective risk indicies.

Source; SSPA, 2011

In total, approximately 155 hazards and accident scenarios were identified and listed and 52 of those are attributed with preliminary probability and consequence figures. The following ten examples were found to be attributed with a risk index figure of 4, 5 or 6. It should be noted that the complete list in Appendix 12 includes more hazards ranked with a risk index of 4, 5 or 6. Identified hazards with a risk index < 4 in the green area are considered acceptable and not subject to further analysis or risk control measures.

1. Hard collision feeder/bunker vessel during transit from loading to unloading or bunkering; 2. Interaction with pleasure craft and bunker boat forced to manoeuvre during transit; 3. Leakage due to technical failure during bunkering from land-based facility;

4. Leakage from bunker connection and activation of ESD during ship-to-ship bunkering; 5. Overfilling risk because of difficulty to predict filling level in the receiving tank; 6. Mooring failure during bunkering alongside another ship and activation of ERS; 7. Fire scenario with oil fire in combined oil-LNG bunker vessel;

8. Blackout and grounding of bunker vessel;

9. High speed collision from large ship during LNG bunkering at anchorage at sea; 10. Pressure build-up due to liquid LNG left in vapour return lines after bunkering.

The numbers in the list are plotted in the risk matrix in Table 45 above. A large number of other important LNG risk and safety aspects were also addressed during the HAZID discussions and are listed in Appendix 12.

As a final part of the hazard identification, other documentation and ranked output hazard lists from similar exercises were reviewed to identify potential omitted hazards and some complementary hazards were added.

12.5.5 Risks Imposed by F Aspects

Sabotage and terror attacks directed at LNG storage tanks and bunkering facilities are sometime

as a potential scenario resulting in an LNG release. Attacked LNG facilities will not detonate but may cause large local fire scenarios and are not considered attractive terror targets.

Basically, the existing International Ship and Port Faci

prevent sabotage and provides an adequate risk control regime regarding security issues in the port area. Terrorism and sabotage are not useful to address by means of probabilistic models and together with aspects mentioned above, this issue is not further elaborated in this study.