CONCLUSIONES

Facts: Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged with the crime of violating Sec. 4, RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). Upon arraignment, both Lasoy and Banisa pleaded guilty and were sentenced to suffer a jail term of 6 months 1 day. On the same date, both applied for probation.

Subsequently however, the People of the Phils., thru Asst. City Prosecutor Escasa-Ramos, filed two separate motions: first, to admit amended Information, and second, to set aside the arraignment of both Lasoy and Banisa, as well as the decision of the RTC. The motion alleged that both Lasoy and Banisa was arraigned under an invalid information. Both the request for inquest proceedings and the joint affidavit of the Poseur-buyer and arresting officer stated Lasoy and Bainsa were apprehended with approximately 45 kilos of marijuana leaves. But per People, the information was fraudulently altered to charge them with selling 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops instead of 42.410 kilos. RTC denied the motion.

Upon second motion, RTC granted on the ground that per SC Resolution in G.R. No. 119131 (Gulhoran vs. Hon. Escano, Jr.), jurisdiction over drug of small quantity should be tried by the MTC.

Accordingly, a second information this time charging Lasoy and Banisa of selling 42.410 kilos of marijuana fruiting tops was filed and raffled to Branch 76 of the RTC Quezon City presided by Judge Zenarosa.

Both Lasoy and Banisa filed a Motion to Quash.

RTC denied their motion to quash, and scheduled their arraignment under the amended information. MR

denied. Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunction and TRO.

Issues:

a. W/N the first information is valid? Valid.

b. W/N the RTC where the first information and Criminal Case was filed and tried, had jurisdiction to try the case? RTC has jurisdiction.

Held and Ratio:

a. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.

Applying the foregoing, the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with.

Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110, Section 6² shows on its face that it is valid.

With respect to the trial court’s point of view that the accused cannot claim their right against double jeopardy because they “participated/ acquiesced to the tampering,” we hold that while this may not be far-fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof. Worse, the accused were already arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first information. Granting that alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the subject of another inquiry.

Rule 110, Sec. 14³ of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

2 Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

3 Sec. 14. Amendment. – The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

In Sanvicente v. People, this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.

The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this case, the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to try again accused for the same offense without violating procedural rules and their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

b. A later resolution superseding the resolution cited by the RTC, Admin. Order No. 51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC with jurisdiction to try the first case. The resolution designated RTC branches to exclusively try and decide cases of, among others, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, committed within their territorial jurisdictions. Subsequently, A.M.

No. 96-8-282-RTC dated 27 August 1996, further clarified jurisdiction of RTCs to exclusively try and decide cases of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved.

This issue is further settled by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in People v. Velasco: “. .. [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as applied/interpreted in People vs. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994;

234 SCRA 555), and of the provisions of R.A. No. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the MeTCsand MCTCs, still fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of RTCs, in view of Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 7691 have neither amended nor modified this Section.

B. SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION SALUDAGA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: An Information charging Saludaga and Genio with violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, by causing undue injury to the government was filed.

It read:

...., accuses QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E.

GENIO, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e)..., committed as follows:

That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, public officials, being the Municipal Mayor and

PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern Samar in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and with the late Limpio Legua, a private individual, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a Pakyaw Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount of NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00), Philippine Currency, without conducting a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the government the chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price, and thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) and COA Circular No.

91-368, to the damage and prejudice of the government...

This case went to the 3^rd Division of the Sandiganbayan. It granted Saludaga and Genio’s motion to quash and dismissed the information "for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, an essential element of the crime charged."

The information was re-filed. It went to the 4^th Division of the Sandiganbayan charging Saludaga and Genio for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government. It now read:

That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while in the discharge of his official administrative function, conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B.

GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government and public interest....

Saludaga and Genio filed a motion for preliminary investigation. They contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary

investigation before the filing of the second Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter charged a different offense–that is, violation of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first Information. They argue that assuming that no substitution took place, at the very least, there was a substantial amendment in the new information and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-examination of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case.

The Sandiganbayan denied their motion. It said there is no substituted information or substantial amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. Saludaga and Genio filed an MR which was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the new information was for a different offense that would require a new preliminary investigation.

Held: No! The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion.

Ratio: Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or"

connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense.

This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.

There is no substituted information. The new information charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was modified. While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v.

Sandiganbayan, provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged under either mode or under both should both modes concur.

There are also no substantial amendments in the information warranting a new preliminary investigation. The new info is founded on the same transaction as the first info, that of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day care centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. The evidentiary requirements for the prosecand defense remain the same.

Take note of People v. Lacson: The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence.

C. AMENDED INFORMATION BONIFACIO VS. RTC OF MAKATI

FACTS: Jessie John Gimenez filed, in behalf of the Yuchengco Family and the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., a criminal complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office 13 counts of Libel against the officers, trustees, and members of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), and the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com [collectively, the accused].

PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc.

(PPI), a wholly owned subsidiary of the Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation which is owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC). PEPCI previously purchased traditional pre-need education plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before RTC Makati City.

Decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com.

Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled,

and moderated on the internet a blogspot under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as

well as a yahoo e-group at

[email protected]. Gimenez further alleged that the articles in the websites contained highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking YGC and Malayan.

The Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed 13 Information charging them with Libel. Several of the accused appealed by Petition for Review to the Secretary of Justice. The latter reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Information for Libel filed in court.

The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of

“internet libel” was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Art. 353 of RPC.

The accused, now petitioners in this case, filed a Motion to Quash before RTC Makati City the Information for Libel on the following grounds: (1) it failed to vest jurisdiction on RTC Makati City (2) acts complained of are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Art. 353 of RPC (3) Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.

The trial court granted the Motion to Quash.

Later on, however, it granted the prosecution’s MR and ordered the public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue. The Information was amended and was admitted by the trial court.

Note: The accused were contending that the prosecution failed to allege that the libelous articles were “printed and first published” in Makati and that the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article. On the part of the prosecution, it insisted that the Information need not allege in verbatim that the libelous publication was

“printed and first published” in the appropriate venue.

It pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen (one of the Yuchengco) is a resident.

ISSUE: WON RTC Makati City committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended complaint? YES.

RULING: Where the complainant is a private individual, the venue of libel cases is limited to only either of the 2 places, namely: (1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or (2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. In the case at bar, the Amended Information opted to lay the venue by availing of the 2^nd option. It state that the offending article was first published and accessed by Gimenez in Makati City. It considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.

The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information becomes more pronounced upon

an examination of the rationale for the amendment of Art. 360 (old rule for crime of libel) by RA 4363. Before Art. 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under this rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. Experience had shown that under the old rule, the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place. To forestall such harassment, RA 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party

an examination of the rationale for the amendment of Art. 360 (old rule for crime of libel) by RA 4363. Before Art. 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under this rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. Experience had shown that under the old rule, the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place. To forestall such harassment, RA 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party