Que los gastos se comprueben con documentación que contenga al menos la siguiente información:

JULITO QUIMCO AND GLORIA CAPIN

Facts: NPC is a GOCC duly organized under RA No.

6395. Pursuant to its 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project (Project), NPC expropriated several parcels of land in Cebu to be traversed and affected by its transmission towers and lines. Among the lots affected were those of Capin and Sps. Quimco (respondents).

To be able to enter the said properties, NPC obtained from each them "Permission to Enter for Construction of Transmission Line Project". These permits were signed by respondents upon representation by NPC that it would pay them just compensation for the intrusion into their properties.

Thereafter, NPC began to construct on the properties its power lines and transmission towers, which were completed in 1996. NPC paid the respondents the amounts of P8,015.90 and P5,350.49, respectively.

Only later did they discover that in comparison to the measly sums they were paid by NPC, the other landowners within their area who resisted the expropriation in court or who entered into compromise agreements with NPC were paid P448.30 to P450.00/sq. m. as just compensation for the portions of their properties similarly affected by NPC’s Project.

Accordingly, they filed a Complaint for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and Other Reliefs, against NPC before the RTC. NPC countered that their claim for compensation for the full value of their properties was repugnant to Section 3-A of its Charter, according to which, NPC is obligated only to pay the easement fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the land as just compensation, plus the cost of damaged improvements. (In short NPC was saying that there was no expropriation but only easement.)

At the Pre-trial, the parties agreed that the only issue for resolution by the RTC was the

determination of the amount of just compensation due.

Hence, the RTC, upon motion of respondents, issued an Order allowed them to file a Motion of Summary Judgment. The RTC gave NPC a 15-day period from receipt of such to file its Opposition to or Comment on the Motion for Summary Judgment. RTC further granted NPC’s Motion for Extension of Time to file their comment. But despite the 15 days extension given, NPC still failed to file its Comment. Consequently, RTC deemed Capin and Sps. Quimco’s Motion for Summary Judgment submitted for resolution.

RTC rendered a Resolution favoring respondents & ordered NPC to pay damages of P448.33/sq. m. for the 3,199 sq.m. of respondents’

lots taken by NPC. NPC filed MR for just compensation to be reduced to P25.00/ sq.m. and a Supplemental MR for reduction of the interest rate (from 14% to 6%

per annum). RTC affimed its Resolution but reduced imposable rate to 6%/annum from filing of the complaint, and 12% / annum from the time judgment become final and executory until fully satisfied. NPC appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC. MR denied.

Hence, the present Petition for Review before the SC.

Issues: 1. W/N NPC only acquired an easement of right of way on the properties (consequently making it liable to pay only an easement fee not exceeding 10%

of the fair market value of the portion of their property actually affected by the Interconnection Project, pursuant to Section 3-A(b) of its Charter)?

Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation." After NPC’s transmission lines were fully constructed on portions of Capin and Sps. Quimco’s lots, NPC imposed restrictions thereon such as the prohibition against planting or building anything higher than three meters below the area traversed by said lines. In addition, Spouses Quimco, holders of a Small Scale Quarry Permit, were also prohibited from continuing their quarry business near NPC’s transmission towers because of the great possibility that it could weaken the foundation thereof.

Hence, the respondents suffered substantial loss of income. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives respondents of its ordinary use.

NPC’s acquisition of an easement of right of way on the lands amounted to an expropriation of the portions of the latter’s properties and perpetually deprived Capin and Sps. Quimco of their proprietary rights thereon and for which they are entitled to a reasonable and just compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word

"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word

"compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

Moreover, the valuation of a property in the tax declaration cannot be an absolute substitute to just compensation or rather, the market value stated in the tax declaration of the condemned property is no longer conclusive. It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. It is also repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court which is promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence, arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judicially evaluated. 10%

of the market value of the expropriated property cannot in any way be considered as the fair and full equivalent to the loss sustained by the owner of the property, such would be 90% less than what is due him. Thus, Section 3A of NPC’s Charter cannot prevail over the mandate of our Constitution on the payment of just compensation.

2. W/N the RTC erred in fixing the fair market value for the lots at P448.33/sq.m. based on a previous RTC decision in Civil Case No. DNA-379 (which was further based on another decision of the same RTC, Civil Case No. DNA-373)? *In Civil Case No. DNA-379, the RTC ordered NPC to pay just compensation of P448.33/sq.m. for the lot owned by the heirs of Gingco which was similarly traversed by NPC’s transmission lines; whereas in Civil Case No. DNA-373, the RTC considered the opinion values of the Committee on Appraisal in determining the fair market value of the properties involved therein.

Although it is a Decision in another case, the RTC can take cognizance thereof when Capin and Sps.

Quimco presented the same for its consideration. The lot of the heirs of Gingco and those of the herein Capin and Sps. Quimco are all located within the same area, separated only by a lot owned by the Loros. The lots owned by Capin and Sps. Quimco are even more advantageously situated than the lot owned by the heirs of Gingco since their properties are traversed by a barangay road and near quarry areas of Llyons Richfield Industrial Corporation. The lots of Capin and Sps. Quimco (effectively taken in June 1996) and of the heirs (July 1996) were all affected by the Interconnection Project and were taken by NPC at about the same time. Since the personalities and properties in both Civil Cases were essentially in similar situations, then the just compensation awarded for the property in the former case was a logical and reasonable basis for fixing or determining the just compensation due in the latter. Furthermore, NPC was given ample time to study, challenge, and controvert

the evidences (including the above case), yet it failed to do so.

3. W/N the RTC erred when it resolved the complaint using the Rules of Court on Summary Judgment (which apply only to the ordinary taking of properties) when complaint is actually for "reversed eminent domain,"

requiring the appointment of commissioners for the determination of just compensation, as provided under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court?

The present case stemmed an ordinary civil action for the rescission of Capin and Sps. Quimco’s agreement with NPC, as well as recovery of the possession of the lots taken, for failure of NPC to comply with its obligation to pay just compensation for Capin and Sps. Quimco’s properties. Payment of just compensation or damages was an alternative remedy, akin to specific performance by NPC of its obligation under its agreement with Capin and Sps. Quimco, which would prevent the rescission of the agreements altogether and the return of the possession of the properties to Capin and Sps. Quimco. The parties, at the Pre-Trial Conference, implicitly agreed to pursue the remedy for payment of damages rather than rescission of the agreement. Clearly, the proceedings before the RTC were not for expropriation, but were for damages, to which Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court is irrelevant.

SC made reference to NPC v. CA, where it ruled that: “.. case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable." NPC herein cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of procedural laws when it has so arbitrarily violated Capin and Sps. Quimco’s right to just compensation for their properties taken for public use.

APO FRUITS V. CA

Facts: Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) offered to sell their land pursuant to RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL). The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) referred their voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) applications to Land Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank fixed the just compensation at P165,484.47/hectare, that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14, for HPI. The valuation was rejected, prompting Land Bank, upon the advice of DAR, to open deposit accounts in the names of AFC and HPI, and to credit in said accounts the sums of P26,409,549.86 (AFC) and P45,481,706.76 (HPI). AFC and HPI withdrew the amounts in cash from the accounts, but afterwards, they filed separate complaints for determination of just

compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).

When DARAB did not act on their complaints for determination of just compensation after more than three years, AFC and HPI filed complaints for determination of just compensation with the RTC in Tagum City, acting as a special agrarian court (SAC).

Summonses were served to Land Bank and DAR, which respectively filed their answers. The RTC conducted a pre-trial, and appointed commissioners to determine the proper valuation of the properties.

The RTC rendered a decision valuing the land at P103.33 per square meter (substantially the same price AFC and HPI wanted). It ordered the DAR and Land Bank to pay AFC and HPI P1,383,179,000.00 for the land and its standing crops. Interest equivalent to the market interest rates aligned with 91-day Treasury Bills, from the date of taking up to full payment was imposed. It also ordered DAR and Land bank to pay the Commissioner’s fees, and the attorney’s fees, to be computed at 2 ½ % and 10% of the just compensation of the land and standing crops plus interest equivalent to the interest of the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date of taking until full payment, respectively. They were also ordered to pay the costs.

Land Bank filed an MR. The decision was modified and an interest at the rate of 12% per annum was fixed from the time the complaint was filed up to the time of the finality of the decision. The same interest rate was imposed on the total obligation from the time it became final and executor up to its full payment. The interest on the attorney’s fees and Commissioner’s fees were removed. As to all other aspects, the decision remained the same.

Land Bank filed a notice of appeal. The RTC denied it saying the proper remedy was a petition for review since it was acting as a SAC. To question the RTC’s denial, Land Bank filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the petition and eventually nullified the RTC’s orders.

AFC and HPI then filed a petition for review on certiorari praying that the CA be reversed and that the RTC decision be declared final an executory. The SC 3^rd Division said that the granting of the appeal was correct but that the RTC’s decision regarding the payment and amount should be affirmed.

Land Bank filed an MR which the 3^rd Division partially granted. The new decision deleted the award of attorney’s fees. It also remanded the case to the RTC for a hearing on the amount of Commissioner’s fees. Most importantly, it deleted the 12% interest rate per annum in the total amount of just compensation.

Both AFC and HPI and Land Bank filed MRs which were denied. Entry of judgment was made on May 16, 2008. Despite this, AFC and HPI still filed on May 28, 2008 several motions, namely: (1) motion for leave to file and admit second motion for reconsideration; (2) second motion for reconsideration (with respect to the denial of the award of legal interest and attorney's fees); and (3) motion to refer

the second motion for reconsideration to the Honorable Court en banc.

The case was referred to the SC en banc.

Issue: WON interest and attorney’s fees should be awarded to AFC and HPI.

Held: No! The second motion for reconsideration (with respect to the denial of the award of legal interest and attorney's fees) is denied, because, firstly, to grant it is to jettison the immutability of a final decision – a matter of public policy and public interest, as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law; and secondly, to award interest and attorney’s fees despite the fact that Land Bank paid the just compensation without undue delay is legally and factually unwarranted.

Ratio: (On the interest and attorney’s fees) The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent domain. A basic limitation on the State’s power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell.

It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State.

Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value, to be computed from the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, the Court came to explicitly rule that interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in case of delay in its payment, which fact must be sufficiently established. Significantly, Wycoco was moored on Article 2209, Civil Code, which provides:

Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of money and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)

`The history of this case proves that Land Bank did not incur delay in the payment of the just compensation. As earlier mentioned, after AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell their lands on October 12, 1995, DAR referred their VOS applications to Land Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank initially fixed the just compensation at P165,484.47/hectare, that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14, for HPI. However, they rejected Land Bank’s initial valuation, prompting Land Bank to open deposit accounts in the petitioners’ names, and to credit in

said accounts the amounts equivalent to their valuations. Although AFC withdrew the amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew P45,481,706.76, they still filed with DARAB separate complaints for determination of just compensation. When DARAB did not act upon their complaints for more than three years, AFC and HPI commenced their respective actions for determination of just compensation in the Tagum City RTC, which rendered its decision on September 25, 2001.

It is true that Land Bank sought to appeal the RTC’s decision to the CA, by filing a notice of appeal;

and that Land Bank filed in March 2003 its petition for certiorari in the CA only because the RTC did not give due course to its appeal. Any intervening delay thereby entailed could not be attributed to Land Bank, however, considering that assailing an erroneous order before a higher court is a remedy afforded by law to every losing party, who cannot thus be considered to act in bad faith or in an unreasonable manner as to make such party guilty of unjustified delay. As stated in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation:

The mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals does not mean that it deliberately delayed the payment of just compensation to KPCI. x x x It may disagree with DAR and the landowner as to the amount of just compensation to be paid to the latter and may also disagree with them and bring the matter to court for judicial determination. This makes LBP an indispensable party in cases involving just compensation for lands taken under the Agrarian Reform Program, with a right to appeal decisions in such cases that are unfavorable to it. Having only exercised its right to appeal in this case, LBP cannot be penalized by making it pay for interest.

The Third Division justified its deletion of the award of interest thuswise:

AFC and HPI now blame LBP for allegedly incurring delay in the determination and payment of just compensation. However, the same is without basis as AFC and HPI’s proper recourse after rejecting the initial valuations of respondent LBP was to bring the matter to the RTC acting as a SAC, and not to file two complaints for determination of just compensation with the DAR, which was just circuitous as it had already

AFC and HPI now blame LBP for allegedly incurring delay in the determination and payment of just compensation. However, the same is without basis as AFC and HPI’s proper recourse after rejecting the initial valuations of respondent LBP was to bring the matter to the RTC acting as a SAC, and not to file two complaints for determination of just compensation with the DAR, which was just circuitous as it had already