IMPUESTO A LOS DEPOSITOS EN EFECTIVO APLICADO AL REGIMEN SIMPLIFICADO

MANGONON v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati against the father and grandfather of the said twins. In said petition, it was alleged that petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married.

As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent, it was annulled. Within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the USA where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because, in essence, their money wasn’t enough.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Set Application for Support Pendente Lite for Hearing because Rica and Rina both badly needed immediate financial resources for their education. This Motion was opposed by respondent Francisco (the twins’

grandfather). The trial court granted the prayer for support pendente lite.

Not satisfied with the Order of the trial court (because she felt that the amount was not enough), petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the trial court. The MR was denied as well.

ISSUE: W/N support pendente lite may be granted?

YES.

HELD: Under this ROC, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of

judgment or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.

After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented, we find that petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins’ entitlement to support pendente lite. The next question is who should be made liable for said award.

[NOTE: THIS PART, ONWARDS, IS MORE CIV LAW THAN REM]The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states:

ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters.

The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient.

However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities as established, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent the twins’ grandfather, Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. The Court discussed that based on the evidence, Francisco had ample means to provide support to the twins. It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters’

education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.

Meanwhile, Art. 204 states that the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered. In this case, the Court said that the second option is not anymore possible due to strained relations between the family members involved.

As to the amount of support pendente lite: we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as

support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors.

Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrearsto be computed from the time they entered college until they had finished their respective studies.

RULE 62: INTERPLEADER

OCAMPO V. TIRONA

Facts: Leonardo Ocampo alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of land in Pasay City and that he bought it from Rosauro Breton. Possession and management of the land was already with him despite the TCT not being issued yet. Leonora Tirona was the lessee of the land even before Ocampo bought it.

Upon acquisition of ownership by Ocampo, he sent a formal notice to Tirona. Tirona religiously paid her rents until the subject premises were declared under area for priority development. As such, Tirona invoked her right to first refusal and refused to pay her rent until the NHA processed her papers.

Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Tirona. Tirona’s defense was that Ocampo was not the owner thus she shouldn’t pay him rent. It should be noted that Tirona kept changing the theory of her case stating that Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza owned the land when the case was at the MTC and stating that Breton was the owner when the case was appealed to the RTC.

Issue: Should the complaint for unlawful detainer prosper? – YES.

Decision: First, the issue of ownership is not essential to an action for unlawful detainer. The fact of the lease and the expiration of its term are the only elements of the action. The defense of ownership does not change the summary nature of the action. The affected party should raise the issue of ownership in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

In actions for forcible entry and [unlawful]

detainer, the main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleadings, and an appeal does not operate to change the nature of the original action.

Furthermore, Tirona was estopped from denying that Ocampo had possession of the lease agreement. She paid her rent to him until such declaration of the area for priority development. The sale of a leased property places the vendee into the shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee bound himself to pay.

Lastly (and more importantly), Tirona should have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims

an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing.

The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

MAGLENTE, ET AL VS. PADILLA in her capacity as Manila RTC Judge, and several private respondents

Facts: Philippine Realty Corp (PRC) owned a parcel of land in Intramuros, which it leased to petitioner Maglente. The lease agreement included a right of first refusal in favor of Maglente, as well as an agreement whereby PRC prohibited Maglente from subleasing the property. Nonetheless, Maglente subleased the property to the private respondents (madami sila so di ko na lalagay names). Later on, PRC decided to sell the property and offered the land to Maglente in accordance with her ROFR. Maglente, together with her co-petitioners in this case (di ko na din lalagay yung names nila kasi madami masyado), as co-buyers, agreed to buy the property from PRC. However, PRC received a letter from the private respondents which expressed their desire to purchase the same property.

PRC filed a complaint for interpleader with the Manila RTC to determine who between the 2 parties had the right to purchase the property. The RTC ruled in favor of the Maglente and her co-petitioners, ordering PRC to execute a deed of sale. CA affirmed.

The SC likewise upheld the CA decision holding that there had already been a perfected contract between PRC and the petitioners. So PRC executed a deed of sale in favor of the petitioners, who then filed a motion for a writ of possession, because the land was in the possession of the private respondents. The respondents argued that the RTC’s decision did not declare the petitioners as owners entitled to right of possession but merely determined that they had the right to purchase. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and denied the writ of possession. So the petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari.

Issue: Whether a writ of possession should be granted to a party with a ROFR in an interpleader case?

NOOOOOO!

Held/Ratio: The decision in the interpleader case merely resolved the question of who had the right to

purchase the property. The directive was only for the PRC to execute the necessary deed of sale, nothing more. It was clear at that point that petitioners were not yet the owners of the property. The execution of the deed of sale was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the property. Also, although in the SC decision affirming the RTC the SC refrained from declaring the petitioners as the owners since, pending the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at that time.

Thus, petitioners’ argument that the trial court’s writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with it the corollary right to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either. The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue.

Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but must strictly conform to it. The RTC cannot therefore be faulted for refusing to issue a writ of possession to petitioners as its issuance would not be in conformity with the judgment in the interpleader case.

Some other matters discussed

A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings;

(2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales.¹² Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial court’s decision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.

Petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a mere motion. They must file the appropriate action in court against respondents to recover possession. While this remedy can delay their recovery, the SC ruled that it cannot permit an abbreviated method without subverting the rules and processes established for the orderly administration of justice.

ARREZA v DIAZ

FACTS: Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing complex located in Balara Quezon City. It instituted an interpleader case against Arreza and Diaz who were conflicting claimants of the property. the RTC ruled in favor of Arreza. In view of said decision, Bliss executed a contract to sell the property to Arreza and Diaz was compelled to transfer possession together with all improvements to Arreza.

Thereafter, Diaz instituted a claim against Arreza and Bliss for the reimbursement of the cost of the improvements which amounted to approximately

1.7 M inclusive of 8% interest. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action. RTC dismissed the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration of Arreza. This prompted Arreza to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed the petition saying that res judicata does not apply because the interpleader case only settled the issue on who had a better right. It did not determine the parties’ respective rights and obligations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for reimbursement is barred by res judicata – YES

HELD: An examination of the answer filed by Diaz showed that he asserted his status as a buyer in good faith and for value and he prayed that affirmative relief arising out of the rights of a buyer in good faith and for value be granted. This only means that Diaz expected that the court shall award him damages in the form of reimbursement in case judgment is rendered in favor of Arreza.

Diaz contends that in the pre-trial of the interpleader case, reimbursement and damages was never put in issue. Thus it could not have been the subject of the interpleader and consequently, not barred by res judicata. Diaz says it was incumbent on Arreza to include the damages as an issue. The Supreme Court said that (1) it is not the duty of the petitioner to do the lawyering against the respondent and (2) in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That party in this case referred to respondent Diaz. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, "as provided by these Rules." The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents

Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz being in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now barred.