The 196O constitution of Cyprus, built on the provisions set out in the Zurich (1959) and London (1960) Agreements, envisaged a consociation between the island’s two main communities, and also provided some minority rights for the island’s Maronite and Armenian communities. Consociationalism was embedded in almost all aspects of the 1960 political system: powers at most organs of the government were to be shared between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. The executive branch of the government was to consist of a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice President, both having veto rights over the most crucial issues, such as ones relating to security and finance. Distribution of power within the council of ministers, which would be headed by the president and the vice president collectively, was also carefully balanced between two communities by allocating certain quotas to each community. There were quotas for both communities in the army and public sector employment as well, usually 65% allocated for Greek Cypriots and 35% for Turkish Cypriots.
At international level, the Cypriot independence and constitution were guaranteed by a treaty between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, in which the three guarantor powers were granted the right to intervene, together or unilaterally, in order to restore the 1960 status quo.46 However, implementation of the 1960 constitution immediately became problematic: for the Greek Cypriots, the island’s independence was not a happy turning point as Enosis was banned and power in the new state of affairs had to be shared with the Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, the negotiation of the basic terms of the 1960 constitution by the Greek and Turkish governments without effective participation of the two communities meant the agreement lacked any
45 “Zurich Agreement: Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus”, Zurich, 11 February 1959,
http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/agmt-zurich.html (accessed 7/8/12). 46
“Treaty of Guarantee”, Nicosia, 16 August 1960,
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/484B73E4F0736CFDC22571BF00394F11/$file/Treaty%20of%2 0Guarantee.pdf (accessed 7/8/12).
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legitimacy, particularly the Greek Cypriots considered the constitution as an imposition. The Greek Cypriots were particularly displeased with the quotas in public employment and the veto rights of the Turkish Cypriots, and perceived these as unfair arrangements which are causing inefficiencies in the government (Dimari and Varnava 2011). The first disagreement was about the composition of the army battalions: the Greek Cypriots preferred mixed battalions while the Turkish Cypriots insisted on each battalion being solely from one community. At the same time, the two communities continued to develop their paramilitary forces, which were originally set up in the 1950s, and those organisations (the Greek Cypriot EOKA47, the Turkish Cypriot TMT48) would become major players in inter-communal conflict. Disagreements also emerged regarding the provision of the constitution which stipulated the right of Turkish Cypriots to set up separate municipalities in the island’s major towns, as well as about implementation of the public employment quotas, which were favouring Turkish Cypriots. By 1963, the Greek Cypriots were blocking establishment of the separate municipalities and the Turkish Cypriots were retaliating by blocking budget and taxation legislation at the Republic’s House of Representatives. In November 1963, President Makarios suggested a set of amendments to the constitution to deal with the deadlock. The set of amendments49 in effect meant curbing the veto rights of the Turkish Cypriots, and were promptly rejected by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey (Baier-Allen 2004, 80-83; Richmond 1998, 77-80).
By late December, the tension between the two communities was dramatically high as both feared an immediate attack from each other. On 21 December 1963, the inter-communal violence broke out in Nicosia and then quickly spread across the island in the following weeks. As a result of this situation, the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government, but whether this was a voluntary or forced withdrawal is still heavily debated. The Greek Cypriots have maintained that the Turkish Cypriots vacated their seats at the cabinet and the other government offices in the hope that this would trigger a Turkish intervention and they deemed the Turkish Cypriots as “rebels” (Kyriakides 1968, 112; Markides 1977, 21-34). The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, have argued that they were forced to leave their posts because they were either prevented by the Greek Cypriots or could not attend their duties due to the security situation. They also have regarded the solely Greek Cypriot composed government as “unconstitutional” (Ertekun 1984, 215-218; Necatigil 1993, 53-56). Although it is hard to establish how it exactly happened, the result
47
EOKA is the abbreviation for the “National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters” in Greek. 48
TMT is the abbreviation for the “Turkish Resistance Organisation” in Turkish.
49 “The 13 Points: Suggested Measures for the Removal of Causes of Friction between the Two
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was very clear: the 1960 consociation was dead. From then on, the island’s two communities have never participated in the same government. The political situation would be further aggravated when the UN Security Council Resolution 186, passed in March 1964 to establish the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), explicitly referred to the government of Cyprus.50 This was at odds with the Turkish Cypriots’ view that there was no constitutionally legitimate government of Cyprus at the time. The resolution thus contributed towards creation of an uneven relationship between the two sides in terms of international status: the Greek Cypriots received international recognition, while the Turkish Cypriots were denied such status (Richmond 1998, 90- 99).
Moreover, the Turkish Cypriots, following the incidents in December 1963, began resettling their population in a few enclaves (covering approximately 5% of the island) and also set up a separate administration. With the arrival of the UN peacekeepers in 1964, particularly after 1967, the security situation was somewhat stabilised (Lindley 2001, 80). Meanwhile, the first ever round of UN mediation (1964- 1965) failed when the mediator’s proposals were rejected by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. After a two year gap, the representatives of the two communities began holding negotiations in 1968, which lasted until the situation took a turn for the worse in 1974, and the UN’s role was, this time, limited with provision of good offices (Richmond 1998, 106). On 15 July 1974, a Greek backed coup d’état aiming at union with Greece deposed President Makarios and installed Nicos Sampson, a Greek Cypriot ultranationalist, as president. On 20 July, alarmed by these developments, Turkey militarily intervened, invoking her role as a guarantor of the 1960 status quo.