Although the political developments on the island were not totally promising, the AKP government in Turkey was pondering a change in Turkey’s long maintained Cyprus policy. The AKP government grew dissatisfied with Denktash’s intransigence which, they believed, led the negotiations process to a collapse and paved the way for the Greek Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the European Union.87 The Turkish government was keen to begin its own EU accession negotiations and Cyprus’s accession to the EU was set to be a problem for Turkey as Turkey did not recognize the Greek Cypriot government. In January 2004 the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan met the UN Secretary-General Annan at the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.88 In that meeting, Erdogan asked Annan to restart the process and assured him that his government would support it and also pressure the Turkish Cypriots to do so as well:
For its part, the Government of Turkey was putting together the elements of a new policy on Cyprus, which was conveyed to me by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan when we met in Davos on 24 January 2004. He told me that Turkey supported a resumption of negotiations. He expressed preferences for dealing with the main issues by 1 May 2004, and for a political figure to handle the negotiations, but was open to discussion on these points. He added that, as far as Turkey was concerned, it had no objection to my “filling in the blanks” in the plan should the parties not be able to agree on all issues. He assured me
87
As early as January 2003, there were signs of Erdogan's rejection of the traditional Turkish policy in Cyprus and his disagreements with Denktash. Erdogan was reported to have remarked: “I'm not in favor of the continuation of the policy that has been maintained in Cyprus over the past 30 to 40 years. …We will do whatever falls on us. This is not Mr Denktash's private matter”, quoted in “Turkish Cypriot Leader Is Criticized by Ankara”, The New York Times, 3 January 2003,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/03/world/turkish-cypriot-leader-is-criticized-by-ankara.html (accessed 7/8/12).
88
“Turkish Leader Suggests UN Can Work out a Cyprus Settlement”, The New York Times, 25 January 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/25/world/turkish-leader-suggests-un-can-work-out-a-cyprus- settlement.html (accessed 7/8/12).
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that, henceforth, the Turkish side, including the Turkish Cypriots, would be “one step ahead” in the effort.89
Subsequent to this meeting, the Secretary-General met Greek Cypriot leader who also assured him about his willingness to negotiate on the basis of the plan. The Secretary-General then asked Denktash and Papadopoulos to meet him in New York and restart the process. Once he received the letter, Denktash travelled to the Turkish capital and met the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. Erdogan sought to persuade Denktash to attend the New York meeting and they negotiated a five-page list of changes the Turkish Cypriots would demand on the Annan Plan.90 In other words, this meeting was a quasi-mediation process led by Turkey as a kin-state. Erdogan's public statements and the evolution of the process after the Ankara meeting indicate that the Turkish government also tightened its grip on Denktash. On 13 February, on the first day of the New York meeting, Erdogan declared that if Denktash would not stick to the road map agreed in Ankara “... the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) will pay for that”.91 It was not clear exactly what consequences were there for the Turkish Cypriots. However, it was no secret that the Turkish Cypriots were dependent on Turkey for both military aid and economic assistance.92 The Turkish government thus initially engaged in quasi-mediation and then turned to coercion to deal with its kin community’s intransigent leader. Denktash responded the Turkish government’s strategy by seeking to form a public opinion against the Plan through his statements to the Turkish media and occasionally in his addresses to public gatherings in Turkey organised by his allies in the Turkish opposition parties, but the support received from the public was far less than he expected.93
At the New York meeting which took place 10-13 April, the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Talat, widely seen as an ally of the Turkish government, was with Denktash. When Denktash
89
UN Security Council (2004), “Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good-offices in Cyprus - (S/2004/437)”, New York, 28 May, paragraph no. 7,
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/312/85/PDF/N0431285.pdf (accessed 7/8/12). 90
“Going to New York, but...”, Turkish Daily News, 7 February 2004,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/going-to-new-york-but.aspx?pageID=438&n=going-to-new-york-but...- 2004-02-07 (accessed 7/8/12).
91
“Message of Erdogan to Denktas”, Turkish Daily News, 11 February 2004,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=message-of-erdogan-to-denktas-2004-02-11 (accessed 7/8/12).
92
Turkish financial assistance to the TRNC in 2004 was estimated at 250 million US dollars (World Bank 2006, 121). Figures on Turkish military assistance to the Turkish Cypriots are unpublished. For an analysis of the Turkish aid and the economic development of Northern Cyprus, see World Bank (2006, 121-122). 93
Denktash would continue to seek manipulation of the Turkish public opinion in the following months. For an account of one of Dentash’s addresses to the Turkish public, see M.A. Birand (2004), “Denktas expected a larger crowd”, Turkish Daily News, 6 Mar., “http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/denktas-expected-a-larger- crowd.aspx?pageID=438&n=denktas-expected-a-larger-crowd-2004-03-06 (accessed 7/8/12).
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attempted to side with Papadopoulos to reject the procedure about finalisation of the plan by UNSG and the commitment to hold a referendum on the finalised Plan, the Turkish Cypriot leader, in the face of the pressure from the Turkish government and his own Prime Minister, changed his mind overnight and accepted the framework.94 After seeking some clarifications, Papadopoulos also changed his mind and agreed to the UN’s framework. Palley (2005, 103), a member of the Greek Cypriot diplomatic team at the summit, claims that the ultimate reasoning behind the Greek Cypriots’ acceptance of the UNSG’s new procedure was that “… they knew that the final word on the Secretary-General’s conduct would be by the people of Cyprus through citizens direct and personal votes at the referenda.” More strikingly, Palley also notes (2005, p. 103 footnote 19) that: “The international furore had his [UNSG] good offices been rejected would have been so damaging that the Republic of Cyprus’s [i.e. the Greek Cypriot government] position as the State of Cyprus could have been thrown to reconsideration by angered States.” In sum, in both cases the leaders submitted to the process as they were motivated by likelihood of certain sanctions from other states or a kin-state, rather than a genuine commitment to a settlement through the UN’s procedure. It should also be noted that the United States was noted as playing a key role, at the request of Turkey, in convincing the UNSG to restart negotiations and also bringing about a deal at the New York summit.95
The UN’s new proposal was that both leaders would follow a three phase procedure: first, they would negotiate until 22 March; and if there is no agreement then an international conference, attended by Greece and Turkey as well, would be convened to finalise the plan; and if there is still no agreement, the UN Secretary-General was to finalise the plan that was going to be submitted to referendum in April. This procedure effectively meant arbitration by the United Nations, though it was not clear whether the leaders would accept the outcome of the arbitration and campaign for its acceptance by their respective communities in the referendum. Moreover, the international conference was to be attended by the EU as well and hence creating more pressure on the parties to agree on finalising the plan. The three phase procedure in place, Weston
94
The then Under-Secretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ugur Ziyal, was in the Turkish delegation accompanying Denktash in the New York summit. Ziyal gave Denktash a note from the Turkish government asking him to either continue the process, or in case he chooses to leave, warning him that the Turkish Cypriot PM Talat will replace him with Turkey's support. See S. Ergin (2004), “AB’den Tarih Almaya Giden Sürecin Perde Arkasındaki Mimar”, Hürriyet, 26 December 2004,
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=284058 (accessed 7/8/12). 95
Palley (2005, 99-100) attributes the restart of the negotiations to the US pressure on the UNSG, and while
Hürriyet, the Turkish daily, claimed that the Secretary of State Powell and the US Special Envoy Weston were
involved in the New York summit, see “Tarihi zirve üçüncü gününe sarktı”, Hürriyet, 11 February 2004,
96
(the US representative to the Cyprus talks) believed the settlement was definitely within reach: ''It is almost certain now that there will be a settlement on the island of Cyprus.''96