Limpieza a alta presión

On 24 April 2004, only a week before the accession of Cyprus to the EU, the Annan Plan was put to simultaneous referenda in the two parts of the island. The Greek Cypriot community overwhelmingly rejected the plan, with a 75.83 per cent ‘No’, whereas the Turkish Cypriot community approved with a 64.90 per cent ‘Yes’.112

Annan Plan V met fierce opposition from the Cypriot leaders. The Greek Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, supported by a group of political parties and the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus, led a fierce ‘No’ campaign.113 The Greek Cypriot leader’s main argument was that the Greek Cypriot community’s EU membership was set to be materialized soon, precisely one week after the referenda, regardless of the outcome thereof, and the Greek Cypriots, according to Papadopoulos and his political allies, would be getting a new leverage against the Turkish Cypriots

111 _{This seems to imply a stronger basis for the rights of the constituent states and thus trying to meet the} Turkish Cypriot demand for separate sovereignty, though it should be noted that such a term does not carry any specific meaning in terms of international law, as only states that are part of the international system (i.e. the UN system) are conceived to be sovereign entities.

112 _{“Greek Cypriot Voted No, Turks Yes”, Turkish Daily News, 24 April 2004,}

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/greek-cypriot-voted-no-turks-yes.aspx?pageID=438&n=greek-cypriot- voted-no-turks-yes-2004-04-24 (accessed 7/8/12).

113 _{The Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus even labelled the Plan “satanic” and threatened those in favour of} its adoption with “eternal damnation” (International Crisis Group 2006, 8).

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and Turkey to secure a better deal in the future.114 Some anticipated that the Plan would be supported by the communist AKEL, the largest Greek-Cypriot political party and also a member of the political coalition which supported Papadopoulos in his presidential bid. In the event, the party demanded security guarantees for implementation of the Plan from the UN Security Council. The efforts to provide such guarantees failed when a resolution with a reference to Article 7 of the UN Charter was vetoed by Russia at behest of Papadopoulos.115

On the other side of the divide, Denktash and the main opposition UBP campaigned against the Plan. Their main objection was that that there were no sufficient guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots, during his “No” campaign Denktash also alleged the Turkish government and media of putting immense pressure on his people.116 In the run up to the referendum the ruling AKP of Turkey also called on Denktash to resign if the referendum succeeded.117 Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot prime minister, Mehmet Ali Talat, worked very closely with the Turkish government during the Annan Plan negotiations and led a ‘Yes’ campaign in the referendum.118 In April 2005 TRNC presidential election, Denktash did not seek re-election and was replaced by Talat.119

In 2006, Talat and Papadopoulos began a new round of negotiations under the UN mediation, which soon proved fruitless.120 A glimmer of hope emerged when Papadopoulos lost his re-election bid in 2008 and Dimitris Christofias of AKEL became the Greek Cypriot leader. The fact that Christofias was known to be more conciliatory towards the Turkish Cypriots than

114 _{In his televised address to the Greek Cypriots on 12 April 2004, as he officially started the “No”}

campaign, Papadopoulos underscored this point: “If the people with their vote reject the plan, in one week the Republic of Cyprus will become a full and equal member of the EU. We will achieve a strategic aim that we mutually set to upgrade and politically safeguard the Republic of Cyprus, we will not stop striving for a solution of the Cyprus problem, history does not end on May 1.” The full text of the speech is accessible at:

http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2004/04-04-08.cna.html#01 (accessed 7/8/12). 115 _{G. Wright (2004), “Greek Cypriot leaders reject Annan plan”, The Guardian, 22 Apr.,}

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/22/eu.cyprus (accessed 7/8/12); Y. Kanli (2004a), “Russian veto relieves Turks”, Turkish Daily News, 23 Apr.,

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=russian-veto-relieves-turks-2004-04-23

(accessed 7/8/12). 116

“Denktash: UN Plan Diabolical”, Turkish Daily News, 16 April 2004,

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/denktas-un-plan-diabolical.aspx?pageID=438&n=denktas-un-plan- diabolical-2004-04-16 (accessed 7/8/12).

117

“AKP says Denktash should resign if referendum succeeds”, Turkish Daily News, 23 April 2004,

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akp-says-denktas-should-resign-if-referendum-

succeeds.aspx?pageID=438&n=akp-says-denktas-should-resign-if-referendum-succeeds-2004-04-23

(accessed 7/8/12). 118

Y. Kanli (2004b), “‘Yes’ and ‘No’ bout on Cyprus”, Turkish Daily News, 3 Apr.,

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/yes-and-no-bout-on-cyprus.aspx?pageID=438&n=yes-and-no-bout-on- cyprus-2004-04-03 (accessed 7/8/12).

119

“Talat Ho!”, The Economist, 21 April 2005, http://www.economist.com/node/3893699 (accessed 7/8/12). 120 _{“Cyprus rivals still far apart after rare talks”, Agence France-Presse (AFP), 5 September 2007,}

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Papadopoulos led many to suggest that a deal was within reach. However, no such deal was materialised, and in the April 2010 Turkish Cypriot presidential election Talat lost to Dervish Eroglu of the UBP, a nationalist veteran of Turkish Cypriot politics.121 The negotiations between Christofias and Eroglu reached a deadlock by early 2012 and were suspended in May 2012, and there seems to be no prospect of a deal until at least February 2013 Greek Cypriot presidential election.122

4.10. Conclusion

The Cypriot elites’ lack of commitment towards a power-sharing agreement was the most important factor in the failure of the UN peacemaking intervention. But the account of the process (1999-2004) also demonstrates that the organisation was not able to play a significant role at many critical junctures in the talks because it was often devoid of means to motivate parties towards a compromise solution, and the UNSG’s efforts seeking to instil a sense of urgency on the parties towards a settlement largely failed. This case study of Cyprus underlines the complexity of relationships between the Cypriot communities, their kin-states and the third party peacemaker. The Turkish-Turkish Cypriot interaction was largely shaped by Turkey’s desire to join the EU, which led the Turkish leadership to seek initially a quasi-mediation role and then a coercive role in shaping the Turkish Cypriot policy vis-à-vis the UN peacemaking process. And the UN seems to have sought to deal with its lack of clout with the Turkish Cypriots by taking advantage of Turkey’s EU accession process and deep involvement as a kin-state in the conflict. Meanwhile, in the case of Greece and Greek Cypriots the kin-state-kin-community relationship was predicated on Greece’s support for the latter’s EU process, and a role similar to Turkey’s was not assumed by Greece in the peacemaking process for two main reasons. Since the Greek led coup d’état in Cyprus in 1974 triggered the Turkish intervention and the island’s de facto partition, Greece’s influence over the Greek Cypriots was substantially reduced, and also there was no direct consequence for Greece from the continuation of the Cyprus conflict. However, within the EU, Greece promoted the Greek Cypriot interests and even threatened to block the EU’s eastern enlargement if Cyprus were not included (Tocci 2004).

During the Copenhagen summit in 2002, the Turkish Cypriots were not prepared to engage fully in the process, and when they were ready to do so at the Bürgenstock conference in 2004, this time the Greek Cypriots were not willing to negotiate. These developments reflected a pattern of the Cyprus conflict: both sides alternately acted as spoilers of peace processes ever since the

121

BBC News (2010), “New hardliner joins Cyprus talks”, 26 May, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10165771

(accessed 7/8/12). 122

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beginning of the conflict. Both Cypriot communities have certain strengths that enable them to pursue the conflict rather than agreeing to a compromise solution. Since the disintegration of the 1960 consociation in 1963, the Greek Cypriots have been recognised as the government of Cyprus (and hence a member of the UN) and there has been a few quite strongly worded UNSC resolutions against international recognition of the TRNC. The UN’s general policy towards the conflict is thus firmly established, with almost no room for flexibility. The status quo leaves the Greek Cypriot side with only one major incentive for a solution: recovering the Greek Cypriot properties in the north. As for the Turkish Cypriots, they have been denied an international status since 1963 and become dependent on Turkey for sustenance of their de facto statehood. But their negotiation positions have often been as hardened as the Greek Cypriot ones, especially as long they did not clash with Turkey’s wider foreign policy objectives.

In terms of the mediator’s role, the 1999-2004 peacemaking process was not essentially shaped by the UN. The process was instead manipulated by the EU and Turkey. Turkey, through its influence on the Turkish Cypriots, and the European Union, through the accession processes of Cyprus and Turkey, were the crucial players. As discussed, Turkey’s desire to join the European Union was the main reason why Denktash agreed to participate in the UNSG mediated process and subsequently submitted to the UNSG's finalisation of the Plan and the referenda. For the most part, the Greek Cypriots tried to appear conciliatory in order to keep their EU accession on track. However, when the accession was guaranteed, they stopped engaging in the UN led process. According to Alvaro de Soto, the UNSG’s special adviser on Cyprus, the failure was ultimately due to the fact that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots changed their course rather late, when there was no incentive left for the Greek Cypriots:

The problem is it all happened rather late: Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots turned around, but they turned around too late and by the time the negotiation had been going for a couple of years the Greek Cypriots had got the impression the Turkish Cypriots, particularly their leader Rauf Denktash, were being their usual obdurate selves. By then Greek Cypriot public opinion had pretty much given up on it and when the presidential election came they elected someone they knew to be much more of a hardliner and much less committed to a settlement than the person who had been leading them until then. So, the EU decided to enlarge the Union with ten states, and the Greek Cypriot leader made a speech a few weeks before the referendum on the settlement plan in which he said something like, 'why should I agree to a compromise that I don't particularly like when I will be able - once we are in the EU in a few weeks - to exert pressure on Turkey in order to get a better deal.' And that proved to be a killer argument. In other words we ran out of time. The incentive was there, which for the Greek Cypriots was entering Europe reunified, but after a certain point, whether it was late 2002 or early 2003, we had probably missed the boat because they were already in a position where they could get the reward contained in the incentive without having to pay anything for it (Accord 2008, 26).

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De Soto does not explain whether the UN team took into account the weakness of the incentive structure after late 2002 and tried to deal with it. Manipulation of the incentive structure (i.e. EU's enlargement policies) was most probably not within the UNSG’s reach. It should be, then, questioned why the UN invested almost five years in a process which was inherently flawed. The most likely explanation is that the UN’s focus on Denktash made it harder for them to notice that there might be some other potential spoilers, e.g. Papadopoulos. Also, it could be argued that the UN committed a strategic mistake by not pushing for the leaders’ consent to the Plan at the New York summit in February 2004. The referenda mechanism was devised to get around Denktash’s intransigence, but the UN failed to see that without a requirement to commit to the outcome of the process (i.e. Annan V) the leaders could continue to undermine the UN’s work through their influence over their publics. As the Cypriot elites were neither willing nor ready to compromise, the UNSG’s mediation efforts should have been supported with a combination of strong incentives and disincentives to motivate the Cypriots. Maintenance of the conditionality of reaching a settlement for EU accession beyond Copenhagen and indicating the international community’s will to take some steps towards legitimising the Turkish Cypriot statehood could have been very effective incentives/disincentives. Both options, though, would require consent and cooperation of a number of states, the EU, including Greece, for making the Cypriot accession conditional and the UN Security Council in legitimising the statehood.

The efforts spent by the UNSG and his team of experts towards piecing together the Annan Plan were huge and the Plan itself was largely successful in striking a balance between the basic needs of both sides. The case of Cyprus indicates that power-sharing regimes cannot be built solely through the efforts of a third party peacemaker. A feeling of urgency should also be shared by the local elites. The de facto partition of Cyprus and the subsequent relative stability of the conflict seem to have led the Cypriot elites to believe that there is no urgent need for a political settlement. As long as the Cypriot elites continue to pursue their idealistic goals and are still enjoying their publics’ support, it is unlikely that there will be a power-sharing settlement. Moreover, the role of kin-states was ultimately inconsistent or negligible and, at times, counterproductive for peacemaking purposes. Without consistent and considerable kin-state pressure on their co-ethnic allies to enter into a compromise agreement, the position of the Cypriot elites is not likely to change, and such pressure currently seems improbable as the conflict is a matter of secondary importance to both Greece and Turkey.

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CHAPTER 5

Bosnia: Kin-states from Quasi-mediators to Enforcers

5.1. Introduction

The disintegration process of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia caused a number of conflicts among its constituent entities and peoples. The war in Bosnia123 _{was the most brutal one}

of those conflicts: the cruelty of warfare and civilian suffering reached to the levels that had not been witnessed on the European continent since the end of the Second World War. The war ended on 21 November 1995 with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The DPA was not merely a peace agreement, it also provided for an intricate power-sharing regime among Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups, namely the Bosnian Muslims (who are also known as Bosniaks), the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. The process leading to the DPA was very convoluted and the agreement was ultimately reached at the very last moments of the Dayton conference. The conference took place against the backdrop of many failed rounds of negotiations mediated by several international bodies since 1991.

This chapter looks at the international peacemaking interventions in Bosnia (1991-1995), which culminated at Dayton. In order to do so, the chapter first discusses the unravelling of Yugoslavia and, in particular, how this unfolded in Bosnia. That is followed by a brief overview of the literature on peacemaking during the Bosnian war. The substantive analysis first focuses on European Community (EC) and the ICFY (International Conference on Former Yugoslavia) led collective mediation efforts. Subsequently, the US policy on Bosnia with a focus on its interaction with kin-state actors within the context of peacemaking intervention is analysed. The latter part of chapter investigates the Dayton conference, especially the mediation strategy and tactics used by the US mediators to coerce the parties towards an agreement. Finally, some assessments on the power-sharing model envisaged by the Dayton settlement and its implementation are provided. The chapter finds that the role of kin-states in the peacemaking process in Bosnia was initially limited with quasi-mediation. However, as the conflict intensified and the international community put more pressure on Croatia and Federal Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro), the two kin-states, in an implicit alliance with the American peacemakers, took over their respective

123 _{In accordance with common practice, I use “Bosnia” instead of the country’s official name “Bosnia and} Herzegovina”.

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kin community’s leadership. The Croat and Yugoslav governments thus assumed the role of enforcing their kin-groups’ submission to the Dayton process and agreement.

5.2. The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the Birth of Bosnia as an Independent