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to the μέρη τής ούσίας (parts of substance); and that the important distinc­ tion in this treatise is that between primary substances (e.g. Socrates, Plato) and secondary substances (e.g. man, animal and so forth) (p. 88, 12- 29).5

The distinction between primary and secondary ούσίαι, as well as Aristotle's characterization of the former as "that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of air' (2a 11-12), was very problematic for Porphyry and the other commentators who happened to be Neoplatonists. It was understandably difficult for those philosophers to accept wholeheartedly the Aristotelian thesis which relegates the εϊδη and the γένη (species and genera) to a secondary position in favor of the particular substance, the concrete individual, τόδε τι.6 Even Porphyry,

who was a sympathetic commentator and tried to find grounds to defend Aristotle's doctrines as presented in the Categories, did not have an easy task at this point. It is clear, then, that the problems involved in this distinction, especially the question of priority between the two types of ούσιαι, call for further consideration. We may begin with the relevant passage from the Categories:

A Substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all—is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is the genus of the species; so these—both man and animal—are called secondary substances. (2a 11-18)

This passage leaves no doubt as to (1) what Aristotle means by primary and secondary substances, and (2) which of the two has priority over the other. This priority is not only ontological, in the sense that "if the

5 In some cases συμβεβηκότα also can be predicated of a subject but with a difference.

For instance, to say of Socrates that "He is a man" and that "He is white" are both correct predications. The difference between them is that 'man' is predicated of him

synonymously (i.e. both name and definition corresponding to the name), while 'white' is

predicated of him homonymously (i.e. only the name, but not the definition of white).

6 For a more complicated analysis of the meaning of the technical expression ό τίς

άνθρωπος, I refer to EAC, p. 162, 5-34. Elias calls the kind of substance which it designates "συνθέτη καί σχετική" (compound and relative) and points out that the τίς is here equivalent to πάς. It seems that by this expression Aristotle tried to say what is easily expressed in English by the indefinite article which the Greek language did not and does not have ("a man" or "any man" qua representative of the human species, are possible renderings). In this connection, Ackrill notes, [2], p. 76, that: "He [Aristotle] does not distinguish between the relation of an individual to its species and that of a species to its genus." For Aristotle, however, "the species and genera" were nothing above or beyond the individuals, viewed collectively in terms of their common characteristics. Thus the relation of an individual to its species does not differ in any way from that of any other individual of the same species.

primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for other things to exist,'' but also logical in the sense that "animal is predicated of man and therefore also of the individual man; for were it predicated of none of the individual men it would not be predicated of man at all" (2a 362b 6). Commenting on this passage, Porphyry accepts and defends both these theses. With regard to species and genera and in view of the fact that they are to be found in every category, the commentator observes that it is important that it be understood that only species and genera in the category of ούσία are called, by Aristotle, secondary substances (p. 70, 1-10). Then he repeats the two reasons which Aristotle provided (2b 29- 3a 7) in explaining this restriction. They are as follows:

It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only other things called (secondary) substances. For only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary substance. For if one is to say of the individual man what he is, it will be in place to give the species or the genus (though more informative to give man than animal); . . . Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances most strictly. But as the primary substances stand to everything else, so the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: all the rest are predicated of these. For if you will call the individual man grammatical it follows that you will call both a man and an animal grammatical.7

This is straightforward. However, things are more complicated regarding the second point which relates to the question of priority between the two types of substances. How are we to understand Aristo­ tle's claim here that, with comparison to its species and genera (καθόλου), the particular substance (i.e. "this man" or "that horse") is called ούσία

par excellence? In other words, how could Aristotle say that individual

substances have every right to be called substances "in the highest sense," as he put it, "κυριώτατά τε καί πρώτως και μάλιστα," when else­ where he states that "τό καθόλου πρότερον καί τό ειδος?"8 Besides, in

distinguishing the meanings of πρότερον (prior) in the post-praedicamenta (14a 26-b 23), Aristotle specifies five different usages one of which is called "prior by nature" (φύσει πρότερον). He explains: "For of things which reciprocate as to the implication of existence, that which is in some

7 In Ackriirs translation, this example does not seem to convey the meaning of the

passage correctly. What Aristotle meant to say is certainly something different. If we recall that, in Topics 102a 18-20, Aristotle identified the ιδιον of man as "capable of learn­ ing grammar," then the meaning of this passage would be something like this: If a man is called grammatical correctly, then every man qua man can be called grammatical in the sense that potentially every man is capable of learning grammar. Potentiality will come up again later in this chapter because Porphyry made use of it.