This being the case, it is clear that VI. 2. falls outside my limited pur- poMc, which is to examine only Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle's categorial doctrine, its presuppositions and consequences. For this reason, this tract will be considered very briefly and only insofar as it is necessary for the understanding of the other two tracts (VI. 1. and 3.). It is in these two tracts where Plotinus' many objections to Aristotle's categories are to be 1'ound. In the first tract Plotinus, as we will presently see, rejects Aristo tle's categories considered as "genera of Being" on the ground that they nrc neither "primary genera" nor related to realm of real Being. In the llurd tract he reduces and modifies considerably the Aristotelian set of (ategories so that they may fit the shadowy world of becoming. I shall proceed to discuss in this chapter the Plotinian rejection of Aristotle's categories, that is, Ennead VI. i . , and leave Ennead VI. 3., that is, the
IMotinian reduction of Aristotle's categories, for the next chapter.
2. An Old Ontological Controversy
Since the subject of the discussion in VI. 1. is τά γένη του δντος, Plotinus appropriately raises the question of the correct number of these
4'genera" at the very beginning. He states:
The extremely ancient philosophers investigated beings, how many there were and what they were: some said there was one being, some a definite number, some an infinite number: and in each of these groups, some said the one being was one thing and some another, and the same applies to those who said the number of beings was limited and those who said that it was infinite. And since these views have been sufficiently examined by those who came after them, we can let them go. But since these later philosophers, after examining the views of the earlier ones, themselves placed beings in a number of definite kinds, we must consider them and see how many the kinds are: these philosophers did not posit one being, because they saw many even in the intelligible realm, nor an infinite number, because this was impossible and knowledge could not occur, and some of them posited ten of their numerically limited kinds and some fewer (they have said that the foundations of being are not rightly thought of as a sort of elements, but as genera of some kind): but there might have been some who posited more than these ten.10 (VI. 1. 1, 1-13)
Consequently, Plotinus seems to reject the two extreme views, viz. (a) that beings are infinite in number, as uemocritus said, and (b) that tfiere is only one Beings as Parmenides claimec}·11 In agreement with Plato and
10 This passage echoes Aristotle's discussion at the beginning of the first book of Physics, especially 184b-186a.
11 Plotinus does not mention the representatives of each doctrine. It was not his habit
to refer to other philosophers by name, except for Plato. But Aristotle mentions Parmenides and Democritus as holding respectively the monistic and the pluralistic doc trines of reality.
Aristotle he admits that there are many ontic genera/2 The question,
therefore, remains: How many are they? Taking ten as a basis Plotinus distinguishes three groups of philosphers holding different views on this issue:
(1) Those who postulate ten genera.
(2) Those who postulate less than ten genera. (3) Those who postulate more than ten genera.
Evidently, group (1) is to be identified with the Peripatetics. Both Stoics and Platonists belong to group (2). Who was supposed to make up group (3) is not easy to specify because Plotinus does not discuss this case.13
What he does consider and discuss in succession are the tenfold, the fourfold and the fivefold divisions of the genera. Respectively these can be identified as the Peripatetic, the Stoic and the Platonic positions on this issue.14 Of all these divisions the most important for my purpose
here, which is to discuss Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle's categories, is evidently the Peripatetic division with which I shall begin.
3. The Tenfold Division of οντα
With regard to the tenfold division of genera Plotinus states:
First, then, we must take the opinion which divides beings into ten, and see whether we think the philosophers are saying that there are ten genera which fall under the common name of "being/' or ten categories. For they say, and say rightly that being does not mean the same thing in all ten: but we should rather ask them this first, whether the ten are there in the same way in the intelligible beings and the beings perceived by sense, or whether they are all in the beings of the sense-world, but in the intelligibles some are there and some not: for it certainly cannot be the other way round. At this point we must examine which of the ten are also there in the intelligible, and if the things there can be brought under one genus with those here below, or the term "substance" is used ambiguously of that there and this here. But if this is so, then there are more than ten genera. But if "substance'' is used in the same sense there as here, it would be absurd for it to mean the same thing when applied to primary beings and those which come after them, since there in no common genus of things among which
12 Metaphysics 1065b 15.
13 To the question "Who were those who posited more than ten genera?" the answer,
according to Henry and Schwyzer, is Peripatetici quos impugnat Dexippus In Categorias 1. 37,
p. 32. The text, though, "etev V άν τινες οί πλείω τούτων", does not assert as a fact that
there were some who posited more than ten but, rather, it seems to state an open possibility.
14 Although Plotinus does not mention Aristotle here, the tenfold division is clearly
PLOTINUS' CRITICISM OF ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES 97
there is priority and posterity. But in their classification they are not speak ing about the intelligible beings: so they did not want to classify all beings, but left out those which are most authentically beings.15 (VI. 1. 1, 15-30) In this lengthy passage, there are several points which need to be dis cussed. First, Plotinus seems to admit the Aristotelian viewlhaLihejierm τό ov is not used synonymously with reference^J^t^^toi,genera..1 6...He goes a j t e p farther to make the point that there i s homonymy inyolyed in the usage of the term ούσια as applied to beings which tQ the intelligible and the sensible realms.17
Second, the distinction between the sensible realm and the intelligible realm plays a fundamental role in the Plotinian metaphysical system and provides the main grounds for Plotinus' criticism of the Aristotelian doc trine of categories. T h e dilemma in which Plotinus puts the Peripatetics is the following: (a) Either the same set of " g e n e r a " applies to both realms, in which case there should be a common genus to ...embrace primary" and secondary (^derivative δντα which; in Aristoteliaji terms,
1S not possible, 18i or (b) the proposed set of " g e ^
both realms, in which case their number should be increased. T h e only way to escape the horns of this dilemma is by neglecting the intelligible realm which, for Plotinus, is the realm of " t h e most authentically beings." H e believed that the Peripatetics did just that. Yet, he did not hesitate to criticize the doctrine of categories on the ground that they are inapplicable to the intelligible realm.1 9
Third, Plotinus makes an important distinction here between πρώτως δντα and ίίστερα δντα, that is, "primary beings" and "posterior b e i n g s " (or, as Armstrong renders it, "those which come after"). This distinction may remind us of the Aristotelian distinction between primary and secondary substances.20 There are significant differences, however, between the two expressions which should not be overlooked. For (a) it should be noted that Aristotle's distinction is restricted only to one genus of being, namely ούσια, while Plotinus refers to δντα in general; (b) Plotinus uses the term ύ'στερα which may suggest the derivative character
15 Plotinus' reference is to Peripatetics as well as Stoics, both of whom he criticizes in VI. 1.
16 In Metaphysics 998b 22ff., Aristotle points out the logical fallacies which follow from the hypothesis that τό ov and τό εν are γένη.
17 The relation between the two realms will be discussed in Chapter Five, section 2. 18 The impossibility is evident from the fact that what characterizes the different species of one and the same genus is not priority or posteriority but simultaneity, Categories 14b 30ff.
19 CAG IV, part 2. I have pointed this out in my paper [437].
of the sensible beings;21 and most important, (c) unlike Aristotle, who in the Categories gave priority to the sensibles, Plotinus insists upon the priority of the intelligibles.22 In this respect Plotinus would seem to be closer to Plato, though it would be a serious mistake to confuse Platonic εϊδη with Plotinian γένη.23
Fourth, Plotinus seems to distinguish between "genera" and 4'categories."24 He accepts Aristotle' stipulative definition of the term 'genus' and he repeats it almost verbatim.25 But he tries to show that this
definition does not apply to Aristotle's categories which, therefore, can not be considered as "genera" in Plotinus' interpretation. Plotinus' main aim, in the discussion of the present tract, is to point out that none of the ten categories can be a " genus" and much less a "genus of Being." Ούσία, for example, Plotinus argues, cannot be a genus of all the 4'so-called sensible substances,"26 because it is not equally predicated of form, matter, and the composite. What all the so-called substances of the sensible world have in common, is not enough to give them the unity of a "genus," though it may distinguish them from other δντα as a separate category.27 Hence Plotinus' query whether we are to understand "ten genera which fall under the common name of "being," or ten categories." Even if all sensible substances could fall under a single "genus," this "genus," according to Plotinus, would be a "genus" of being only homonymously in comparison to the realm of real Being.28 As
21 In Plotinus' doctrine of ύποστάσεις, Intellect proceeds from the One, Soul proceeds
from the Intellect, while Nature is the product of the Soul's operation on matter through λόγος. On the relations of these hypostatic realities, I refer to Henry's introduction to MacKenna's translation of the Enneads, xxxiii-li; also the fundamental works of Inge, [152], Armstrong, [17] and [18], Brehier, [46], Arnou [21], Trouillard, [328] and [329], and Schwyzer, [601].
22 Enneads VI. 3. 5.
23 In Chapter Five we will see the reason why Plato's Forms together with Aristotle's
categories are excluded from Plotinus' list of ''genera of Being."
24 Aristotle used the following expressions in reference to the categories:
"γένη τών δντων," De Anima 412a 6; "κατηγοριαι του δντος," Physics 200b 28; "σχήματα της κατηγοριας," Metaphysics 1017a 23; "κατηγορήματα," Physics 201a 1;
"κατηγορούμενα," Metaphysics 1017a 25.
25 Enneads VI. 2. 8, 42-43; and 10, 37-40.
26 The Plotinian expression ούσια λεγομένη is variously rendered by other scholars.
E.g. "ambiguous substance" (Armstrong), "what passes as substance" (MacKenna), "pseudo-substance" (Anton). I prefer the rendering "so-called substance" because it better captures the irony of λεγομένη.
27 In a final analysis the difference between the terms "genus" and "category," as
used by Plotinus, is a matter of more and less unity. On this see Rutten, [281], pp. 45-56, and Wurm, [360], pp. 101-102, 117-118, 147-152, and Chapter Five of his book passim.
28 On this ambiguity Plotinus' "nominalism" is based. See Lloyd [530], Rutten [281],