It may be stated from the outset that in general Plotinus' criticism of the Stoic doctrine of categories is based on the same grounds as his criticism of the Aristotelian theory. It seems that, in Plotinus' view, the Stoics have repeated all the errors which the Peripatetics committed regarding the problem of the "genera of Being." What is even worse, the Stoics added two more mistakes to the Peripatetic stock. For (1) they included every entity in a single "common genus," the famous τι, (which literally means "something"); and (2) they identified it with υλη (matter). Thus they appeared to be both monists and materialists, which is definitely an unpleasant combination to the eyes of a pure Platonist, like Plotinus.
The following passages may serve as an indication of Plotinus' attitude towards the Stoic philosophy in general, and their categorial doctrine in particular:
But as for those who posit the four genera and make a fourfold division into subjects and qualia and things in a certain state and things in a certain state in relation to others, and posit over them a common something and include all things in one genus, there is much that one could say against them because they assume a common something and one genus over all.86 (VI.
1. 25, 1-5)
84 See also PAC, pp. 141-142.
85 The Stoic categorial scheme has been recently discussed by Graeser [123], Chapter Four, which is characteristically titled "Plotinus and the Stoic Categories of Being," with relevant bibliography.
86 As given by Plotinus the names of the Stoic categories are:
ύποκειμενα, ποιά, πως εχοντα, πρός τι πως εχοντα.
Again:
They rank subjects first and at this point rank matter before the others, and so rank what they think is the first principle along with the things which come after their first principle. (Ibid. 12-14)
And again:
But, though there are many things which are said against this hypothesis, we must stop here for fear that it may be absurd to strive for victory with so manifest an absurdity by showing that they give non-being the first rank as that which is most of all being and so rank the last first. The cause of this is that sense-perception became their guide and they trusted it for the placing of principles and the rest. For they considered that bodies were the real beings. . . . (VI. 1. 28, 1-7)
In spite of all these negative remarks there is one point of importance which should not be overlooked. Plotinus seems to treat both the Aristotelian set of categories and the Stoic categories or ύποκείμενα, as he calls them in the same manner. Now, with regard to so-called Stoic categories, the available evidence seems to support the view that, although they function well ontologically (in Stoic ontology, to be sure), they do not seem to play any significant role logically (in Stoic logic, of course).87 If this view is correct, then the fact that Plotinus treats both sets of categories in the same manner would seem to suggest that he accepted the ontological interpretation of Aristotle's categorial doctrine. That this was the case we have the additional testimony of Simplicius.88
But, it may be asked, why is this point considered important? In reply, the following reasons may be provided. First of all, Plotinus' acceptance of the ontological interpretation of the categories (Stoic and Aristotelian) sharply contrasts with Porphyry's rejection of it. Thus the two philosophers appear to disagree radically, at least on the issue of the cor
rect interpretation of Aristotle's categorial doctrine. Yet, the generally accepted view is that Porphyry was nothing more than "le disciple et l'editeur de Plotin."
Secondly, it certainly throws some new light on the presuppositions which underlay Plotinus' severe criticism of Aristotle's doctrine of the categories, to know that he interpreted the categories as "genera of Being," that is, ontologically. In this perspective, it is not difficult to see that the Aristotelian doctrine could not be accepted by Plotinus, whose theory of the three ύποστάσεις and the doctrine of the two realms of being (the realm of real Being and the realm of mere becoming) seem to go beyond this sensible world to which Aristotle's categories were restricted.
87 On this, see B. Mates [200], p. 18, and Ressor [583].
88 SAC, pp. 1-2.
PLOTINUS' CRITICISM OF ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES 127
Thirdly, it indicates the lines along which Porphyry was going to move in order to be able to find a way to incorporate Aristotle's theory of categories in the Neoplatonic version of the Platonic tradition. If nothing else, at least he had to abandon the ontological interpretation of the categories.
5. Conclusion
It was my intent in the present chapter to examine Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle's categories considered as ''genera of Being." The preceding discussion has shown that:
(1) Four of the ten categories, that is, when, where, having and posi
tion, were criticized and rejected as superfluous. It was argued that they could be reduced to other categories, such as substance, quantity, quality, and relation.
(2) Two other Aristotelian categories, that is, acting and being acted upon, were replaced by a new category which Plotinus introduced. The name of the new category was κινησις, which for Aristotle was something to be found in more than one category, that is, an inter-categorial term.
(3) With regard to the other four basic and more important categories, substance, quantity, quality and relatives, Plotinus' criticism intended to show that they cannot be called "genera," since they lack that "unity"
which "genus" implies Platonically. It is at this last point where the core of his criticism is to be found.
There are two underlying presuppositions which must be grasped in order for the Plotinian endeavor to be appreciated. First, it must be clearly understood that Plotinus in this tract criticized the categories as
"genera of Being," that is to say, as rivals of Plato's summa genera, iden
tified in the Plotinian ontology with the supreme κόσμος νοητός. Secondly, according to Plotinus, there are two separate spheres of being: (a) The sphere of real Being, that is, the intelligible realm of the second hypostasis or Νους, and (b) the sphere of mere becoming, that is, the sen
sible realm of Φύσις. These two realms resemble each other in a way similar to that of a reflection resembling the reflected object. Because there is a tendency to use the same terms in our discourse with references to these two realms, Plotinus thinks that homonymy, ambiguity and con
fusion are inevitable. We ought to distinguish between the really real δντα and their εϊδωλα.89
It is in this light that Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle's categories must be seen. Plotinus refused to accept the Peripatetic categories as "genera
89 On this glaring homonymy is based what modern scholars refer to as Plotinian and Neoplatonic "nominalism." See note 28 above.
of Being" because, for him, Being is something different from the sensi
ble world of becoming for which Aristotle's theory of categories was tailored. He may allow them to be called "categories" but never genera and, a fortiori, never "genera of Being." His position will be understood better once we see what he considers as authentic "genera of Being."
The first section of the next chapter is devoted to this aspect of his ontology.
CHAPTER FIVE
PLOTINUS' R E D U C T I O N OF ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES In VI. 1., as we saw, Plotinus criticized and rejected both the Peripatetic and the Stoic sets of categories on the ground that neither of them was qualified to account adequately for the realities of the intelligible world.
These two sets of categories refer exclusively to the realm of mere becom
ing which is, to use Plotinus' favorite metaphor, "like the reflection in the mirror, depending upon the original which stands outside of it".1 It would be mistaken, in Plotinus' view, to call them "genera of Being,"
for the following reason:
For it is absurd to put being under one genus with nonbeing, as if one were to put Socrates and his portrait under one genus. For "making a distinc
tion' ' here means marking off and setting apart, and saying that what seems to .be being is not being, and by this Plato indicates to them that what is truly being is something else.2 (VI. 2. 1, 23-28)
Accordingly, it is in the realm of true Being that one ought to look for the "genera of Being" as Plotinus understood them. In such a lofty search Plato is the only proper guide. It is not surprising that in Plato's theory of μέγιστα γένη,3 Plotinus found the solution to the problem of the nature and number of the "genera of Being." The entire second tract of the sixth Ennead is devoted to the presentation and defense of this thesis. Consider its opening:
Now that our enquiry about what are called the ten genera has been com
pleted, and we have spoken about those who bring all things into one genus and posit four species of a sort under the one, the next thing would be to say how these things look to us, trying to lead back our own thoughts to the thought of Plato. . . . Since, then, we are enquiring about being or beings, we must in our discussion first of all make a distinction between what we call being, about which at present our investigation would be cor
rectly conducted, and what others think is being, but we call it becoming, and say that it is never really real. {Ibid. 1-22)
1 VI. 2. 22, 33-35. The picture which Plotinus has in mind here is that of a κάτοπτρον (mirror) placed between the άρχέτυπον (original object) and the εΐδωλον (reflection, image) which it casts into the mirror from εξω (outside).
2 The next section of this chapter is devoted to the relation of the two realms of being as Plotinus sees it.
3 Sophist, especially 254a-255c
In VI. 3 . , Plotinus will have occasion to consider the realm of becom
ing which is "the universe perceived by the senses" {Ibid. 30-33). But he will also make it clear that "Therefore, we must look for more genera, and different ones in this All from those in the intelligible, since this All is different from that and it is not called the All in the same sense but in a different one, and is an image" (VI. 3. 1, 19-20).
Later on I will have something more to say regarding the relation of Plotinus' two realms, the realm of real Being and the realm of mere becoming. In so far as the problem of their genera is concerned, two things should be pointed out: (a) That according to Plotinus the correct number of the genera of Being as well as the number of the "genera"
of becoming is just five; and (b) that some of the "genera" of this shadowy realm of becoming have the same names (but only the names) as the genera of real Being. Thus, ambiguity caused by homonymy is inevitable. This being the case, it will be well to examine briefly the Ploti-nian genera of real Being, as stated in VI. 2., before we proceed with the discussion of the so-called "genera" of becoming, that is, Plotinus' pro
posal of a new list of categories for the sensible world, as found in VI. 3.
It should be made clear from this point forward that Plotinus' doc
trines, as stated in Ennead VI. 2., are more complicated than the usual and difficult to comprehend and interpret. A thorough account of them would call for a critical examination of the entire system of the Plotinian philosophy, a task which obviously falls outside the limited scope of this study. Besides, since our main purpose here is to consider and assess Plotinus' criticism of Aristotle's categorial doctrine as well as to contrast Plotinus' views with Porphyry's position on the same subject, there is no real need for us to deal with the Plotinian reinterpretation of Plato's metaphysical doctrines in detail. Therefore, I shall confine myself to a brief survey of the second tract (VI. 2.) by emphasizing the points which may shed light on Plotinus' criticism of the Aristotelian and Stoic sets of categories as found in the first tract (VI. 1.), and which may somehow explain the reduction of the categories as worked out in the third tract (VI. 3.) which is the central theme of this chapter.