The concept of legitimacy is closely associated with regime type. Würtenberger (1982, 680-81, cited in Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017, 2) defines legitimacy as “a form of political rule that was justified by the absence of despotism and tyranny and was, instead, characterized by the rule of law”. According to this narrow definition, legitimacy is not a proper concept when discussing a non-democratic regime due to the lack of rule of law.
However, many studies have shown that non-democratic regimes do, and use various tactics to establish and maintain legitimacy. Examining Central Asian countries, Schatz (2006, 268-9) argues that “claims to legitimacy establish plausible … links between ruler and ruled”. Regardless of the regime type, no ruler would refuse what legitimate rule brings: enhanced order, stability, and effectiveness (Beetham 1991, 25-37). Legitimacy, together with repression and co-optation, sustain autocratic rule (Gerschewski 2013). Legitimacy is particularly important, as the CCP is transforming itself from a revolutionary force into a ruling party, and the extreme friend/enemy distinction during the revolutionary era is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the public today.
Regime type does not make a considerable difference to whether or not a state pursues legitimacy. However, it does play a role in how a state is influenced by, and respond to terrorism. The debate on the relationship between regime type and terrorism has generated a substantial amount of academic work. Scholars disagree on whether democracy encourages or constrains terrorism. Eyerman (1998) divides the scholarship into the “strategic school” and the “political access school”. The former
contends that the higher level of freedom in democracies lowers the cost of violence, thus exposing democracies more to potential attacks. The latter argues that the opportunities of political participation that democracies provide offer peaceful alternatives to express political grievances, reducing the likelihood that discontented groups will resort to violence.
Schmid (1992, 18–20) summarises several weaknesses of democratic regimes in dealing with terrorism. First, freedom of movement allows immigrants and political refugees to mobilise international terrorism from abroad. Second, it is more difficult to convince the public to accept the trade-off between civil liberties and state security, which creates obstacles for intelligence collection. Third, the counter-value nature of terrorists means that open societies provide an abundance of targets.
Fourth, legal constraints make it difficult for a democratic government to prosecute an individual without solid proof.
In contrast, authoritarian governments are less constrained by these democratic values (Eubank and Weinberg 1994, 420). According to Pape (2003, 350), authoritarian police states are less restrained in curtailing civil liberties, making it more difficult for suicide attacks to be organised or gain publicity. Crenshaw (1981) and Eubank and Weinberg (1994) suggest that the lack of legal norms and complex institutions in non- democracies allows for relatively more efficient counter-terrorist measures. As totalitarian regimes are not under pressure to follow the due process and
demonstrate procedural justice, they are less restrained in terms of using extreme measures. In extreme cases, with the monopoly of armed forces, totalitarian regimes can effectively use state terror to exert control and persecute political enemies (Wilkinson 2001, 17). As Lutz and Lutz (2010, 63) illustrate, totalitarian regimes have a record of eliminating dissidents abroad, as is evident from Nazi Germany and the KGB in the Soviet Union.
Although empirical research (Gurr 2003, 202; A. P. Schmid 1992; Laqueur 2001, 122) demonstrates a generally positive correlation between the level of freedom and terrorist incidents, it would be an over-simplification to suggest a causal link between regime type and terrorism, regardless of other factors. Wilson and Piazza (2013, 941) argue that whether a certain regime type is more prone to terrorism is contingent on “complex institutional differences that go beyond the democracy-autocracy divide”. Indeed, non-regime factors cannot be ignored in understanding the causes of terrorism. Savun and Phillips (2009) argue that it is the type of foreign policy
democracies tend to pursue that makes them vulnerable to transnational terrorism. Ogden (2005, 247) argues that it is not authoritarianism per se, but poor governance, that has led to the aggravation of the grievances of the Uyghurs.
China seems to be particularly resilient to democratisation, according to Andrew J. Nathan (2003), due to its succession mechanism, meritocratic considerations that balance factional considerations in promotions, evolution towards the separation of the responsibilities and spheres of authority between the Party and government, and ability to rehabilitate its legitimacy. However, the four aspects that Nathan discusses have changed dramatically during President Xi Jinping’s terms in office. First, the CCP has amended the Chinese Constitution to remove the term limits (Griffiths and Schwarz 2018), and its increasingly firm grip on power makes it less likely that we will see a peaceful succession to the next generation of leaders. Second, Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign rewrote the rules of Chinese politics (The Economist 2015a). As many observers (Fiol-Mahon 2018; Schmitz 2017; Skidmore 2017) argue, Xi’s anti- corruption campaign, aimed at removing his political rivals, has reshaped factional politics, and brought factional considerations back to the forefront. Third, the
institutional restructuring in 2018 (Xinhua 2017; Xinhua 2018a) signals a regression of institutional differentiation. Although the revision of the Anti-Terrorism Law indicated some attempt to accord power to the judiciary, the executive remains dominant in the designation, evidence collection, and rehabilitation processes in counter-terrorism practice. Fourth, terrorism can erode legitimacy and trust within a democracy (Crelinsten 1989), but what is the impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism on legitimacy in an authoritarian regime like China? How does the CCP rehabilitate its legitimacy in the face of heavy-handed counter-terrorism policy and practice? This thesis contributes to the broader enquiry in regard to how authoritarian regimes respond to terrorism. While some believes that authoritarian regimes “differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy” (Geddes 1999, 121), others see commonalities among these regimes in regard to their legitimation mechanisms. Dukalskis and Gerschewski (2017, 3) have distilled four legitimation mechanisms, namely, indoctrination, performance, passivity, and democratic-procedural. Examining the links between China’s counter-terrorism approach and its quest for legitimacy and historical continuities, this thesis demonstrates similarities and differences between China and liberal democracies. The CCP shares the concerns for the legitimacy of its approach to terrorism, and it seeks to legitimise it through a number of tactics that have been studied by scholars, such as Gerschewski and Dukalskis, as typically non-democratic.
To maintain stability and sustain the CCP’s rule, three processes, as identified by Gerschewski (2013), can be seen from China’s counter-terrorism discourse, policy and practice, namely, legitimation, repression, and co-optation. The framing of terrorism- related incidents is built upon an array of ready-made assumptions that originated
from the narratives of the Century of Humiliation, which serve to establish and maintain the legitimacy of China’s security agenda, which prioritises national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The Strike Hard campaign, as well as the
restrictions put on education, religion, and ideology, serves to repress activities, ideas and views that are deemed “wrong”. The increase of ethnic minorities in the political system4 and the engagement with community members – mainly seen in the
mobilisation of the “patriotic believers”, “opinion leaders”, and “cultural workers” – reflect the CCP’s attempt to tie relevant actors to the Party and facilitate frame alignment among the Uyghurs through the voice from within.
To legitimise its approach to terrorism, the CCP has employed various tactics, which can be categorised according to Dukalskis and Gerschewski’s (2017) analysis of four legitimation mechanisms. Indoctrination, which is evident from the important role of the Department of Propaganda, has always been ingrained in China’s contemporary politics. Since the reform and opening up era, the CCP’s legitimacy has been sustained by a hidden social contract whereby individuals give up part of their freedom in exchange for rapid economic growth. The latter has also enabled the CCP to
demobilise the population so that they do not challenge the regime’s goals. Moreover, the regime is under pressure to persuade its citizens that it is at least making efforts to respect democratic procedures.
This thesis highlights the CCP’s struggle to seek to establish a counter-terrorism strategy that by and large respects democratic procedures. First, the revision of the definition of terrorism shows, albeit very limited, attempts to live up to the
commitment to freedom of expression. Second, the revised Anti-Terrorism Law gave power to the judiciary to designate terrorist individuals and organisations, which indicated some concern for due process and procedural justice. However, the power of the executive is still not constrained, and the terrorism designation process is still problematic, with very little support for the reviewing and delisting process. Without an independent body to examine the designation issued by the State Counter-
terrorism Leading Organ, the current designation mechanism still leaves the door open for power abuse. These factors show that China’s counter-terrorism approach is constrained by authoritarian characteristics such as highly concentrated power, limited freedom, and a general lack of due process, even though there have been some efforts to resist these characteristics.
4 According to the White Paper “Human Rights in Xinjiang – Development and Progress” (2017), the number of ethnic minority officials in Xinjiang increased from about 3,000 in 1950 to 91,076 in 2016 which accounts for 40 % of the population at the time.
This thesis also highlights the coexistence of the four legitimation mechanisms that Dukalskis and Gerschewski (2017, 3) have identified – the regime did not abandon indoctrination when China’s rapid economic growth allowed it to do so, although it arguably has relied much less on the friend/enemy distinction as a source of legitimacy.
Moreover, this thesis further explores the politicisation of the past and the use of history as a source of legitimacy. As Lary (2008, 131) observes, the Chinese
government has always considered the past as a key factor that provides the CCP’s right to rule. Compiling an official version of histories is a national project
underwritten by the political considerations of gaining legitimacy by presenting the “correct” version of history. The history of Xinjiang is an example where the
manipulation of history is obviously geared towards establishing the CCP’s right to rule. Section 4.3 demonstrates how the official history of Xinjiang has been controlled by the CCP, how the alternative accounts of the past have been labelled “nihilism”, and how it functions as a propaganda tool to support the CCP’s claims about the nature of terrorism in Xinjiang.