This thesis draws on Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) to examine the existing power relations embedded within the Chinese discourse on terrorism. The criticisms of CTS in regard to what it calls the “orthodox terrorism studies” offer some useful insights to uncover the interaction between the ways in which terrorism is framed in official and academic settings and the security agenda of the CCP. Terrorism-related information in the official and academic discourse is carefully selected and organised to represent a reality that is conducive to the CCP maintaining political stability. Although some of CTS’s claims are described as “overstated” (Horgan and Boyle 2008), the series of critiques offered by the CTS can help examine the status of the terrorism research field in the context of China’s counter-terrorism discourse, policy and practice. Richard Jackson (2007) lays out four main critiques of what he and other CTS scholars call “orthodox terrorism studies” (Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning 2009, 1). First, there is a series of methodological and analytical shortcomings in the traditional terrorism studies (Jackson 2007). Some of these shortcomings are particularly pertinent to the study of terrorism in China. The over-reliance on secondary data, as Zulaika and Douglass (1996, 149–50) and Silke (2004) point out, is also prevalent in the Chinese scholarship. The wording and information regarding terrorist individuals and
organisations in the academic literature can be traced to official documents, such as “‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity” (State Council Information Office 2002a) and the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism,
Separatism and Extremism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China 2001). Relevant research is highly repetitive; the same body of historical
research is used as the source for the analysis of the historical roots of the violence in Xinjiang (Xiaoxiao Liu 2004; W. Xie and Wang 2002; Yuemin and Lifang 2004; Bin Xu and Pu 2002). Only a few scholarly works involve actual primary research. An example is a Doctoral thesis on the Islamic movement in China (W. Yan 2006). Several Chinese scholars indicated to the researcher that there might be a large number of studies conducted by researchers at several counter-terrorism research centres across China, but most of that research is not open to the public due to the confidentiality of the primary data they have accessed. This observation was further confirmed in an interview with two researchers at the Peking University and the Counter-terrorism Research Centre at the Northwest University of Political Science and Law.
In this thesis the researcher did not seek to access classified information on counter- terrorism. Instead, publicly available information was used as the primary data with which to examine China’s counter-terrorism discourse, policy and practice. Because a discourse must be conveyed to the public in order to serve its political purpose, the
lack of classified information does not constitute an impediment to the understanding of the discourse.
Second, according to Jackson (2007, 245), the traditional approach to terrorism studies is limited by state-centric priorities. Such priorities result from the root of terrorism research in traditional security studies and counter-insurgency studies, where there is an established paradigm to study the nature and causes of political violence, and the response of the state. In this paradigm, “knowledge” is little more than a reproduction of the discourse of “terrorism” made up of myths (Jackson 2007, 245). Some of these myths, as summarised by Stohl (2008), are highly relevant to the study of terrorism in China. The terrorism discourse in China assumes that political violence in Xinjiang is the activity of non-governmental actors. Terrorists are “evil” criminals. All terrorist attacks involve support from “external hostile forces”. The myths about terrorism in China and its ties to external supporters are rooted in its quest for legitimacy and historical continuities, as the following chapters will
demonstrate. The ties between domestic terrorism and external supporters are not entirely imagined given the incapability of domestic individuals to launch attacks due to the stringent social control. However, it is difficult to convince those who do not live in China that the real threat is caused by others. As Debata (2010) points out, considering the increasingly important role that China plays in the international community, very few countries would be willing to confront China in regard to its internal affairs. Upon critical examination of these myths, this thesis highlights the affinity between the “knowledge” of terrorism and the official terrorism discourse in China. The cases of religious and education policy in Chapter 5 demonstrate how the reproduction of the terrorism discourse in academia in turn feeds into policy-making. Third, Jackson (2007, 245) points out that the boundary between the scholarship and state-linked policy studies is blurred due to the close ties between the terrorism researchers and state institutions. This criticism is particularly pertinent when studying China’s counter-terrorism approach. All of the counter-terrorism research centres in China are affiliated with public universities, which are funded by the state. One of the major think tanks, the China Institute of International Studies, is under the direct leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As discussed earlier, the official position on the “East Turkistan forces” is often replicated in scholarly works published in China. Because of the alignment with the official position, scholars take the state’s terrorism designation for granted, and seldom question the political context from which the separatist sentiments emerged. Some scholars treat “East Turkistan forces” as if this grouping were self-evident, requiring no further efforts to discern “terrorism” from separatism (see Yuemin and Lifang 2004; Xuewu Liu 2013). As Schmid and
authors could easily lead to double standards, which feed into bad science and bad policies. In China, the close ties between academics and the state have resulted in a bias among Chinese scholars; they avoid some key issues related to the negative impact of counter-terrorism measures and, in doing so, they avoid challenging the legitimacy of China’s counter-terrorism policy. Considering the implications of scholarship on the legitimacy of these state policies, many Chinese scholars tend to replicate the state discourse of terrorism, portraying China as an innocent victim of terrorism, and avoid framing the CCP or its policy as escalating factors for ethnic tensions (see W. Xie and Wang 2002; Yuemin and Lifang 2004; Bin Xu and Pu 2002). Fourth, borrowing Robert Cox’s criticism of “problem-solving theory”, Jackson (2007, 245) questions the ways in which traditional terrorism studies treat the hierarchies and operation of power that are implicated in the “problem” of terrorism. CTS thus advocates the challenge against the status quo that contributes to the “problem of terrorism” (Gunning 2007, 370). Like early terrorism research in the West, relevant studies in China are highly policy-oriented. The self-alignment and self-censorship limit these studies so that they function to reinforce the existing power relations. In doing so, the academic discourse follows the official discourse in ignoring the historical processes that produced the “problem” of terrorism and simply proposes solutions that would smoothen the “existing relationships and institutions”.
This thesis uses CTS as a lens through which to examine the existing power relations in the discourse of terrorism in China. However, as Horgan and Boyle (2008), Lutz (2010) and Heath-Kelly (2010) point out, CTS is not without limitations. According to Horgan and Boyle (2008, 52) in setting up the “orthodox terrorism studies” as a “straw man”, CTS “creates just the kind of dualism that critical theory was designed to challenge”. Heath-Kelly (2010, 245) echoes this argument, and states that the declaration of an explicit normative function for reason of a particular theory does not make itself better than a non-explicit one, if one was to conduct “value-free” research. According to her (2010, 235), the “pearl fishing” method is flawed in the sense that “a section of a philosophical position is appropriated without regard for the whole”. Projecting a normative vis-à-vis “problem-solving” dichotomy per se goes against the critical commitment to conduct value-free research (Heath-Kelly 2010).
Furthermore, narrowly depicting terrorism studies as a monolithic body of uncritical literature risks losing sight of alternative approaches outside the mainstream journals (Horgan and Boyle 2008, 55). Lutz (2010, 33) adds that CTS’s claims against the lack of attention to state violence is unfounded and lists a number of studies on repressive governments. Many established scholars have gone to great lengths to engage in the
definitional debates and take issue with “non-critical” approaches to terrorism (Baker- Beall, Heath-Kelly, and Jarvis 2015, 3).
Critical Terrorism Studies have undergone a series of critical reflections and
developments and have become increasingly robust in their claims and diverse in their scope. The special issue regarding the practice, limits and experience of critical
terrorism studies stands as evidence of this trend (Heath-Kelly, Jarvis, and Baker-Beall 2014; Jackson et al. 2018).
Employing CTS does not mean that this thesis dismisses the rest as “uncritical” just because mainstream terrorism scholars are not necessarily using the language of critical theories, but rather because the questions CTS scholars have posed are particularly relevant to terrorism studies in China. Taking the criticisms of CTS into consideration, this research does not dismiss the existing mainstream terrorism research entirely, simply because of a lack of explicit normative commitment.