Contrastación de hipótesis

Before looking at the textual support for the claim that emotions for Hume always have a positive (pleasurable) or negative (painful) valence, I will give a brief account of this term in the context of contemporary philosophy of emotion.41 The classification of emotions by valence, i.e., by whether they are positive or negative, is common to many theories of emotion, both contemporary and historical. More controversial is the question of how to best understand what makes a particular emotion positive or negative. For instance, we may evaluate an emotion as positive insofar as it is ‘about’ something good (intentional valence). On the other hand we may evaluate the valence of an emotion

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My presentation of the concept will follow closely the discussion of valence found in the entry on emotion in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy [Charland, L. and R. Gordon (2005). Emotion. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. D. Borchert, MacMillan. 2: 197-203].

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based on what the felt experience of that emotion is like (experiential valence). It should be no surprise at this point that Hume is inclined to classify according to the experiential valence of emotions. That is, he is concerned with whether an emotion feels painful or pleasant. The distinctly painful or pleasant nature of an emotion is an essential

component of it for Hume. In particular, the valence of our impressions of reflection play a key role in how they associate with other impressions, produce new impressions (often particular passions), and at times act as opposing forces. I have broken the discussion of valence in Hume’s theory of emotion here into three parts. The first will deal generally with text supporting the claim that for Hume emotions are valenced, and argue further that in his view the pains and pleasures that constitute the valence of each emotion come in a variety of kinds, not merely degrees. In the second, 1.6, I will look at the role of this kind of valenced feeling in the production of our passions Finally, in 1.7, I will begin considering the way we are ultimately motivated by our impressions of reflection, and the vital role played by valenced emotions in experiences of willing. But to begin, I will start with a basic look at emotions as experientially valenced mental events.

At 2.2.5.3 Hume argues that one of the reasons we tend to feel esteem (a species of love) for the rich and powerful is the pleasure we receive from the agreeable objects they own or control. He explains,

We seldom reflect on what is beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, without an emotion of pleasure or uneasiness; and tho’ these sensations appear not much in our common indolent way of thinking, ‘tis easy, either in reading or in

conversation, to discover them… [E]very thing, which is agreeable to the senses, is also in some measure agreeable to the fancy, and conveys to the thought an image of that satisfaction, which it gives by its real application to the bodily organs.

There are several interesting things we learn about the emotions here. Emotions are presented as the feelings of pleasure and uneasiness that we receive in response to the reflection on things that are beautiful and ugly, agreeable and disagreeable. Emotions are thus presented as valenced, sensitive reactions that are generally positive or negative in

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nature. It is interesting to note that Hume specifies here that these are sensations of reflection; we perceive things that are beautiful, ugly, agreeable, or disagreeable, and upon reflecting on them (i.e., responding to our conscious experience of their ideas and impressions) experience emotions that are either pleasant or uneasy in nature. These emotions, however, Hume notes are not necessarily obvious to us (they are, perhaps, calm in nature), and it is not so much from a conscious awareness of always experiencing emotions of pleasure or uneasiness that we can conclude that beautiful/ugly or

agreeable/disagreeable things always have this felt effect on us. Rather, it is when we note human behavior, such as the way in which things which please our senses are used in attempts to produce vivacity in thought (Hume gives the example of the use of imagery pleasing to the senses in poetry or conversation), that we realize there are two kinds of pleasant sensations at play. This is what Hume is explaining in the latter part of the quote above: when we reflect on the ideas and impressions of pleasant experience that come to the imagination upon the experiences of pleasant sensation, we experience a second kind of pleasant sensation, one of reflection. This is the valenced emotion that Hume argues arises whenever we experience something agreeable or disagreeable, beautiful or ugly. This passage also tells us something very important about emotions of pain and pleasure: painful and pleasant emotions are not identical to the sensations of pain and pleasure, which arise “from the constitution of the body” without “any antecedent perception” in the soul (i.e., impressions of sensation; 2.1.1.1). In the passage above Hume clearly distinguishes the sensations of body and the senses, including potential bodily pains and pleasures, from the sensations of reflection that are our valenced emotions. These reflective impressions are pains and pleasures of a different kind from impression of sensation, yet are also not properly considered passions (as even reflective sensations of pain and pleasure as such are never listed as passions by Hume). This clearly marks out

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space in Hume’s category of secondary impressions for reflective impressions that are not passions.42

A point of classification I take to be less clear at this point is the question of whether Hume thinks that the pains and pleasures of our original impressions of sensation qualify as emotions. That is, would Hume consider my felt pain at stubbing my toe an emotion, separate from the disagreeable reflective sensation such an event would occasion? It is tempting to make the clear division between pains/pleasures of original impressions and pains/pleasures of impression of reflection also the divide between non-emotion

sensations of pain/pleasure, and emotions of pain/pleasure. This is especially attractive, as it appears to give a more defined role for emotions within the category of impressions of reflection: they become the sensations of reflection, a key part to any impression of reflection, but a broader category than the grouping of specific passions. But I do not think it is clear whether a claim of this kind can be justified. For now, I will note it as a potential, and intriguing, read on Hume’s use of ‘emotion.’

One might also question whether it has yet been shown that Hume thinks all emotions are either positively (pleasurably) or negatively (painfully) valenced. I would argue that this is likely the case. There are often times where Hume argues as though painful and pleasant emotions together exhaust the category of emotions. For instance, at 1.3.10.4, in his discussion of the effects of beliefs and passions on each other, Hume argues that not only do beliefs excite passions, but passions also often encourage belief, and this is true “not only [of] such facts as convey agreeable emotions, but very often such as give pain.” Here Hume treats the emotions arising from the perception of certain facts as either pleasant or painful, and appears to take these designations to exhaust the potential kinds of emotions arising from objects. Likewise, the passage at 2.2.2.5 suggests all emotions

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Or perhaps, one might say they are not fully ‘established’ passions, taking a cue from Hume at 2.2.2.8. Either way, we now have a clear candidate for the “other emotions resembling” the passions that make up part of the category of impressions of reflection (2.1.1.1).

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can be divided into either painful or pleasurable.43 Hume’s discussion of the effects of probability on the direct passions also appears to assume that emotions fall into these opposite categories.44

That particular emotions for Hume appear to be categorized either as positively or negatively valenced may suggest a sort of scale with pleasure on one end and pain on the other, and lead the reader to conclude that the difference between the pains and pleasures of particular emotions is one of degree. In fact, this appears to not be the case for

Humean emotions, which differ not only in degree of pain or pleasure, but also in kind. This point should not be too quickly passed over. Considering the elaborate structure that Hume offers as the causes and ‘circumstances’ that attend the various passions, it may be tempting to think of emotions, as the feeling aspect of a passion, as playing the role of determining first, whether the passion is painful or pleasant, and second, the degree of force or violence with which a particular experience of a passion is felt. On such a reading, emotions do not really act to distinguish between various passions; emotions merely establish valence and degree of feeling. Further distinction between passions would then be made according to their typical objects and causes. This seems at odds with Hume’s own pronouncement that the emotion of a passion, i.e., its sensation or feeling, is the “very being and essence” of the passion (2.1.5.4).

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This is the passage about the stone that “caus[es] no emotion, or independent pain or pleasure.” There are two potential ways to read this passage. Hume may be using the ‘or’ to indicate identity—emotion would in that case be intended to mean an independent pain or pleasure (independent, presumably, from the basic sensations associated with the stone). Alternatively, the disjunctive may be in place to acknowledge the distinction between pains and pleasures that are impressions of sensation, and pains and pleasures that are impressions of reflection (emotions, according to the argument made above). In this case the ‘independent’ would mean independent of the pains and pleasures of emotions, sensations of reflection the perception of the stone might inspire. In either reading, the category of ‘emotion’ appears to be exhausted by the painful/pleasant dichotomy.

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It is therefore of great significance that Hume speaks of a variety of kinds of pains and pleasures, which may bear more or less resemblance to each other. Whether these differences are actually sufficient to distinguish between different kinds of Humean passions, without reference to their causes, objects and ‘attending circumstances’ generally, is not altogether clear. Despite Hume’s contention at 2.1.5.4 that the feeling component of a passion constitutes the very essence of the passion, there are places where he makes other claims that seem to suggest some of the attending circumstances are essential for distinguishing between passions. The debate over whether passions for Hume are ultimately sensitive in nature, or are best understood in terms of their complex logical structures, I will discuss in Part Two of this work, and characterize as a debate between those who would give a sensationalist reading of Hume’s theory of the passions, and those who would give a cognitivist reading of his theory of the passions. For now, it will be sufficient to provide some evidence for the claim that, whether they are the feature differentiating between different passions or not, the valenced emotions come in varieties of pain and pleasure, not merely degrees.

As has been pointed out in a previous section, there are many instances of use of

‘emotion’ in the Treatise in which that single term is being used to reference a variety of passions or impressions that have been mentioned in the discussion in question. Of particular interest here are those instances in which multiple kinds of pleasant or painful impressions of reflection are grouped together as similar emotions. Take for example 1.2.1.1, where Hume refers to surprise and admiration and “those agreeable emotions,” or 2.2.9.18, where women inclined to feel pity and attraction towards condemned criminals “[feel] no such tender emotions” when they are exposed to the horrors of the punishment of the criminal on the rack, in which case uneasy emotional sensations overpower the variety of positive emotions that may have otherwise been experienced.

This type of use may not be, by itself, enough to convince us of a variety of kinds of pleasant and painful emotions. Rather these could be taken as indications of multiplicity of instances of pleasure or pain, which may still nevertheless be argued to differ by degree, not kind of sensation. Consider, then, Hume’s discussion of love between the sexes at 2.2.11.2, where the appetite to generation (characterized here not as a mere

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bodily impulse, but as a kind of passion) is characterized as pleasant in nature.45 Hume notes that in virtue of this, it has “a strong connexion with, all the agreeable emotions,” which he goes on to tell us include, among others, joy, mirth, vanity and kindness. This passage suggests two things: first, that there is a multiplicity of agreeable emotions; and two, that they are associated based on their resemblance to each other as pleasurable. It could still be insisted, however, that these agreeable emotions resemble each other exactly because it is the same pleasure, experienced perhaps to different degrees and in different contexts, that is felt with all of these emotions. So as a final piece of proof that Hume takes there to be different kinds of pleasures and pains, consider Hume’s insistence on the qualitative difference between self-love (pride) and love of a friend or lover at 2.2.1.2:

[W]hen we talk of self-love, ‘tis not in a proper sense, nor has the sensation it produces any thing in common with that tender emotion, which is excited by a friend or mistress. ‘Tis the same case with hatred. We may be mortify’d by our own faults and follies; but never feel any anger or hatred, except from the injuries of others.

Here Hume specifically says that it is the sensation of self-love that differs from the

sensation of love of others, the latter being characterized as “that tender emotion.” Though these kinds of sensations are both pleasant, and though we may be inclined to characterize both as kinds of love, differing only by object, Hume insists that we not understand pride as a form of love because the sensations are ultimately different. The same is true of the difference between humility and hatred. While these passions share a general valence (painful or pleasant), they ultimately differ in kind. We could assume that pride/humility experienced with the same degree of pleasure/pain as love/hate would not make the similarly valenced passions identical in feeling. Love of myself is pleasant, and

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Hume qualifies that the appetite to generation is a pleasing emotion insofar as it is “confin’d to a certain degree” (2.2.11.2). See 2.3.5.4 for a possible Humean explanation of why this otherwise pleasing emotion becomes unpleasant when experienced in an extreme.

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love of my friend is pleasant, but these pleasures are different sensations. And the sensation of a passion, for Hume, is its particular emotion. Therefore, this appears to make it certain not only that emotions are necessarily valenced feeling, but also come in a variety of kinds of positive and negative feeling.