There is an array of challenges inherent in the opening up of the Arctic. This section reviews the key challenges posed by the Arctic. It looks to issues of governance and environment, as well as military and technological challenges emerging in the Arctic. Figure 18 illustrates the overlapping and competing Arctic claims, as explored earlier in this chapter. Responsibility for mediating these claims falls upon the governing UN legal architecture of the Arctic, as implemented by the Arctic Council.
102 Shaparov, A. 2013. NATO and a new agenda for the Arctic . Available
at:http://eurodialogue.eu/energy-security/NATO-and-a-New-Agenda-for-the-Arctic. [Accessed 5 July 2016].
103 See for further information on the Vienna Document see: Arms Control Association. 2010. Vienna
Document. Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ViennaDoc99. [Accessed 5 July 2016].
3.4.1 Governance
The Arctic’s central governing institution is the Arctic Council. Established in 1996, the Arctic Council as an intergovernmental forum and consensus body which focuses on the Arctic’s protection and sustainable development. Military or security issues are not mandated for discussion.105
The Arctic Council consists of eight members: Canada; Denmark; Finland; Iceland; Norway; Russia; Sweden and the US. There are a number of organisations representing Arctic indigenous peoples that have permanent participant status in the Council. The Arctic Council decides by vote whether or not to grant applicant states observer status. The following hold observer status: Germany; The Netherlands; Poland; Spain; UK; Italy; Japan; Korea; Singapore; India and most recently, China.106
In 2008, Arctic Council members signed the Ilulissat Declaration, through which members set a firm course for cooperation, agreeing to resolve territorial disputes without resorting to military means.107 In addition, members renewed their support
for UNCLOS to remain the sole legal regime in the region. According to Denmark, the ‘landmark political declaration’ sent a ‘strong political signal that the five coastal states (would) act responsibly concerning future development in the Arctic Ocean’.108
The Arctic Council has formalised cooperation between Arctic nations. Certainly, Russia has been instrumental in this cooperation. In the past, this cooperation had been insulated from other global affairs. However, following Russia’s annexation of
104‘Arctic territorial claims’. Durham University,2015. Available at:
http://www.durham.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic. Reproduced with permission.
105 Brigham, L, 2014. The changing Arctic: new realities and players at the top of the world. Asia
Policy, 18.
106 Arctic Council. 2016. Member States. Available at: http://www.arctic- council.org/index.php/en/about-us/member-states. [Accessed 5 July 2016].
107Dodds, K, 2013. The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Artic states, ‘Law of the Sea’ and the Arctic
Ocean. SAIS Review of International Affairs, 33:2.
Crimea, A5 members have largely cut defence cooperation with Russia and kept to a reduced level of communication on Arctic affairs.
In terms of legal architecture, the Arctic is governed by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Convention has been ratified by some 150 states, including all A5 powers except the US. UNCLOS is a legal regime but it is not legally binding. Signatories have ten years from the ratification of UNCLOS to submit a claim of territorial extension. Multiple claims may be submitted from that point thereafter.
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is empowered to pass judgement on UNCLOS submissions; however, it is ultimately at the discretion of claimants to negotiate disputes bilaterally. No country has a right to establish control over the Arctic other than states which have access to the Arctic Ocean (the A5). These Arctic rim powers may declare an area extending 200 miles from the coast of their EEZs. The EEZ can be extended a further 150 nautical miles (NM) if the country proves that its Arctic shelf is an extension of its land territory.109 In order to prove such
extensions of existing territories, some Arctic rim powers have turned their attention to their continental shelves. The continental shelf debate is a key territorial issue in the Arctic today. An extension of the EEZ provides rights to the claimant over the sea floor and any resources below the sea floor. The extension does not guarantee that claimants receive rights to the water column, or sole passage within this extended area. Figure 19 illustrates UNCLOS.
109 United Nations, General Assembly, (10/12/1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Section 2, Article 4. Available at:
Figure 19: Illustration of maritime zones affected by UNCLOS.110
Central to the Arctic continental shelf debate is the Lomonosov Ridge - a 1,800 km long underwater mass. Figure 20 outlines the location of and overlapping claims to the ridge. The ridge is essentially an underwater mountain range over which there is a dispute as to whether it is a territorial extension of the Russian, Danish (by way of Greenland) and Canadian continental shelf. Scientific evidence provided in formal claims to the CLCS could potentially grant claimants an extension of their EEZ by 150 NM, based on this ridge. The US, yet to ratify the UNCLOS, approaches the ridge as an oceanic ridge and thus not as an extension of any one state’s continental shelf— rejecting any single claim to ownership. All claims to the ridge may be regarded as tenable by the CLCS—however, in this scenario, the CLCS would refuse to rule either way and would instead call on the competing claimants to settle the dispute bilaterally (or potentially trilaterally).111
110‘Maritime zones as affected by UNCLOS’. National Oceanography Centre, 2012. Available at: http://noc.ac.uk/research-at-sea/planning-expedition/law-at-sea/law-sea. Reproduced with permission.
111 Stimson Analysis. 2013. Evolution of Arctic Territorial Claims and Agreements: A Timeline (1903-
Present). Available at: http://www.stimson.org/content/evolution-arctic-territorial-claims-and- agreements-timeline-1903-present. [Accessed 5 July 2016].
All three nations moved to focus their claims on questions of ‘geologic origin’— sovereignty over the ridge being based on estimates from rock deposits as to where the ridge originally formed. Given the rock deposits were from the same ridge, all three nations have come to the same conclusion—the ridge is a continuation of each of their particular continental shelves. Figure 21 illustrates the shelves’ connection with bathymetric findings linking all three claimants to sections of the ridge. It is likely the CLCS will not rule in the matter; instead opting for the nations to come to an agreement amongst themselves. Canada’s new Trudeau leadership is presenting itself as an advocate of international cooperation, Denmark is not able to defend its claim militarily against Russia’s superior forces, and it is unlikely Russia will recognise other claims. For Russia, the ridge is synonymous with national pride, reflected in the fact that the ridge is named after a celebrated eighteenth-century Russian polymath.
Figure 20: Map of the Lomonosov Ridge112
112‘Arctic territorial claims’. The Economist, 2014. Available at:
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21636756-denmark-claims-north-pole-frozen- conflict. Reproduced with permission.
Figure 21: Bathymetric map of the Lomonosov Ridge.113
3.4.2 Environmental
Climate change is raising Arctic temperatures at twice the global average. This means the Arctic will see ice-free summers as soon as 2050.114 A National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) study has found:
Rapid Arctic sea ice loss is probably the most visible indicator of global climate change; it leads to shifts in ecosystems and economic access, and potentially
113 Kingdom of Denmark, Government of Greenland, 2014. Submission to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf.
114 NOAA. 2013. Arctic nearly free of summer sea ice during first half of 21st century. Available
impacts weather throughout the northern hemisphere … Increased physical understanding of rapid Arctic climate shifts and improved models are needed that give a more detailed picture and timing of what to expect so we can better prepare and adapt to such changes. Early loss of Arctic sea ice gives immediacy to the issue of climate change. 115
A further concern for Arctic development is the waste from increased activity in the region, as well as the potential for an oil spill. Compared to spills on land, those at sea are harder to contain. With higher traffic and areas of more intense resource production, tanker spills are a risk. Further transportation utilising the NSR is set to increase, emitting waste as a by-product of transit. Likewise, increased Arctic tourism brings with it the potential for environmental degradation.
Any oil spill within the Arctic Ocean would be a grave challenge to the fragile Arctic ecosystem. However, with advances in technology, there is cause for optimism for the future of the Arctic as a bustling commercial hub. Advances in technologies such as satellite surveillance will provide early warning of potential Arctic devastation.116 Oil
spills at the deep-water level are often not recognised until the oil slick appears on the surface, or miles away, carried by ocean currents. Satellites provide images which penetrate deeper beneath the ocean surface, able to detect deep spills sometimes days before they surface.
The emergence of social responsibility campaigns at IOCs, as well as the general public’s concern for the Arctic, has resulted in a cautious operating environment for firms. This is evident in the IOC approach to Arctic offshore exploration. Firms are going slow, investing billions in state-of-the-art technology and pulling out of projects if there is any cause for concern. Concern for the polar environment is voiced by a representative of an IOC who stated:
115 Ibid.
116 Offshore Technology . 2014. The remarkable decline of oil spills in the Baltic Sea - lessons learnt?.
Available at: http://www.offshore-technology.com/features/featurelessons-learnt-the-remarkable- decline-of-oil-spills-in-the-baltic-sea-4379564/. [Accessed 5 July 2016].
Shell left its Arctic (Chukchi Sea) venture because it couldn’t meet operational requirements. It’s really that simple; although their PR machine would have you believe anything from Obama blocking license renewal, to the oil price having been too low. Shell pulled out because it rushed to the Arctic and in the rush, got caught up with inefficient deep-sea production materials. They are back to the drawing board. We have oil rigs that can’t be anchored correctly—Shell lost one of their rigs and it drifted to the Alaskan shore. Like the rest of us, they now won’t touch the wells until the technology is foolproof. The industry is almost there; demand will get us over the line sooner or later. 117
ExxonMobil’s 1989 Valdez and BP’s 2008 Gulf of Mexico spills are ever-present in IOC thinking in its approach to the Arctic. These firms are risk-averse, for no one wants to be the first to spill in the Arctic. Estimates from the US Department of the Interior put the risk of Arctic spills at 75%, yet the Department still sold licenses for offshore Arctic exploration.118 That said, globally there has been a decrease in oil spills despite solid
increases in oil trade. Figure 22 illustrates the decline in ocean oil spills, likely because of the risk-averse approach firms now have more generally.
117 Interview, Washington, December 2015.
118 US Government, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2015. Chukchi Sea Planning Area–Oil and
Gas Lease Sale. Available at:
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing_a nd_Plans/Leasing/Lease_Sales/Sale_193/2015_0127_LS193_Final_2nd_SEIS_Vol1.pdf
Figure 22: Occurrence of ocean oil spills (1970–2014).119
Key to preventing ocean spills as far as possible are cross-border collaboration and cooperation. For example, the Baltic Sea area represents an important policy lesson for Arctic rim powers. It was once the case that the ‘Baltic Sea had something of a reputation as being a cradle for oil spills’, with the Finnish Environment Institute recording a record 107 spills in 2001.120 Fast forward to 2013 and the Institute
reported only nine oil spills, and none at all in 2014.121 Governed by the Baltic Marine
Environment Protection Commission, the region is working to maintain a zero spill rate out to its next review in 2021. Success stems from Baltic Sea rim states collaborating to act as a commercial watchdog, passing regulatory changes as well as
119‘Occurrence of ocean oil spills’. International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation, 2015. Available
at:
http://www.itopf.com/fileadmin/data/Documents/Company_Lit/Members_Handbook_2015_lo.pdf Reproduced with permission.
120 Offshore Technology. 2014. 121 As at June 2014.
conducting cross-border surveillance operations. Finland carried out 625 hours of aerial surveillance over the Baltic Sea in 2013, and whilst the majority of flight time was in Finnish territory, around one quarter of the time was spent in the territory of neighbouring countries.122
Baev notes that Putin has gradually developed an interest in the Arctic environment. Although Putin may have few concerns related to global warming, he has used the Kremlin media machine to portray him as deeply committed to the welfare of polar bears.123 As per Putin’s previous wildlife photoshoots with tigers and whales, this is
also employed to perpetuate the ‘strong man’ Putin persona.
3.4.3 Military
Militarisation is a central challenge to the Arctic, but it is not a new one. In the post- Cold War period, the Arctic underwent a major decline in levels of militarization. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia no longer directed funds to the Far North projects and the region became somewhat forgotten. Since 2012, there have been steady efforts by Arctic-rim powers to restore and in some cases, enhance, Arctic military capabilities. It is therefore important to note that the current military build- up has the potential to surpass even Cold War levels.
Generally, the Arctic is viewed as the home of a new arms race and as a theatre for a new Cold War between Russia and the West.124 The Arctic rim powers have actively
bolstered their military presence in the region, further fuelling such sentiments. In
122 The Finnish Border Guard, 2014. A record low in oil spills detected by aerial surveillance in 2013.
Available at:
https://www.raja.fi/en/facts/news_from_the_border_guard/news/1/0/a_record_low_in_oil_spills_d etected_by_aerial_surveillance_in_2013_50494 [Accessed 23 April 2015].
123Baev, P, 2013. Russia’s Arctic ambitions and anxieties. Current History, October. 124 See for example: Lucas, E, 2008; Blank, S, 2014. The Russian Arctic: Between Economic
Development and Accelerating Militarization. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 11:199; Blank, S, 2015. Russia’s
New Arctic Base Continue the Militarization of the High North. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 12:202; Borgerson, S, 2013.
2007, Canada launched an annual ‘sovereignty operation’ called Nanook in the Canadian Arctic. The operation involves the deployment of 600-1250 navy, army and air force personnel to ‘assert Canada’s sovereignty over its northernmost regions’ and enhance ability to operate in Arctic conditions.125 Since 2007, Nanook has also
involved various international military partners. 126 However, the operation objectives
since 2007 have focused on responses to petrochemical leaks and general maritime emergency scenarios. Operation Nunalivut is a further annual sovereignty operation conducted by Canada in the High North. Since 2007, the exercise has also included various international military partners.127
These militarisation efforts are unsurprising and to be expected given geopolitical pressures. Such pressures span A5 economic interests and the securitisation of borders as global activity increases in the region. The domestic politics of the respective A5 rim powers are often the leading driver of military policy in the Arctic. As Michael Byers argues in relation to the ‘rush’ for the North Pole:
We're talking about the centre of a large, inhospitable ocean that is in total darkness for three months each year, thousands of miles from any port … the water in the North Pole is 12,000 feet deep and will always be covered by sea ice in the winter. It's not a place where anyone is going to be drilling for oil and gas. So it's not about economic stakes, it's about domestic politics.128
Certainly, the requirement for functioning search and rescue capabilities in the region is also driving states to acquire new equipment or move existing hardware north.
125 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. 2016. Operation NANOOK. Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-recurring/op-nanook.page. [Accessed 27 July 2016].
126 For example, NANOOK 2015 included US troops with UK observation. NANOOK 2010 involved
members of the Royal Danish Navy and the US Coast Guard.
127 National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. 2016. Operation NUNALIVUT. Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-recurring/op-nunalivut.page. [Accessed 24 June 2016].
128 The Guardian . 2013. Canada to claim North Pole as its own. Available
at:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/canada-north-pole-claim. [Accessed 27 July 2016].
Disputes that could be labelled ‘conflicts’ are cordoned off as largely bilateral issues. Further, outright military conflict in the Arctic is unlikely. This reality is supported by a Russian government official:
We have to look to capability and deployability before war can be waged in the Arctic. Military capabilities cannot change the fact that the environment is unpassable between Nov–Jan each year, the region is dark 24 hours a day and ice storms limit deployability. It is difficult to fight over a region that simply will not host the battle. 129
There is existing precedent for regional military cooperation, given the various joint exercises. Further, arguing that there is a correlation between increasing military activity in the Arctic and looming Arctic conflict is problematic. First, all Arctic rim nations have a history of military exercises in the region. Given that US submarine deployments to the Arctic continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union and that the Cold Response exercise predates the return of Russian long-range bomber patrol flights, it is evident that the Arctic isn’t militarising now for it never demilitarised in the first place. 130 The installation, in Russia’s case reinstallation, of military
infrastructure should not be narrowly viewed as increasing Arctic tensions – for ‘not all military capabilities are designed for force’. 131
Norway, via a statement to NATO, noted that Russia’s military activities in the Arctic are similar to other countries and as such reflect a ‘return to a more normal level of activity from a major power with legitimate interests in the region’. 132 In 2015, despite
Russia-West tensions, Norway and Russia conducted a joint exercise codenamed Barents 2015. The two-day exercise trained for search and rescue events in the Arctic Ocean and was conducted despite Norway’s 2014 suspension of military cooperation
129 Interview, Moscow, April 2014.