Russia’s claim to the Lomonosov Ridge was signalled in part by the 2007 Arktika expedition. Arktika involved the world’s first descent to the ocean floor of the North Pole and was headed by famed Russian explorer Artur Chilingarov.78 Chilingarov holds
a range of roles and is said to have close ties with Putin.79 He was awarded the honour
of Hero of the Russian Federation, and was earlier made a Hero of the Soviet Union, serves as both President of the Association of Polar Explorers, and the presidential envoy for international cooperation in the Arctic.80
Arktika’s mission goals were to collect deep sea soil samples to substantiate Russia’s continental shelf claim and to plant the Russian flag on the seabed. It was the latter objective that gained global attention. Figure 24 depicts the moment when the Russian flag was planted some 4,000 metres below the Arctic’s surface. The missions scientific value was ‘negligible compared with its political value’.81 This claim is
supported by Russia’s own Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute which noted ‘samples taken from the surface of the seabed are not very reliable…besides we already know the geology of the Arctic Ocean’s seabed and have been collecting samples for many years’. 82
78 Nezavisimaya gazeta reported the drilling of the Lomonosov Ridge by Russia some years prior to the
2007 expedition. The activities attracted minimal press coverage, and yet the 2007 drilling was
reported in terms of Russia’s proactive expansion into the Arctic. The 2007 expedition coincided with increased awareness of an aggressive Putin’s Russia and thus must have influenced some of the media commentary of the expedition to take a darker view of the activity than they might otherwise have done. See for further discussion: Blagov, S, 2007. Russian experts divided over claims to Arctic continental shelf. The Jamestown Foundation, August.
79 Interview, Moscow, May 2014.
80 The Russian Geological Society, 2015. Arktika 2007: Closed hydrospace walk. Available at: http://arctic.ru/analitic/20150826/148239.html.
81 The Economist, 2007. Ships, subs and missiles. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/9622181.
Figure 24: Arktika mission image83
Chilingarov announced ‘the Arctic is Russian’ to onlookers on the expedition, and declared that ‘the North Pole is an extension of the Russian coastal shelf’.84 The
expedition was viewed largely by the West as an exercise in Kremlin public relations propaganda.85 At the time, Chilingarov was not only an Arctic explorer, he was also
Deputy Speaker of the Russian parliament. Canada’s foreign minister, Peter MacKay, signalled Canadian anger over the symbolic flag planting, stating ‘this isn’t the 15th
century, you can’t go around the world and just plant flags and say: “we’re claiming this territory”’.86 Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov responded to criticism of the 2007
expedition by saying that ‘the aim of this expedition [was] not to stake Russia’s claim
83 The Telegraph, 2007. Russia Arctic stunt celebrated by Moscow press. Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1559367/Russia-Arctic-stunt-celebrated-by-Moscow- press.html.
84 BBC News, 2007. Russia ahead in the Arctic ‘gold rush’.Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/6925853.stm.
85 See for example: Financial Times, 2007. Scramble for the Arctic. Available at:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/65b9692c-4e6f-11dc-85e7-0000779fd2ac.html; Financial Times, 2007. Russia plants flag on North Pole seabed. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/12294b00-40e7- 11dc-8f37-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz4FNESQ5M5.
86 The Guardian, 2007. Russia plants flag on North Pole seabed. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic.
but to show that our continental shelf reaches to the North Pole’.87 The symbolic
planting of Russia’s flag on the seabed of the North Pole sparked new debate surrounding a resurgent Russia. However, Arctic expeditions are not a new phenomenon in Russia as established earlier in this chapter. Stalin’s conquest of the north (pokorenie severa) initiatives between 1936–39 set the historical precedent for post-Soviet Russian Arctic interest.88
Putin called all members of the Arktika expedition to thank them personally, a clear sign of the high importance of the operation to the Kremlin.89 A Russian academic
commented on the controversial nature of the expedition:
The 2007 flag plant and mission resulted in an element of surprise among the Arctic neighbours. This was something Russia did not account for, we thought our objectives in the north were much clearer and didn’t require a titanium flag to confirm. Chilingarov’s team just used the flag to highlight Russia as a leading scientific Arctic power; they had no orders to carve out the North Pole as Russian. The US planted a flag on the moon and why didn’t the world have issues with this? The US was not at any point claiming the moon! Just as Russia was not using the flag to claim the North Pole per se—we leave that up to international law. This is already in our favour.90
In retrospect, concerns were largely unwarranted as ‘Russian rhetoric [has] quieted down and its leaders [are] focusing on negotiated solutions to territorial disputes in the region’.91 Despite Putin’s assertiveness since Ukraine 2014, avenues of
communication and cooperation within the Arctic appear to be relatively open. In the years since the Arktika flag planting, the idea of Russia staking its Arctic claim by force
87 Spiegel Online, 2007. Claim-Jumping the North Pole? Russian Subs Dive to the Arctic Ocean Floor.
Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/claim-jumping-the-north-pole-russian-subs- dive-to-the-arctic-ocean-floor-a-497774.html.
88Dodds, K & Powell, R, 2014. Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and Legal Regimes. United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishers.
89 New York Times, 2007. Russians Plant Flag on the Arctic Seabed. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/03/world/europe/03arctic.html?_r=0.
90 Interview, Moscow, April 2014.
has lost currency as Russia continues to seek confirmation of its continental shelf stake based on international law, by adhering to UNCLOS.
In 2001, Russia made a formal submission to the CLCS after ratifying UNCLOS in 1997. Russia’s 2001 claim is illustrated in Figure 25, a map which shows the claim submitted to the CLCS. The map covers the area of the Russian continental shelf right up to the North Pole.
Figure 25: 2001 Russian Arctic claim.92
92 Government of the Russian Federation, 2001. Submission to the CLCS on the outer limits of the
Russian Federation’s Continental Shelf. Available at:
In providing evidence of territory beyond the 200 NM EEZ zone, the map offers various markers at the bottom left of the map translated into English as follows:
1. provisional line of delimitation of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation with neighbouring states; subject to more precise determination through negotiations.
2. 200 nautical mile zone from the baselines.
3. line showing the thickness of the sedimentary rocks equal to 1% of the distance from the foot of the continental slope.
4. 60 nautical mile zone from the foot of the continental slope. 5. points of the outer limits of the continental shelf determined
6. numbers of segments of the outer limits of the continental shelf determined according to various criteria.
7. baselines 8. basepoints
9. 200 nautical mile zone from the baselines.
10. the area of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic Ocean beyond the 200 nautical mile zone.
The CLCS circulates all submission materials and UNCLOS signatory states are encouraged to communicate their reactions to submissions. In 2002 Canada responded to Russia’s 2001 claim by stating:
[Canada] is not in a position to determine whether it agrees with the Russian Federation’s Arctic continental shelf submission’ and that its inability to comment ‘should not be interpreted as either agreement or acquiescence by Canada to the Russian Federation’s submission.93
Denmark also responded in 2002 to Russia’s submission, stating it too was ‘not able to form an opinion on the Russian submission’. It declared it would also make an Arctic
93 Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, 2002. Notification regarding the submission
made by the Russian Federation to the CLCS. Available at:
claim in the coming years, although not having ratified the UNCLOS, Denmark would not be subject to the ten-year submission rule. However, shortly after, Denmark communicated ‘its reservation to the Government of the Russian Federation’ about the claim extending Russia’s continental shelf to that appurtenant to Greenland.94
Norway also responded in 2002, citing the unresolved delimitation issue between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea. Norway urged the CLCS to treat the Barents Sea issue as a ‘maritime dispute’ and argued that as an area under dispute, it needed to be shielded from ‘prejudice’ related to Russia’s early claim.95 Finally, the US
responded, stating that ‘the submission has major flaws as it relates to the continental shelf claim in the Arctic’, and attaching a brief paper for circulation to all members of the UN.96 The paper questioned the legal architecture of UNCLOS, noting ‘the United
States of America is of the view that, while the commission has no competence over questions of baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, it should not be perceived as endorsing particular baselines’.97 Further, the US argued
that the Lomonosov Ridge ‘is a freestanding feature in the deep, oceanic part of the Arctic Ocean Basin, and not a natural component of the continental margins of either Russia or any other state’.98
The US response pushed for the Russian claim to be ‘considered in a deliberate manner’ ‘insofar as no applications to explore or exploit the Area have been made or
94 Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations, 2001. Notification regarding the submission
made by the Russian Federation to the CLCS. Available at:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__DNKtext.pdf.
95 Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, 2002. Notification regarding the submission
made by the Russian Federation to the CLCS. Available at:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__NORtext.pdf.
96 Permanent Mission of The United States of America to the United Nations, 2002. Notification
regarding the submission made by the Russian Federation to the CLCS. Available at:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__USAtext.pdf.
97 Ibid. 98 Ibid.
are likely to be made in the Arctic for the foreseeable future, no prejudice is likely to result from a deliberate process’.99
The CLCS agreed with respondents and ruled that Russia needed to provide further detailed scientific data to substantiate its continental shelf claim in the Arctic. The commission recommended ‘that the Russian Federation make a revised submission in respect of its extended continental shelf in the Central Arctic Ocean’, and suggested that Russia ‘follow the scientific and technical advice as indicated’.100 Moreover, the
commission ruled that ‘according to the materials provided in the submission, the Ridge cannot be considered’.101