This section explores the central drivers of Russian Arctic strategy under Putin. These drivers help shape and direct Russia’s Arctic strategy and are often interrelated. These drivers are relatively standard and to be expected when it comes to the development of Russia’s Arctic strategy.
120 Government of the Russian Federation, 2013. Revision of the partial submission of the Russian
Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf related to the Continental Shelf in the Sea of Okhotsk. Available at:
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01_rev13/part_1_Rezume_MID_engl.p df.
4.5.1 Securitization
Securitisation is a key driver of Russian Arctic strategy under Putin. Russia has an evident interest in securitising its economic stake in the Arctic – both in terms of the region’s energy resources and the NSR. The region is a central component of Russia’s projected future budgetary position and factors into the wider great power identity project for Putin. As evidenced in the key policy documents examined above, Russia is actively working to secure not only its vast border from increasing activity, but also its stake as the Arctic’s leading actor and the largest holder of territory. Russia’s formal territorial bid to the CLCS to extend its shelf would, if accepted, cast a large shadow over the entire region. The Arctic race, as it were, has already been won —Russia will continue to direct the Arctic narrative. As a Russian Government official comments:
The Arctic isn’t going away for Russia, the Arctic is largely Russian by default. Three per cent of our population resides there—you would have heard that polar bears are Russian. I think, to borrow from Robert Kaplan, what the West is witnessing now is the ‘revenge of geography’. The more demand increases, the sooner we will have people approaching Russia for partnership, and this could be a powerful position for us, but we have shown—and of course, this requires careful reading of our policy documents that are made readily available to all— that we seek partnerships based on cooperation with our neighbours in the Arctic. I think this is wishful thinking in the short to medium term however, but just think about a passenger ship running into trouble on the NSR for a moment. It becomes Russia’s duty to search and rescue and this would be expected by our neighbours, and yet in order to carry out such missions, there would need to be readily deployable teams stationed nearby. We are building such teams and growing our capacity and yet Russia is criticised for these actions? Symptomatic maybe, but the West cannot have it all. 121
The process of securitisation in Russia’s Arctic necessarily invites discussion of Russia’s militarisation of the Arctic. Often confused, the two concepts are nonetheless distinct
and their confusion can result in a misreading of Russian Arctic activity if viewed purely through a militarisation lens. As examined in Chapter Three, the majority of the NSR falls within Russia’s EEZ. Any vessel seeking passage will have to negotiate with Russia—as would be the case with any major shipping route elsewhere. Further, the increase in activity in the Arctic will necessitate an active coastguard operation, which Denmark, Norway and Canada have already implemented. In developing Arctic coastguard capabilities, Russia is merely applying the same measures as its neighbours. Militarisation has been apparent in the updating of ageing Soviet hardware in the Arctic and the re-opening of Soviet bases on the Arctic coast, spurred by Russia’s newly formed Arctic Joint Strategic Command. This should not be a surprise for it is a desperately overdue modernization project given the hardware has been neglected since the fall of the Soviet Union.
As discussed in Chapter Two, Medvedev’s modernization agenda for the Russian military necessarily included Russia’s Northern Fleet. Since 2012, under Putin, the pace of military modernization has increased. Beyond the reopening of Arctic bases there has been increase in Russian military exercises and war games. However, these activities are more or less outlined in the 2008 Arctic security strategy. Further, most of the refurbished military outposts in the Arctic are ‘dual use’ facilities also servicing regional search and rescue operations. Russia’s securitization efforts in the Arctic have clearly intensified, going far beyond standard coastguard strengthening capabilities. Russia’s Arctic threat perceptions are more intense than in the Cold War period, as seen in the deployment of Arctic brigades. Yet, despite apparent militarization, it is still nowhere near what it was during the Cold War. In 1989, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet navy had 69 strategic submarines in operation within the Arctic including 63 nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and 6 ballistic missile submarines (SSBs). By 2015, the Russian navy had a mere 12 submarines in operation within the Arctic.122
It is important to note that the majority of Russia’s military capabilities in the Arctic are confined to operation within the region. Therefore, the argument that these forces can be mobilised elsewhere is problematic. It is incorrect to determine Russia’s Arctic military developments as a reaction to events beyond the Arctic. In many ways, Russian Arctic strategy (including its securitization aspect) predates Russia’s current assertive foreign policy. The Kremlin’s strategic planning documents, as examined earlier in this chapter, indicate that military growth plans were implemented long before events on Crimean Peninsula.
For Stephen Blank, Russia’s militarisation of the Arctic coast ‘highlights a certain paradox’ in Moscow’s Arctic strategy.123 The bases are closely connected to the
development of Russia’s economic interests in the Arctic, serving to safeguard the region. However, it appears Russia is becoming increasingly alarmed about potential threats. As Blank points out, this is interesting given, to date, no A5 state has ‘even remotely expressed the intention (let alone the desire) or demonstrated the capacity to threaten’ Russia’s Arctic position and interests.124 The notion that militarisation
efforts are to warn off China’s mounting Arctic interest is also moot given Russia’s recent close dialogue with China for Arctic project investment.
Further, despite the current economic constraints, Putin has ensured some military investment continues. Since 2014 the planned redevelopment of airstrips and northern fleet docking facilities has continued. On Russia’s securitization approach to the Arctic a Russian Government official commented:
Russian security officials, for example the FSB and some individual interests, will keep the current statist approach and continue to securitise the existing state of affairs in the Arctic. I don’t see a departure from this thinking. It is important to understand that our Arctic posts have dual operational civil, industry, and defence purposes. We militarise out of
123Blank, S, 2015. Russia’s new Arctic base continues the militarization of the high north. Eurasia Daily
Monitor, 12:202.
necessity to match increasing human activity on our shores, as our neighbours are also doing. 125
In any case, this apparent Arctic militarisation is long overdue for Russia.126 Had events
on the Crimean Peninsula not occurred, it is likely that the modernization of Russian infrastructure in the Arctic would have been viewed in the securitisation context as an expected development in the changing region. Instead, events beyond the Arctic have swayed Russia’s Arctic policies more towards an intensified strategy of militarisation. Figure 30 illustrates Russia’s military presence in the Arctic. It also incorporates non- Russian bases in the Arctic region, demonstrating that it is not uncommon for Arctic states to possess military outposts in the Arctic. It is important to note that of those Russian military bases illustrated in Figure 30, the majority date from Soviet times.
Figure 30: Russia’s military presence in the Arctic.127
125 Interview, Moscow, April 2014.
126See for discussion on Russia’s downsizing of the Northern Fleet during the 1990s: Baev, P, 2013. Russia’s Arctic Ambitions and Anxieties.
127 Business Insider, 2015. This map shows Russia’s game-changing militarization of the Arctic.
Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com.au/chart-of-russias-militarization-of-arctic-2015- 8?r=US&IR=T.
4.5.2 Individual interests
There is a range of factors driving Russian Arctic strategy under Putin. Bobo Lo speaks to the guesswork associated with Russian foreign policy in which ‘decisions, rarely if ever, reflect an “objective” national interest, but are made by individuals with their own particular biases, prejudices, and vested interests’.128 This is certainly the case in
contemporary Russian Arctic strategy.129
Beyond Putin, the leading individual driver of Russian Arctic strategy is Nikolai Patrushev.130 As Russia’s current national Security Council head, he is central to all
Arctic affairs and is a close and long-standing Putin ally. Patrushev is responsible for the reordering of Russia’s maritime priorities to promote the Arctic, and to a lesser extent the Antarctic, to greater national significance. Another key individual in Russia’s Arctic policymaking processes is defence minister Sergey Shoygu. Shoygu is responsible for the undercurrent of securitisation within Russia’s Arctic strategy. In step with Putin, Shoygu deems the Arctic to be of great strategic significance and brings the hardline Arctic aspect to the table—as evident in the refocus and redevelopment of Russia’s Arctic military capabilities. Although neither Patrushev nor Shoygu are ‘free agents’ they nonetheless have central roles in Arctic matters.131
In a commercial sense, personal interests are apparent in the potential financial windfalls from Arctic resources. As the heads of the state energy apparatus, Igor Sechin and Alexei Miller have a vested interest in seeing Russia’s Arctic strategy realised.132 This variety of individual interests helps shape Russian Arctic strategy, and
against the background of shifts in Russia’s relationship with the West, can at times
128 Bobo, L, 2015. Russia and the New World Disorder. United States: Brookings Institution Press. 129 AS is the case for Russian politics more broadly, for further discussion on the latent brittleness of Putin’s power base in terms of his elite management see: Gill, G, 2016.
130 Interview, Moscow, April 2014. 131 Interview, Moscow, April 2014. 132 Interview, Moscow, April 2014.
elicit more airtime depending on the circumstances. For example, souring relations between Russia and the West post-2014 have allowed some individual biases to emerge in Arctic decision-making. Dugin’s ultra-nationalist agenda for Putin’s Russia has gathered pace, marking the Arctic as a zone for Russia to flex its imperial muscles. Despite these current tensions, those at the helm of Russian foreign policy are consistently voicing calls for multilateral cooperation in the Arctic. In November 2015, Patrushev declared Russia’s continued commitment to ‘expanding the platform of international dialogue’ in the Arctic which he described as a region with a ‘tradition of good neighbourliness and cooperation’.133