Correlación de variables.

With the increase of local autonomy through economic reform, the presence of local authorities in China’s system of economic governance has also become important. The

country is divided into four kinds of provincial-level administrative regions (22 provinces; five autonomous regions; four municipalities; and two special administrative regions, excluding Taiwan).2 These divisions are designed to accommodate the differentiation of China historically, politically, economically, racially and culturally. Vertically, each administrative region has three tiers (the provincial, sub-provincial and local levels). The provincial and sub-provincial units are especially important actors among China’s administrative divisions. The average size o f population o f Chinese provinces, including municipalities and autonomous regions, is about 40 million, and the average land area is 300,000 square kilometres. For example, in 2000 the population o f Henan province was 92.56 million, that of Shandong province was 90.79 million, and that of Sichuan province was 83.29 million (Mitsubishi, 2001). In terms of land area, four provinces (Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai) are larger than France (551,500 square kilometres), and eight provinces (the above four plus Heilongjiang, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu) are larger than Germany (356,733 square kilometres). Furthermore, the cities (as sub-provincial units) also have large populations. For example, Shanghai had 16.74 million people and Beijing 13.82 million in 2000.1 Given China's enormous size, for ordinary residents regional

identity is linked to the county (xian) or middle-size cities (local level), with populations of

about 0.8 million (Nakai, 1999).

Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), many changes of administrative structure have taken place through mergers, division and abolition4. These have been undertaken for the purpose of national defence, ethnic minority management, regional projects, and the promotion of economic reform. After 1979, for example, Hainan Island was separated from Guangdong province and became a province with the status of a special economic zone (SEZ). In 1997, Chongqing, which had a crucial role in the Three Gorges Dam Project, was upgraded to a fourth municipality. In 1997, Hong Kong reverted to China and was given a new status as a Special Administrative Region (SAR). In December 1999, Macau followed the same pattern and also became a SAR. Thus reform processes have added further complications to China's administrative divisions by establishing a variety of special zones.

China s administration. In the pre-reform period, the province was the highest sub-national unit of administration that supervised sub-provincial units. Reform processes have stimulated the creation of new cities. The status of cities has become more flexible than that of other divisions in China’s hierarchical administrative system. Setting up new special zones is a new regulatory function. By 1999, there were 5 SEZs, 14 coastal open cities, 5 coastal open areas, 39 economic and technology zones, 15 coastal bonded zones, and 14 border economic areas. Some cities, given the status o f SEZs, coastal open cities and Cities with Separate Plans (CSPs)5, were elevated by reform to almost the semi-provincial level. As a result, the total number of cities increased from 194 to 667 between 1979 and 1997 (Tang and Hao, 1997: 17).

Since 1999, 39 coastal cities have been given the status of economic and technological

development zones’ (jing/i jishu kaifa qu) and have received similar preferential treatment

to that given to the SEZs. They differ from SEZs in that they originally had economic foundations as ports or coastal industrial cities. In 1991, the centre approved the establishment o f 27 ‘high-technology development zones’, where cooperative relations with universities and research institutes are emphasised By 1997, the number o f such zones had increased to 58. Finally, in order to promote processing trade and entrepot trade in priority areas, the centre adopted the establishment o f bonded zones in 1990.*’ By 1999, 15 bonded zones had been established in China. Following the establishment of special zones, the further expansion of such zones in terms o f scale was carried out through the

designation of 'open economic areas' (jin^ji kaifangqu). In 1985, the counties and cities

located in the Yangtze Delta, Pearl River Delta and southern Fujian triangle were given this new status. By 1999, China had established five coastal open economic areas (the Yangtze Delta, the Pearl River Delta, the southern Fujian triangle, the Liaodong peninsula, and the Shandong peninsula).

Thus, sub-provincial units, especially cities, have functionally increased their economic role and have been able to engage in direct communication with the centre, by-passing the provinces. This is a particularly important example o f the dynamics of MLG in the state system. At the same time, the centre has also increased its territorial domain without the interference of the provincial governments. However, China’s regional administrative

divisions embrace both the remaining old structures and the birth of new administrations with their enhanced economic and entrepreneurial status. The diversification of administrative divisions and the mixture of the new and old vertical divisions continue, and the situation is further complicated by the dominant role of the CCP. Finally, decentralisation in China has produced a variety of responses at the local (provincial and sub-provincial) levels. Some local governments have been more assertive and less compliant than others in their behaviour vis-à-vis the centre, and this variation reflects the influence of a number o f factors, both internal to the local unit and external (in terms of central-local relations). (See Chung, 2000 for a detailed study of local variation.) This is another reason for suggesting that the model o f MLG is applicable to the current stage of governance reform in China As Solinger (1996: 33) observes, decentralisation in China is not a uniform national policy but has affected localities in different ways: the ‘enhanced

comparative differentials horizontally - among localities - have had a profound impact on

the shape of the overall, national vert ical balance of power’.