Interpretación del nivel de riesgo:

Hitherto, the paradigm of MLG has been applied mainly to the analysis of European Union governance. As Rosamond (2000: 110) explains, 'MLG analysis amounts to the claim that the EU has become a polity where there are significant sectoral variations in governance patterns’. Christiansen (1996: 13) stresses that MLG involves a shift from a hierarchical (vertical) to a non-hierarchical (horizontal) system of political negotiation, with sub-national regions within the EU - and the horizontal links among these regions - becoming particularly important in this negotiation process. The multi-level governance of EU policy-making involves complex 'interweavings' among the supranational, national and sub-national levels, and close links between governmental and non-governmental agencies, a picture which is represented by the image of a 'networked polity’ (Ansell, 2000). This image draws heavily on the developing theory of policy networks and policy communities as a basis for understanding the intricacies of contemporary governance. For Ansell, the networked polity is characterised by functional and territorial disaggregation, and also by strong inter-organisational and inter-governmental network relationships (Ansell, 2000: 303). Moreover, these network relationships are underpinned by strong inter-personal social networks (Ansell, 2000: 318). These new patterns are stronger in some sectoral areas of EU policy than others, and are especially prominent in EU cohesion

policy and regional policy (see, for example, Hooghe, 1996; Regional and Federal Studies,

2000). Put another way, the EU’s policy networks are 'o f varying density and depth' (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 74).

Although the MLG paradigm has not been applied to China, many authors have recognised the emerging spatial complexity of the new market economy in China and the increasingly important role within that economy of other actors besides the central government and Party institutions. There is widespread agreement that a focus on formal 'government’ needs to be replaced by a focus on the various components o f economic 'governance’, which must include a consideration of the role of states, hierarchies, clans or networks, and associations (Wang, 2001a: 113). Francis (2001) stresses four key features of China’s

market economy: (1 ) the proliferation of paragovernmental organisations (as the state takes on new regulatory functions but does so by delegating authority to private and quasi-govemmental agencies; (2) the integration of non-govemmental entities into state structures (so that the boundaries between the public and private sectors become blurred); (3) corporatist trends; and (4) the commercialisation o f the state (as state entities - including those at the sub-national levels - become market entrepreneurs). Although she does not use the specific term, it would appear that Francis is putting forward a model which is remarkably close to that of multi-level governance. However, she wishes to stress that the Chinese case involves some unique features, especially the combination of quasi-public and quasi-private responsibilities. If MLG means the spreading o f authority and policy-making influence across multiple levels of government and across the private/public boundary, then there is clear evidence of the emergence of such a system in China, although undoubtedly the Chinese state and party remain crucial gatekeepers' of the process (just as national governments still do in many areas of EU policy).

Zheng (1997) suggests that the old hierarchical Party-state in China is gradually being

replaced by a segmented state’, characterised by the emergence of multiple centres o f

power among the state legislative, judicial and administrative institutions vis-à-vis the Party organisation (Zheng, 1997: 264) This is very close to the idea of MLG, although the author does not use this exact term. Zheng observes: ‘China has today become more decentralized than it used to be. On many occasions, the center pretends to command provinces whereas provinces don't even recognize the center. In reality, many regions and provinces are on their own ... If economic modernization continues to be the top priority for the post-Deng regime, we are going to see more divergent interests between the center and localities and among various regions’ (ibid : 264). Zheng therefore predicts that increasingly China will move towards a federal model of decision-making. However, this conclusion ignores the possibility of a more flexible model of MLG, which would in many ways be more capable of meeting the needs of China’s future modernisation.

In the case of China the unique characteristics of business networks and their roots in close social networks, including those across the public/private divide, add a particularly important dimension to the nature and scope of MLG. Thus, Castells (1996: 188)

emphasises the importance of ‘linkage between supportive government and family-based business networks . .. in the process o f export-oriented industrialization in Southern China in the 1990s’. He then describes how, for example, manufacturers in Hong Kong and Taiwan take advantage of the regional networks based in their villages of origin in Guangdong and Fujian to create subsidiaries and establish subcontracting relationships ‘in order to offshore the low end of their manufacturing production (for example, in shoes, plastics, or consumer electronics)’ (ibid.: 188). At the same time, as Castells stresses, these production networks can only emerge because they are supported by provincial and local (especially city) governments. Thus, Chinese MLG has its own unique features, and these become especially evident in the cross-border relations which constitute the so-called ‘Greater South China Economic Region' among Southern China (Guangdong and Fujian), Taiwan and Hong Kong (Chen, 1994). Most importantly, the combination of strong social networks and supportive governance arrangements makes the Southern Chinese form of micro-regionalisation worthy of attention as a particular case of MLG which is different in key respects from the European ‘model’.

It is important to understand the distinction between the processes of formal intergovernmental relations and the emergence of overlapping jurisdictions in the case of China’s MLG. The administrative (state) system is mutually exclusive in terms of territoriality and is bound to a limited number of jurisdictions. The Party networks are extended along with the levels of formal government On the other hand, the ‘overlapping competencies among multiple levels o f governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels’ (Marks et al., 1996: 41) suggests the lack of any limitation on the number of jurisdictional levels. The number of actors in the latter case is unlimited and relations among them are more flexible than in the formal and intergovernmental type of MLG. This facilitates the coordination of the spatial economy and thereby involves economic governance by firms (see the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6).