Factores de riesgo psicosocial intralaboral

Undoubtedly, as a supra-state regional project, East Asian régionalisation has not yet achieved levels of integration comparable to those of the EU. There are various reasons for this. To begin with, East Asian regionalism is still rooted in the Pacific security framework that was established by the United States and its allies during the Cold War Regional territorial disputes, such as those concerning the Spratly Islands and the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, remain unresolved. As state-building in East Asia is still a fairly new process, there remains the possibility of military conflict as economic development proceeds. Moreover, the pace of development of regional stability and confidence-building measures is slow. As far as economic co-operation is concerned, the financial crisis of 1997 suggested that there was little capacity for a coherent regional response. Regional organisations such as APEC and ASEAN have no capability without the approval of the United States. This suggests that in East Asia there are so many variations of culture, religion, history, ideology, language, level of development, and political system that the emergence of a coherent regional identity above the state level in the foreseeable future is not very likely.

Debates on economic development in East Asia also emphasise the crucial role of state-led intervention. Thus, explanations have usually stressed domestic political factors such as the combination of selective state intervention with neo-liberal perspectives (free trade, the division o f labour, the accumulation of capital and technologies, etc.) (World Bank, 1993), institutional development (Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997), and the role of the developmental state (on Japan see Johnson, 1982; on South Korea see Amsden, 1989; on Taiwan see Wade, 1990). From the institutionalist perspective, the establishment of export-processing zones (EPZs) is seen as a kind of institutionalisation from above on the basis of an export-led strategy. In this sense, the state has attempted to secure domestic governance reform, and in so doing has often promoted domestic régionalisation (through the rescaling of political economy), usually on the basis of nationalism and the national interest. The state thus remains a major co-ordinator o f the response to globalisation and régionalisation.

While most studies concentrate on each country’s individual economic base, there has recently been a growing interest in the search for the cause o f the region’s broader economic dynamism, as illustrated by the revision of the so-called ‘flying geese’ model. According to the institutional perspective, in the 1990s East Asia began rapidly to promote the enlargement and institutionalisation of its regional organisations. For example, in the 1990s the number o f member countries o f ASEAN increased from six to ten with the entry of Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. Furthermore, the establishment of the framework o f ASEAN + 3 (China, South Korea and Japan) speeded up institutionalisation by regularising the ministerial meetings. In November 2000, a decision was taken to

extend the free trade agreement and have regular summit meetings (Nihon Kei:ai Shinbun

hereafter NKS, 25 November 2000).

In the development and deeepening of East Asian regional cooperation, the change of attitude o f the two major powers (Japan and China) is critical Japan's attitude, which originally supported a bilateral relationship with ASEAN, changed in the 1990s. The East Asian financial crisis in 1997 deepened Japan’s involvement with ASEAN in terms of economic co-operation. The framework o f ASEAN + 3 has provided an opportunity for regular summit meetings among China, South Korea and Japan.7 In this way, ASEAN has increased the mediating role of the Northeast Asian countries. In November 2000, China,

South Korea and Japan agreed to hold regular summit meetings (Toa, January 2001: 65).

Also, there has been mounting enthusiasm for the development o f free trade. Although Japan was suspicious of the EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus) in the early 1990s, it began to move toward the creation of a free trade area with South Korea and Singapore in the latter part of the decade. While the levels of institutionalisation and direction of these regional organisations remain weak and uncertain, the supra-state regional project is now gathering support in East Asia.

China's international relations also improved throughout the 1990s. Since economic reform, China has committed itself to various international regimes (e.g. membership of the World Bank and IMF in 1980). In 1986, China became a member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). China also started to join the United Nations PKO (peace-keeping operation) activities in Namibia in 1989. In 1992, China became a member

of APEC. In 1994, China joined the ARF (ASEAN regional forum), which sought to improve the transparency of defence and armaments policy. China also joined the first ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) in Bangkok in 1996. In 2001, China was accepted as a member o f the WTO. In parallel with its improvement of the international environment, in the last decade China has also strengthened relations with neighbouring countries by diplomatic normalisation (with Indonesia and Singapore in 1990, with South Korea and Vietnam in 1992). In November 2001, China proposed to establish a free trade agreement (FTA) with ASEAN. Thus, participation in multilateral organisations and the establishment of friendly relations with neighbouring countries as well as the promotion of economic cooperation have offered China important opportunities to develop economic relations with the East Asian economy.