Significado …

Logic exists because of the difference between the mode of being of material things in their own nature and the mode of being which those same things have in human intellection. Like all knowers, we consider things according to the being which they have in reality, i.e. outside of knowledge, but unlike some knowers we are also able to consider things according to the being which they have in the mind, and to compare the thing as found in the two modes.6 _{It is in this comparison that we form}

the notions of “genus” and “species,” “individual,” etc., which Thomas calls the “logical notions.”7

However, logic itself, as a science,8 _{is of modest extent. It pertains to}

the general introduction to the sciences. It is to be taught before the sci-

4. Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, 1.2.1 [ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, Turonibus, 1900: Alfred Cattier, t. 1, pp. 117–144] asks whether God is intelli- gible for us in the state of the way (i.e. in the present life). The ninth conclusion is that by the same concept by which the wayfarer conceives of the creature it can conceive of God, though the name signifying that concept is not said univocally of God and of the creature. Cf. 124b–125a for the use of the Sentences text. On Capreolus’s use of the text, cf. my pa- per: “Does Being Have a Nature? (Or: Metaphysics as a Science of the Real),” in Approaches

to Metaphysics, ed. William Sweet, Dordrecht, Holland, 2004: Kluwer Academic Publishers,

pp. 23–59.

5. Thomas is there commenting on Aristotle, Metaph. 5.6 (1016b31–1017a3). 6. Cf. ST 1.14.6.ad 1; 1.16.4.ad 2; 1.16.2; 1.84.1. Thomas accuses Plato of failing to ap- preciate the possibility of our having a mode of knowing of material things different from the mode of being proper to the things themselves (ST 1.84.1): this suggests why in a Pla- tonism metaphysics and logic would tend to be identifi ed.

7. Cf. Sent. 1.2.1.3 (ed. Mandonnet, p. 67); also, CM 4.4 (572–577, especially 574); and 6.4 (1233). Cf. also De ente et essentia, c. 3 (Leonine ed., lines 73–119).

8. Cf. CM 4.4 (577), concerning the “demonstrative part of logic” (not to be confused with dialectic as demonstrative (576)).

ences which bear upon things, and it teaches the method common to all. As such, it has an extremely limited outlook. We are accustomed to the idea of such sciences as mathematics and physics being contrasted with metaphysics, in that the two former are particular sciences, cutting out some part of being and treating of it.9 _{So also, but even more so, the sci-}

ence of logic is of limited outlook, being meant to consider the points of method common to all rational undertakings. Each special science of things has its own peculiarities of method, and these are to be treated when the sciences themselves are taught, toward the beginning of the presentation of the science.10 _{Thus, Aristotle, in Physics 2, presents the}

nature of physics in contrast to mathematics, and also to metaphysics.11

Whose responsibility is the doctrine of method in the special science? To the extent that it requires the comparison of diverse sciences, it is the responsibility of the metaphysician. One of the main arguments for the existence of metaphysics is the need for a science which considers the principles common to all the sciences.12

Indeed, this is so much the case that the principles of some sciences are simply given to that science by the metaphysician. St. Thomas gives the example of geometry which obtains from metaphysics the defi nition of magnitude, its subject genus.13 _{This is also the case with logic. Whose}

9. Cf. CM 7.1 (1147). On the limits of physics as compared to metaphysics, cf. above, chapter 4.

10. CM 2.5 (335):

[Aristotle] shows what is the appropriate method of seeking truth; and.......fi rstly he shows how man can know the appropriate method in the quest for truth.......He says.......that diverse people seek the truth by virtue of diverse methods, therefore it is necessary that a man be instructed in what way [per quem modum] in each of the scienc- es [in singulis scientiis] the things said are to be taken [sint recipienda ea quae dicuntur].

And because it is not easy for a man to grasp two things at once, but rather while looking toward two he can grasp neither, it is absurd for a man simultaneously to seek science and the method which is appropriate to science. And because of this one ought to learn logic previously to the other sciences, because logic treats of the common method of

proceeding in all the other sciences. However, the method proper to each of the sciences ought to be treated in the individual sciences, toward the outset. [My italics.]

11. Cf. CP 2: Thomas presents the whole of book 2 of the Physics as treating of “the principles of natural science”: cf. 2.1 (ed. Maggiòlo, 141), and we get such questions as how the physicist and the mathematician differ (2.3) and on the basis of which sorts of cause the physicist demonstrates: cf. 2.5 (176). At 2.4 (175), we see a contrast between the phys- icist’s interest in form and the metaphysician’s interest in form.

12. Cf. CM prologue: without a knowledge of the things metaphysics teaches, one can- not fully know the things proper to a genus or species; metaphysics is described as maxi- mally intellectual and thus regulative of all the sciences. In CP 1.1 (4), we are taught that Aristotle’s Physics is placed at the beginning of the study of natural science, just as first phi-

losophy, i.e. metaphysics, is placed before all of the sciences; this is because it treats of what

is common to beings as such.

13. Cf. CM 6.1 (1149); the geometer receives from the metaphysician the answer to the question: what is magnitude? i.e. the very essence of the “subject genus” of the science of geometry; the example is not in Aristotle, but is supplied by Thomas.

responsibility is it to defi ne the genus, the species, and, we can add, the analogue? Aristotle is explicit, and Thomas takes no exception to his doc- trine on this point. To investigate genus and species is proper to the metaphysi-

cian, since they pertain properly to being as being.14

Accordingly, when Thomas writes his short overall view of the meta- physical world, the De ente et essentia, he spends a good part of it discuss- ing genus and species, fi nding this crucial for the presentation of essence in material substances, but also explaining what is to be said concerning the divine essence in this regard, and how genus and species are found in separate substance and in accidents.—What is proper to the notion of the genus, as found in material things, is its being a name for the whole, but one derived from the (common) matter. This tie of the genus to mat- ter is crucial for Thomas’s treatment of “body” as an analogical name, metaphysically speaking, when used in common for the corruptible and the incorruptible (i.e. celestial) body.15 _{In the subsequently inserted dis-}

puted question found in Sent. 1.2,16 _{on ratio in things, we see the impor-}

tance of genus and species having a foundation in things, if they are to be distinguished from chimeras from the viewpoint of truth.17

But all of this is beyond the ken of the logician, who receives the doc- trine of genus and species from the metaphysician. The logician’s out- look is limited to things from the viewpoint of their mode of being in the intellect.18 _{Indeed, his outlook, even about logical intentiones, does}

14. Cf. CM 4.4 (587), concerning Aristotle at 4.2 (1005a13–18):

[The metaphysician].......considers the prior and the posterior, genus and species, whole and part, and others things of this sort, because these also are accidents of that which is inasmuch as it is that which is [accidentia entis inquantum est ens].

15. On this, cf. CM 10.12 (2137 [2]; and 2138–2142; and 2145). This doctrine fi gures in an important way later in this essay.

16. Sent. 1.2.1.3. This item is a disputed question, probably written about 1265–67, and inserted by Thomas in his Sent.; cf. James Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D’Aquino, His Life,

Thought, and Work, Garden City, N.Y., 1974: Doubleday, p. 366 and p. 359. See especially

A. Dondaine, O.P., “Saint Thomas et la dispute des attributs divins (I Sent., d. 2, a. 3): au- thenticité et origine,” Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 8 (1938), pp. 253–262.

17. Concerning logic, I have noted Aristotle’s statement that it is the metaphysician who considers what genus and species are. In this respect, I would refer not only to De

ente et essentia 2 and 3 (and especially 2, wherein we get the defi nitions of the genus and

the species), but also to De substantiis separatis c. 6 (Leonine ed., lines 74–77; ed. Spiazzi, 70), where, in criticizing the position of Gebirol, Thomas says that it does away with the

principles of logic, doing away with the true notion of the genus and the species and the

substantial difference, inasmuch as it changes all into the mode of accidental predication. Now, no particular science really provides the defi nition of its principles, not even logic. It seems to me clear that it is the metaphysician who provides the logician with the defi ni- tions of the principles. But the logician accepts them only in a limited way, by mere “logi- cal consideration.”

18. It is true that he is closer, in treating of names, to the concept’s relation to things themselves than is the mere grammarian. Cf. In Peryermenias 1.2 (Leonine ed., lines 49– 55, in t. I* 1, 1989: Commissio Leonina and Vrin):

not coincide with that of the metaphysician, who considers beings as be- ings.19

Let us recall the occasion in the Metaphysics in which Aristotle argues that a universal cannot be a substance, because a substance is not “said about something.” Thomas introduces the obvious possible objection that what is proper to substance is, rather, that it cannot be “found in something.” Being “said of something” is attributed to secondary sub- stance in Aristotle’s own Categories. Thomas’s reply is of interest:

...But it is to be said that the Philosopher is speaking in accordance with logical consideration [secundum logicam considerationem] in the Categories. Now, the logi- cian [logicus] considers things inasmuch as they are in the reason [res secundum

quod sunt in ratione]; and so he considers substances inasmuch as according to the

intellect’s grasp [secundum acceptionem intellectus] they lie under the intention of universality [subsunt intentioni universalitatis]. And thus, as regards predication, which is an act of reason, he says that they are predicated “of a subject” [de sub-

jecto], i.e. of a substance subsisting outside the soul. But the primary philosopher

considers things [de rebus] according as they are beings [entia]; and so in his con- sideration “being in a subject” and “being about a subject” do not differ. For here “being said of a subject” [dici de subjecto] is taken as regards that which is in itself some thing and is present in an actually existing subject [quod est in se aliqua res

et inest alicui subjecto existenti in actu]. And it is impossible that this be a substance.

For thus it would have being in a subject. Which is against the notion of sub- stance, [a point] which is had even in the Categories.20

The logician hears something of what the metaphysician says, but cannot be concerned with the whole of it.

Thus, we can expect that logic itself will provide only a rather super- fi cial account of genus or species, and that the application of such inten-

tiones in this or that science, including metaphysics, will require a special

treatment.—So also, the account of analogy given by logic cannot be ex- pected to do the job that a metaphysician will do, either as presenting logic with its principles or as explaining their application in metaphysics itself.

There is another extremely important feature of the relation between the intentiones of logic and the science of metaphysics which should be

......But because logic is ordered toward knowledge to be obtained concerning things [de rebus sumendam], the signifi cation of vocal utterances, which is immediately relat- ed to the very conceptions of the mind [inmediata ipsis conceptionibus intellectus], per- tains to its principal consideration, whereas the signifi cation of letters, inasmuch as it is more distant [from our conceptions], does not pertain to its consideration, but rather to the consideration of the grammarian......

19. Cf. CM 4.5 (591), concerning the limited outlook the physicist has regarding the fi rst principles of demonstration.

20. CM 7.13 (1576), concerning Aristotle at 7.13 (1038b15–16).

considered. It is mentioned by Thomas in connection with Boethius’s defi nition of the person. An objector, criticizing the Boethian defi nition, viz. “an individual substance of a rational nature,” points out that “indi- vidual” is not the name of a thing outside the mind, but is rather a logi- cian’s consideration; not the name of a “res,” but merely of an “intentio”; and yet the person is a real thing. Boethius’s defi nitional procedure is thus, he claims, unsuitable.

Thomas replies, explaining carefully the meaning of “individual” in the defi nition. We read:

...because substantial differences are not known to us, or else are not named, it is necessary sometimes to use accidental differences in place of substantial [dif- ferences], for example, if someone were to say: “fi re is a simple, hot, and dry body”; for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms, and reveal them. And similarly the names of logical notions [intentiones] can be accepted in order to defi ne real things [res], inasmuch as they are accepted in the role of some names

of real things which [names] have not been invented. And thus this name “individual”

[individuum] is inserted in the defi nition of the person in order to signify the mode of subsisting, which belongs to particular substances [modum subsistendi qui

competit substantiis particularibus].21

That the logical intention called “analogy” is used in this way by Thom- as is clear. For example, consider ST 1.4.3, whether some creature can be like God. This is obviously a metaphysical question, a question about the intrinsic being of creatures. The notion of likeness involves community of form. The question is answered on the basis of the doctrine that every agent causes something like itself, so that in any effect there must be a likeness of the form of the agent. Degrees of such likeness are sketched, and it is true that logical notions of species and genus are used to de- scribe these degrees of likeness, but clearly this is a use of logical notions as stand-ins for metaphysical conceptions. Ultimately one reasons to the case of the divine agent as “not contained in any genus.” Here the similar-

ity of the effect to the cause is called “according to some sort of analogy” [se- cundum aliqualem analogiam]. Notice that we proceed from the species to

the genus to the analogously one. Thomas explains what he means:

...as being itself is common to all [sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus]. And in this way those things which are from God are assimilated to him inasmuch as

21. ST 1.29.1.ad 3. In DP 9.2.ad 5, on the same point, we have:

......“individual” is inserted into the defi nition of the person in order to signify the indi- vidual mode of being [ad designandum individualem modum essendi].

At Sent. 1.25.1.1 [ed. Mandonnet, p. 601], the discussion of Boethius’s defi nition of “person,” note how different is Thomas’s handling of “individua” than in ST 1.29.1 and

they are beings [inquantum sunt entia], as to the fi rst and universal principle of being in its entirety [totius esse].

And one could cite many prominent texts in this line.22

I notice in McInerny’s conclusion, “The Point of the Book,” that he says:

My second thesis is that Thomas never speaks of the causal dependence in a hi- erarchical descent of all things from God as analogy. That is, terminologically speaking, there is no analogy of being in St. Thomas. [162]

McInerny is surely in error on this point. Thomas uses logical terms as stand-ins for metaphysical terms.