Materialidad y paleta de colores

Anyone reading the later writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example the Disputed Questions on the Soul, can have no doubt as to the importance accorded, in the argument for the incorruptibility of the human soul, to the doctrine that existence is the inseparable associate of form. It is re- markable, then, that in his early Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lom-

bard, the discussion of the human soul’s incorruptibility makes no men-

tion whatsoever of such a doctrine. This situation calls for investigation.1

Let us begin by recalling the elements of the argument for incorrupt- ibility as found in the mature writings. One premise is that the soul is form having its own existence independently of the corporeal compos- ite: the rational soul is subsisting form. The other premise is that form, by its very nature, is inseparable from existence: existence accompanies form, just because of the sort of thing form is: the rational soul is subsist- ing form. It is this latter premise which will occupy us here. In passing, we might note that these elements correspond fairly closely to the ultimate argument of Plato’s Phaedo (which St. Thomas did not know directly): in the face of Simmias, who wonders whether the soul is not a harmony, it is argued that the soul is a subsisting thing; in the face of Cebes, wonder- ing whether this subsisting thing might not eventually cease to exist even though it outlasts the body, it is argued that the soul has the nature of something indissociable from life or existence.2

1. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de anima, q.14 (ed. James H. Robb, Toronto, 1968: Pontifi cal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, pp. 200–201). Though Robb, p. 36, dated these questions 1268–1269 (at Paris), R.-A. Gauthier has argued convincingly that they are more likely a preparatory exercise for the corresponding questions of Summa theologiae 1, and thus should be dated 1266–1267 (at Rome): cf. R.-A. Gauthier, O.P., “Quelques questions à propos du commentaire de St. Thomas sur le De anima,” Angelicum 51 (1974), p. 452, n. 44bis. For the Sentences, cf. Scriptum super libros sententiarum 2.19.1.1 (ed. P. Man- donnet, Paris, 1929: Lethielleux, pp. 481–483).

2. Cf. Plato, Phaedo 91c–107a.

In its developed state, St. Thomas’s premise concerning form runs as follows:

It is manifest that that which belongs to something according to itself is insepa- rable from it. But being [esse] belongs to form, which is act, through itself: thus, matter, according to precisely this, acquires being-actually [esse in actu], viz. that it acquires form; according to precisely this does corruption take place in it, viz. that

form is separated from it.3

We should notice that while the doctrine leads to genuine incorrupt- ibility only where one has to do with subsisting form, nevertheless it is a general doctrine of the nature of form as form, and one arrived at by ob- servation of the role of form in corporeal, perishable things.

In the early Commentary on the Sentences, we fi nd a fi rm theological stand as to the fact that the human soul is a substance not depending on the body, that it is multiplied according to the multiplication of individual bodies, and that it survives the destruction of bodies, nor does it pass into other bodies. However, as to the philosophical doctrine supporting this view, the article argues merely that the human soul has its own being [esse

absolutum], i.e. does not depend on the body for its esse. Thus, it is not cor-

rupted upon the corruption of the body. No mention is made of the na- ture of form and what it tells us about the subsisting soul. We have a doc- trine here which responds to Simmias but not to Cebes.4

The closest St. Thomas comes here to discussing the relation between form as form and being is in the answer to an objection. The objector has argued that as form of the body, the soul has one being [unum esse] with the body, and so must perish with the body. The objector envisages someone replying that the soul is both form and substance, and at death it ceases to be form but continues as substance. He counters that either the soul is essentially form, and then what he has said holds, or else it is only accidentally form: which leads to the absurd result that man is only

3. St. Thomas, Summa theologiae [henceforth “ST”] 1.75.6 (ed. Ottawa, 425a54–66): Manifestum est enim quod id quod secundum se convenit alicui, est inseparabile ab ipso. Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam; secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corrup- tio, quod separatur forma ab ea.

Notice that the argument continues:

Impossibile est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa. Unde impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse. [445b7–9]

Some people, seeing the proposition: “form cannot be separated from itself,” have thought that the argument is based on simplicity. The truth rather is that it is based on the nature of form, and its relation to existence.

4. St. Thomas, Sentences 2.19.1.1, the body of the article and ad 2 (ed. Mandonnet, pp. 481–483).

accidentally something one. St. Thomas replies, fi rst, that it is right to say that the soul is not form in exactly the same way as other (material) forms; since the soul has its own being, it does not have being through the being of the composite, though the composite has being through the being of the soul. He then goes on to say that the two terms “form” and “substance” apply to the same thing, but according to two diverse consid- erations. That thing, the soul, remains after the body, not precisely from the fact that it is form, but from the fact that it has its own being [esse abso-

lutum], i.e. is a subsisting substance.5

Here, we fi nd no interest on St. Thomas’s part in the notion of form as form for furthering the doctrine of incorruptibility. Nothing he says is

opposed to the later doctrine: he does not say that form as form must dis-

appear or tends to disappear with the body. He says simply that it is not “as form” that the soul has the capacity to remain after the body.

It is remarkable that in the discussion of angels in Sentences, book 2, there is no discussion of their incorruptibility. This surprises since such a doctrine fi gures in the text of Peter Lombard being commented upon. The angels are described as “indissoluble and immortal.”6 _{Albert the}

Great in his commentary provides at least brief comment.7 _{St. Thomas}

himself, later in his career, will consider the question of the angels’ incor- ruptibility as one which even an elementary questionnaire for beginners in theology ought to contain.8 _{One has very much the impression that St.}

Thomas did not feel philosophically at ease with this issue of incorrupt- ibility at the beginning of his academic career.

The Sentences date from 1252 to 1256. By the time he writes Summa

contra gentiles 2.55 (dated ca 1261),9 _{St. Thomas already has the fully de-}

5. Ibid., obj. 3 and 4 (p. 479) and the replies (pp. 483–484); especially:

......non enim ex hoc quod est forma habet quod post corpus remaneat, sed ex hoc quod habet esse absolutum, ut substantia subsistens......

With this text is to be associated St. Thomas, Sentences 1.8.5.2, ad 5 (ed. Mandonnet, p. 231):

Dico igitur, quod animae non convenit.......habere esse absolutum, inquantum est for- ma; sed inquantum est similitudo Dei.

6. Peter Lombard, Sentences 2, dist. 3 (in St. Thomas’s commentary, ed. Mandonnet, p. 80):

Quod [angeli] spiritus erant, quod indissolubiles et immortales erant, commune om- nibus et aequale erat.

7. Cf. Albert the Great, Sentences 2, dist. 3, a, art. 2 (ed. Paris, t. 27, p. 63a and 64a–b); also, dist. 3, c, art. 11 (p. 78a–b).

8. Cf. St. Thomas, ST 1.50.5, and also the prologue for the whole Summa theologiae in which the aim is stated: to avoid needless questions lest beginners be confused.

9. For the dates, cf. James Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas D’Aquino, Garden City, N.Y., 1974: Doubleday, pp. 358–360. Henceforth we will use “SCG” for Summa contra gentiles.

veloped argument. To what extent can we discover something about the process of St. Thomas’s thinking between Sentences 2 and SCG 2? One obvious item to consider is the Question on the Immortality of the Soul.10 _Dis-

covered in this century, this document has recently been published in a good edition. While the few scholars who have spoken of it have tended to date it later than SCG 2, I will suggest that it is an earlier work.

The main response in the Question is rather long (quite normal for a quaestio disputata), and is taken up for the most part with the prem- ise that the human soul is incorporeal and subsisting (fairly parallel to

ST 1.75.2). The premise which interests us, viz. that such a being is in-

corruptible, is rather briefl y presented, using the argument that corrup- tion being the outcome or terminus of a movement, only beings subject to movement are corruptible, and only bodies are subject to movement. The response then goes quickly on to consider at some length the prob- lem presented by the position that the possible intellect is not a part of the soul at all.11

However, the doctrine upon which we are focusing does occur in the

Question. The fi fth objection to the soul’s incorruptibility is that every-

thing composite has a possibility of dissolution, and that the soul has at least the composition of “that which is” [quod est] and “that by which it is” [quo est]. St. Thomas’s reply begins on the entirely defensive note that the composition which is found in the soul is not grounds for conclud- ing to its corruptibility. It is not a composition out of matter and form, but out of quod est and quo est. He then explains what he means by such a composition, the explanation fi rst introducing esse as what is meant by

“quo est,” and then presenting the hierarchy of beings: God, created im-

material substances, and substances composed of matter and form, in the light of the doctrine of quod est and esse. At the point of speaking of substances composed of matter and form, St. Thomas asserts that esse at- tends upon form of itself, so that the material substance only loses esse inasmuch as matter is separated from form. It is quickly pointed out that such separation from esse cannot even be conceived with respect to a sub- stance which is pure form. The conclusion is no longer merely defensive. It is that a substance which is form alone cannot possibly be corruptible. Thus, the actual accomplishment of the reply goes far beyond what was

10. Cf. Leonard A. Kennedy, “A New Disputed Question of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immortality of the Soul,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge, 45 (1978), pp. 205–208 (introduction) and 209–223 (text).

11. St. Thomas, Quaestio de immortalitate animae (ed. Kennedy, p. 217):

Non enim potest corrumpi per se, cum per se non moveatur. Nihil enim movetur nisi corpus, nec aIiquid per se corrumpitur nisi moveatur, cum corruptio sit terminus mo- tus.

announced in its fi rst sentence. It ends up being the doctrine which as we have said will become paramount.12

Both doctrines used in the Question, that on form and esse and that on only bodies being subject to movement and corruption, appear in SCG 2.55, but that on form is given a very prominent place in the chapter. It is the second argument presented, and the fi rst argument in the chapter falls in with it very closely.13 _{The argument from movement and corrup-}

tion comes in seventh place.14 _{While such positioning in an SCG chapter}

proves nothing by itself, when added to the general picture it suggests that the Question on the Immortality of the Soul represents an earlier stage of St. Thomas’s refl ection than SCG 2.55.15

Let us now present more fully that general picture. To do so, we will look fi rst at Quodlibet 10.3.2 and then at the De ente et essentia. The Quod-

libet asks about the incorruptibility of the rational soul, and is generally

12. The objection (ed. Kennedy, p. 209) runs:

5. Preterea. Ubicumque est aliqua compositio, ibi est possibilitas ad dissolutionem. In anima est aliqua compositio, saltem ex quo est et quod est. Ergo est dissolubilis et non incorruptibilis.

The reply (ed. Kennedy, p. 219):

Ad v dicendum quod compositio que est in anima non potest esse ratio corruptibilita- tis. Non enim est composita ex materia et forma, sed ex quo est et quod est, sive ex esse et quod est, quod idem est, nam ipsum esse est quo unumquodque est. Hanc autem compositionem inveniri oportet in omnibus preter Deum, in quo solo idem est sua substantia et suum esse. In substantiis autem immaterialibus sed creatis, aliud est esse et substantia rei. Sed substantia subsistens in esse est ipsa forma. In materialibus autem substantiis est compositum ex materia et forma: esse autem est per se consequens for- mam. Unde substantia materialis non amittit esse nisi per hoc quod materia separatur a forma. Que quidem separatio nec intelligi potest in substantia que est forma tantum. Nihil enim potest a seipso separari. Unde impossibile est quod substantia que est for- ma tantum sit corruptibilis.

13. The fi rst two arguments in SCG 2.55 differ inasmuch as the fi rst bases the insepa- rability of form from esse on form’s being that through which the substance is the proper receiver of esse, whereas the second uses to the same effect the doctrine of per se sequence. These two approaches differ only inasmuch as the former brings more into the picture how the formal cause presupposes an outside agent: cf. St. Thomas, ST 1.104.1 ad 1, and

SCG 2.54 (para. 5; ed. Pera, 1291). For the background of this doctrine of form as consti-

tuting the proper subject of esse, notice Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima, tr. 2, c. 4 (ed. Simone Van Riet, Louvain/Leiden, 1977: Peeters/Brill, pp. 98.47–99.64).

14. St. Thomas, SCG 2.55 (para. 8; ed. Pera, 1304). We might note that this argument is not to be found even as an auxiliary in ST 1 or Qq. de anima (where there are four sed

contra arguments given).

15. In the Compendium theologiae, the doctrine of form and esse is used in 1.74, and then that chapter is related to the rational soul in 1.84. No use or mention is made of the movement/corruption argument. I have elsewhere argued that the Compendium should be dated (at least the main part: De fide) between the SCG and the ST 1. Cf. my “St. Thomas and the Divine Names,” Science et Esprit 32 (1980), p. 26, n. 22. This is also the opinion of the Leonine editor (H.-F. Dondaine), in Opera omnia, t. 42, Rome 1979: Editori di San Tommaso, p. 8.

dated at Christmas 1258.16 _{Its main response has some differences and}

some resemblances in pattern with the Question. It includes at the end a lengthy discussion of the problem of whether the intellect is substantial- ly one with the human soul, and so in this way is similar to the Question. However, it begins with the discussion of corruptibility and takes some time over it, before moving on to what is the main discussion in the Ques-

tion, viz. the soul having being of its own because it has an operation of

its own. The argument that the soul cannot be subject to corruption on its own account is this:

Only those things can be corrupted on their own account which are composed of matter and form having a contrary: which cannot be [the case of the soul] unless it is an element or [composed] out of the elements, as the ancient philosophers held, which positions are disproved in De anima 1.17

This is not the argument from corruption as terminus of movement, the argument featured in the Question, though it belongs to the same “physi- cal” genre, one might say. The main point to note is that there is no men- tion whatsoever in the Quodlibet of the doctrine of form and esse.

We turn now to the De ente et essentia. In so doing, we turn away from Thomas’s direct consideration of the problem of the soul’s incorruptibil- ity, our purpose being to note a hint of development in his general on- tology, revealed in his early discussions of created intellectual substances. There is a change in St. Thomas’s approach to the ontology of the soul and the angel between his Sentences 1 and 2, and his De ente et essentia. In the Sentences, in order to ascend to the level of immaterial beings, he points out that to quiddity as quiddity, it belongs neither to be compos- ite nor to be simple: either may be the case.18 _{In the De ente, in order to}

make the same move, St. Thomas rather argues that since form is the cause of being of matter [“......forma dat esse materie......”], therefore form

can exist without matter. It happens to some forms that they cannot be without matter, according as they are distant as to ontological perfection from the fi rst principle which is the fi rst and pure act.19 _{Thus, we see St.}

Thomas showing an increased interest in form as exhibited in material things, as presenting a nature to which being belongs. He no longer has

16. Cf. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, p. 127: “According to Mandonnet’s chronology, about which there has been little discussion......” In any case, it belongs to the fi rst Parisian pro- fessorship.

17. St. Thomas, Quodlibet 10.3.2 (ed. R. Spiazzi, Rome/Turin, 1949: Marietti, 200): Per se quidem corrumpi non posset nisi esset composita ex materia et forma contrarie- tatem habente: quod esse non potest, nisi esset elementum aut ex elementis, ut antiqui philosophi posuerunt, quorum positiones in I De anima reprobantur.

18. Cf. St. Thomas, Sentences 1.8.5.2 (ed. Mandonnet, p. 229); also 2.3.1.1 (ed. Man- donnet, p. 87).

the outlook, which we noted earlier in this paper, that it is not “as form” that the soul is able to exist independently of the body, but “as substance” or “as resembling the fi rst cause.”20 _{Rather, to be form is to have a resem-}

blance to the fi rst cause; to require matter in order to exist is to fall some- what short in the very line of being a form. This De ente doctrine of form’s natural independence of matter, precisely inasmuch as form is cause of being of matter, is to be found throughout the rest of St. Thomas’s ca- reer, and nowhere more forcefully than in the De substantiis separatis writ- ten near the end of his life.21

Is this interest in the form/esse association to be related primarily to the doctrine of Boethius in his De trinitate: “All being is from form” [“omne esse ex forma est”]?22 _{It is unfortunate that Thomas Aquinas, in his}

early Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate, discontinued work just at the point where Boethius begins to talk about the relation between form and esse.23 _{However, the tendency of the Boethian text is toward an iden-}

tifi cation of form and esse, and it could easily be read (and was read by