Iluminación

Reality consists primarily of beings, and indeed, of substances.33 _There

are many substances, differing from one another in kind, and differing from one another numerically within one kind. The intellectual grasp of these substances in their diversity and multiplicity is the starting point of metaphysics.34 _{Substances are not all that there is. There are all the}

things-which-happen-to-substance or things-that-are-found-in-substances

universal hierarchy, implicitly rejects what is essential to the universe: unity of order. [129]

De Koninck says that since Suarez the Scholastics abandon more and more the ontological study of nature. They think that scientifi c explanations replace the philosophy of nature. The philosophers concentrate only on notions of interest to the theologians. Cosmic repul- sion may explain the expansion of the universe, and the theory of genes explain mutations, but none of that is an explanation of why anything is in motion.

32. It is notable that in his CP 1.1 (4 [4]), in order to explain Aristotle’s presentation of the Physics at the very beginning of all the physical works, Thomas asserts that prior to all the sciences one locates “fi rst philosophy,” in which one determines concerning those things which are common to that which is, as such [communia enti inquantum est ens]. While in the order of human learning one should learn physical science before metaphysics, nev- ertheless at the more mature level one’s curriculum should give metaphysics the priority.

33. The following twelve paragraphs are an adaptation from my paper, “Something Rather than Nothing, and St. Thomas’ Third Way,” Science et Esprit 39 (1987), pp. 71–80, at p. 77.

34. Thomas Aquinas, De substantiis separatis, ch. 6 (Leonine ed., in Opera omnia, t. 40, 1969), lines 88–129:

......[Gebirol’s] position does away, indeed,.......with the principles of fi rst philosophy, taking away unity from singular things, and consequently the true entity and diversity of things......

And also De veritate 5.2.ad 7:

......the necessity of the mentioned [absolutely fi rst] principles follows upon the divine providence and disposing: for from this [fact], that the things have been produced in such a nature, in which they have determinate being [esse terminatum], they are distinct from their negations: from which distinction it follows that the affi rmation and the negation are not simultaneously true; and from this principle there is necessity in all other principles, as is said in Metaphysics 4.

—there are “accidents” and movements and so on.35 _{However, all these}

others have being only in dependence upon substances. If other beings do not “fl ow” from the substance in which they have being, then they “fl ow” from some other substance which is thus “infl uencing” the sub- stance in which they are found. All the things that are depend for their existence on substances.36

What sort of thing is substance? What are some of the characteristics by which we recognize it, discern it, and keep from confusing it with oth- er things? It is diffi cult to present because it is so well known and it is on it as basis that questions of “recognition” (even, “how will I recognize substance?”) are posed, understood, and answered. To ask for “identi- fying marks” is to know already what “identity” is. Now, identity is a no- tion which expresses unity, and not mere unity as to quantity (the “same” size), as “equality” does, or mere unity as to quality, as “similarity” does (two white things look “the same”), but unity in substance (things are truly “identical,” unqualifi edly “the same,” when they are one substance). We see how we depend on substance to make sense, and employ its notion in various watered-down ways to talk about everything else.37

Substance, along with “a being,” belongs to the domain of what all naturally know. Metaphysical refl ection can only serve to render that knowledge less subject to impediments, freer from the infl uence of our various lesser habitual cognitive stances. Among these, physics, because of its proximity to metaphysics (physics is “second philosophy,” relative to metaphysics being “fi rst”),38 _{is very likely to cause confusion. Although}

and even because physics is developed (by Aristotle) in accordance with and under the rule of substance, so that its principles are the matter and the form in the order of substance, physics can act as a smoke screen be- tween the real and metaphysical refl ection.

Thus, it is in physics that the doctrine of matter and form as parts of substance is fi rst presented (fi rst, speaking of pedagogical order).39 _How-

35. Thomas Aquinas, CM 4.1 (ed. Cathala, 540–543). Thomas there presents four “modes of being,” beginning with the weakest, the least, and moving toward the strongest. The four are (1) negations and privations, (2) generations and corruptions and move- ments, (3) inhering accidents, and (4) substances. See above, chapter 2, ca. n. 17.

36. On the primacy of substance among beings, cf. Thomas, CM 7.1 (1246–1259). On the causal “fl ow” of all beings from substances, cf. ST 1.77.6. The whole of SCG 3.97 should be read.

37. Cf. Thomas, CM 7.4 (1331–1334), concerning the fact that all the categories par- ticipate in the mode of entity proper to substance, viz. being a “what” [quid]. On identity as substantial unity, cf. CM 4.2 (561).

38. I use the word “physics” here to encompass all interest in the mobile as such. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, CM 7.11 (1526–1527), quoted above, n. 13.

39. Thomas teaches (CP 1.12 [ed. Maggiòlo, 107 (10)]) that to prove through a reason [“per rationem”] that in all natural production there must be a subject pertains to metaphys- ics; that is why, in the Physics 1.7 (190a31–190b11), Aristotle proves it merely by induction.

ever, our vision of substance, in physics, remains tied to the problems of mutual infl uence, through action and passion, proper to the physical in- terest. That is why, for example, in the ancient doctrine of the elemen- tary substances, fi re and water were seen as contraries, one to the other, a view ultimately requiring correction (or interpretation) by the metaphy- sician—since a substance, as such, has no contrary. A substance, as such, simply is, absolutely. We have to purge our vision of substance of infl u- ences coming from the “mobility” setting. [See Addendum 1]

Approaches to being and substance always oblige us to talk about something at least conceptually slightly different. To talk about “indivis- ibility” is to shift the discussion at least into the domain of unity. The be- ings that we know most readily are composites, and we easily see that it is one and the same thing to preserve one’s being and to preserve one’s unity. Remember the biblical incident of Solomon and the two women both claiming the one baby. The real mother refuses to take half a baby. Half a baby is no baby at all.40

Many issues requiring insistence on the indivisible character of sub- stance could be mentioned. There is need for a theory of elements and how they persist in the resultant substance.41 _{There is need for a theory}

of parts and how they unite in a substantial whole.42 _{There is need for}

a doctrine of substantial identity throughout a lifetime of metabolism.43

There is need for a discussion of the substantiality of cadavers.44

One of the refl ective occasions provided by St. Thomas which seems to me very helpful for fi xing our attention on substance and its prima- cy occurs in the De potentia discussions of God’s conservational causality. Thomas’s doctrine is that creatures would not remain in being were it not for God’s conservational causality. The objectors see some effi cient causes other than God as simply establishing things in being in such a way that the effect no longer needs the effi cient cause: the house builder builds a house which has no need of him later; why not envisage God’s role that way.45 _{The objector I am especially interested in is rejecting a}

distinction employed by Thomas between a “cause of coming to be” and a “cause of being.” This is a distinction exemplifi ed by the difference be- tween the house builder (who causes the coming to be of the house, but not its constantly remaining in being) and the natures of cement, stones, and wood, which are receptive of and conservative of composition and

40. 1 Kings 3:16–28. 41. ST 1.76.4.ad 4.

42. CM 7.16 (1631–1636). This touches on the important question of survival of parts of living things when separated.

43. Thomas, In De generatione 1.17 (118).

44. Thomas, In De generatione 1.8 (60 [3]), concerning Aristotle at 1.3 (318b1–14). 45. DP 5.1.obj. 4.

order, the form of the house (thus the being of the house depends on those natures).46

The idea (and it is indeed Thomas’s) would be to explain the need for God as conserver by claiming that the proximate causes of things, the lower agents, are merely causes of coming to be, not causes of being. That is why one can take them away and still have the effect. However, God is a cause of being, and so must “stay around” and conserve things even once they have been produced.

The objector says that using this distinction, in such a way as to make lower agents mere causes of coming to be, puts one in the camp of Plato and Avicenna, and against Aristotle. Aristotle taught that it is forms in matter which cause forms in matter. Thus, since something, inasmuch as it is cause of form, is cause of being, to say that the lower causes (corpo- real causes) do not cause being but only coming to be, is to say that they do not cause form. Hence, one is holding that the forms in matter must come from separate forms (the Platonic position) or that they come from the “giver of forms” (the Avicennian position).47

Thomas replies that since corporeal agents can act only by producing changes, and since nothing is changed except by reason of matter, the causality of corporeal agents can extend only to those things which are in some way in matter. The Platonists and Avicenna did not posit that forms are educed from the potency of matter, and so they were forced to say that natural agents merely dispose matter: the introduction of forms was from an incorporeal principle. If we say (as Thomas does say) with Aris- totle, that substantial forms are educed from the potency of matter, then natural agents will not be merely the causes of the dispositions of matter, but even the causes of the substantial forms. However, Thomas qualifi es this as follows:

...but just so far and no farther, viz. that the forms are educed from potency into act. Consequently, the natural agents are principles of being as regards be- ginning to be [essendi principia quantum ad inchoationem ad esse], and not as re- gards being, absolutely [et non quantum ad ipsum esse absolute].48

Obviously, Thomas’s distinction between “cause of becoming” and “cause of being” is not the same as that of Avicenna. However, it is a distinction which must be maintained because, in our very consideration of mobile substances, we see that substantial being, as such, lies beyond the order of motion and change. As Thomas says in the body of the same article:

46. Cf. ST 1.104.1 (622b43–623a4). 47. DP 5.1.obj. 5.

...Since the being of form in matter [esse formae in materia], speaking of this just in itself, implies no movement or change, except, if one will, per accidens, and since no body brings to actuality anything except “the moved”... therefore it is necessary that the principle on which form as such depends be some incorporeal principle.49 _{[See Addendum 2]}

The metaphysical vision grasps the integrity of the whole, the indivis- ible, the “being of form in matter.” The importance of totality50 _{and indi-}

visibility51 _{for the grasp of substance needs stressing.}

Notice that while we are dealing with the very same matter and form which is talked about in (Aristotelian) physics, they are now seen as in- gredients and principles of substance, rather than as principles of move- ment. We grasp substance fi rst, and develop the substantial but subordi- nate notions of “form” and “matter” in order to respect the substantiality of the movable and changeable thing.52

The metaphysician directs our attention to substances, as lying be- yond generation and corruption. Substance is not the terminus of gen- eration, except per accidens. It is rather what simply is (even though it has been generated). Form, the principle of substantial being, is recognized as form, in part, because it is the unity, through time, in spite of changes in things, of something recognizable. And by “being” [Latin esse] we mean the actuality of a substance, the remaining one in the midst of change.53

When generation and corruption reveal the ontological status of the sub- stances most immediately known to us as “possibles with respect to being and not being” (to use the language of Thomas’s “Third Way”)54 _{and so}

as caused, our only recourse, in order to explain why there is anything at all, is to admit there is a higher kind of substance, necessary being. (And inasmuch as that too can be found in a caused instance, we are eventu- ally led to uncaused necessary substance.)

The metaphysical habituation of the mind, the relentless return to

49. DP 5.1. See my paper, “St. Thomas, Joseph Owens and Existence,” New Scholasti-

cism 56 (1982), pp. 399–441. Fr. Owens conceives of the substantial being of movable

things as intrinsically a “fl ux,” ignoring the per accidens aspect of such being’s being mea- sured by time. Charles De Koninck strikes me as tending in this same direction: cf. e.g. his “Thomism and Scientifi c Indeterminism,” in Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophi-

cal Association (1936), Washington, D.C., 1937: The Catholic University of America Press,

pp. 58–76, at pp. 60–61.

50. ST 1.76.8 (461b39–43 and 462a8–11).

51. ST 1.85.8 (534b22–31); 1.76.3 (454a24–48); 1.76.4.ad 4 (457a3–16).

52. For the point that it is the same matter which is considered by the physicist and by the metaphysician, cf. CM 7.2 (1285); for the difference in outlook of the two, cf. 7.11 (1526), cited above at n. 13.

53. Even this expression is inadequate, since it suggests rest, i.e. absence of motion; the being of substance, as such, is beyond both motion and rest.

54. ST 1.2.3 (14a44–b15), the “third way” of proving the existence of a God.

substance and that-which-is as principles of judgment of all experience, requires long practice. Physics, on the one hand, is an invitation and dis- position toward the metaphysical, but it is also a source of possible “for- getfulness of being,” as it already was for Thales.55

To repeat, both the Aristotelian physicist and the metaphysician are interested in the analysis of natural changeable substances into form and matter. The physicist locates in matter and form the principles of the move- ments or changes (and rests) found in things. The metaphysician, on the other hand, keeps his eye fi xed on substance as a primary unit or “indivis- ible.” He then sizes up the “ingredients” or components of composite sub- stance, from the viewpoint of being. It is the composite which properly has being (and so it is what we mean primarily by “a being”).56 _{As such, it is}

called “the subsisting thing.” The matter, just in its own nature, is a being,

potentially or is a being in potency. Form is that by virtue of which the matter

has defi niteness and being. It is the composite which is.57

We must dwell on the (intellectual) vision we can have of the existing

substance, if we are to come to a truly philosophical understanding of

these questions. I imagine the existing substance by imagining a bear com- ing at me in the forest. It is the “one,” independent of me, which I encounter in the bear. It is not just the bear’s movements, but the unity of source of those movements. It is not even the bear’s being source of movement which I wish to point out, though from the strictly practical point of view, i.e. my own safety, that is what counts; also, that is what interests the physicist. But for the metaphysician, it is the one58 _{which is at the source. I might}

55. Thales depreciated the being of sensible substances in their variety, inasmuch as he held that nothing comes to be or ceases to be.

56. See Thomas Aquinas, ST 1.45.4:

......[the act of] being belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they be simple, as are separate substances, or composite, as are material substances. For, to that [sort of item] it belongs properly to be, which has being, and that is what is subsisting in its own being. Forms, on the other hand, and accidents, and other items on that level, are not called “beings” as though to say that they themselves are, but rather because in function of them something is; for example, whiteness is called “a being” for this reason, that in function of it the subject [i.e., e.g., the dog] is white. Hence, according to Aristotle, an accident is more properly said to be “of a being” rather than simply “a being.”

This text speaks of “form” as something that does not subsist; however, we eventually rea- son to the existence of subsisting forms.

57. CM 8.1 (1687), concerning Aristotle at 8.1 (1042a24–31).

58. Thomas, at ST 1.11.1, raises the question: whether “one” adds anything to “a be- ing.” He replies:

......“one” does not add on, over and above “a being,” some real thing, but merely the negation of division. For “one” signifi es nothing else but “an undivided being”; and from that very fact it is apparent that “one” is interchangeable with “a being.” For every being either is simple or composite. But what is simple is undivided both actually and potentially. But what is composite does not have being [esse] so long as its parts are di-

kill the bear, but what I am pointing to is just what is there until I kill it. We have a strong tendency to reduce things to a mechanical charac- ter. We have a tendency toward a particle theory, i.e. to think of each dis- tinctive being as made up of “a lot of little beings (substances!).” The bear, one might say, is an assemblage of “molecules” or some other sort of small item. “Mr. Smith is a bundle of events.”59 _{This kind of picture is}

a formula for permanently setting aside the being of things, a technique for evading “substance.”

If we are to have a grasp of substance, we must allow the unity of sub- stance to dominate the multiplicity of parts. We can see something of this in Thomas Aquinas’s discussion of the human soul, in which he is teach- ing that the soul is the substantial form of the body. He is asked wheth- er the soul is in every part of the body. What he says applies, not merely to the human soul, but to any and every substantial form relative to the body in which it is:

...if the soul were united to the body merely as a source of movement, then one could say that it was not in every part of the body, but only in one part, by means of which it moved the others. But because the soul is united to the body as its form, it is necessary that it be in the whole of the body and in every part. For it is not an accidental form of the body, but rather the substantial form.