DESARROLLOS REGIONALES COSTEÑOS Costa norte: Chimú

within the gift are secret CODEs, film strips, etc. CUT-OUTs and GO-BETWEENs often act as couriers.

cousins

An unofficial term used by American and British intelli- gence officers when referring to one another. The term “cousins” stems from both North America’s deeply rooted British heritage and the historically close coordination between the two national intelligence communities.

Israeli officers also make reference to “cousins,” but the term is not quite as affectionate. To an officer in the MOSSAD, a “cousin” is an Arab, usually a Palestinian. The Mossad refers to Arabs as “cousins” because Israelis and Arabs have a common ancestry, both being descended from the Judeo-Christian-Islamic patriarch Abraham.

cover

“Cover” is a term used by CIA officers and members of other intelligence services to describe a given, pre- arranged story that conceals either the name and back- ground of an operative, or the title and raison d’être of a clandestine organization. For instance, during the war in SOUTHEAST ASIA, the CIA’s operational air arm was pro- vided a cover identity, AIR AMERICA, and a cover mission, civilian air transport, in order to conceal the Agency’s primary purpose—that of gathering intelligence as well as transporting covert operatives and ammunition across national borders. Covers are also known as FRONTs.

See alsoLEGEND.

Covert Mission Protocols

The CIA’s Covert Mission Protocols were seven clandestine operations particulars spelled out in NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL(NSC) Resolution 10/2 during the early years of the Agency. The CMPs included covert political actions, covert psychological warfare, covert paramilitary opera- tions or guerrilla warfare, covert sabotage, economic war- fare, evasion-and-escape plans for downed pilots, and STAY-BEHIND NETSin the event of enemy takeover.

NSC Resolution 10/2, which became effective on June 19, 1948, also provided for the establishment of the OFFICE OF POLICY COORDINATION(OPC), the CIA’s then- covert operations arm.

Cowboys, the

“The Cowboys” were a group of five CIA officers who planned and directed the 1953 COUP D’ÉTAT IN IRANfrom a SAFE HOUSEin Tehran.

See alsoROOSEVELT, KERMIT.

cowboys vs. scholars

The CIA is a mixed bag of intelligence-gathering tal- ents. In his book The Very Best Men, Evan Thomas describes what CIA officer DESMOND FITZGERALD believed was the perfect clandestine operative—a cross between a cowboy and a scholar. “He [Fitzgerald] wanted his spies to be at once intellectual and macho,” writes Thomas. “His idea of perfection, said one of his case officers, was a Harvard Ph.D. who could handle himself in a barfight.”

British intelligence officer WILLIAM “INTREPID” STEPHENSONadopted a similar policy in recruiting agents for MI6 during World War II. Like Fitzgerald, he believed that “the best agents” were those who “in peacetime make good bankers, physicians, or creative artists.”

cryptanalysis

Cryptanalysis is the term used to describe the analyst’s art of “breaking” CODEs or CIPHERs into legible text.

cryptography

Cryptography is the term used to describe the enciphering or coding of legible text into a form that will be unintelligi- ble to an unauthorized person who might gain access to it.

cryptonym

A cryptonym is a code name. For example, AJAX was a cryptonym for the CIA’s covert operation aimed at restor- ing the shah of Iran to power in 1953. ZAPATA was a cryptonym for the CIA’s invasion of Cuba at the BAY OF PIGS.

CSIS

SeeCANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

Cuba, operations in

SeeBAY OF PIGS INVASION; CASTRO, FIDEL ALEJANDRO RUZ; CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS; ZAPATA, OPERATION.

Cuban missile crisis

No incident in history has brought the world closer to the brink of all-out nuclear war than the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. For 13 days, the United States and the Soviet Union faced off in a dangerous confrontation over Soviet nuclear missile installations in Cuba. It ended in a con- cession on the part of the Soviets, a victory for the Ameri- cans, and a fortunate conclusion for the entire world.

68 Cuban missile crisis

On October 16, 1962, President John F. Kennedy called two emergency meetings with his top advisers in the Oval Office to discuss a startling revelation. On the previous night, the CIA had produced detailed aerial photographs of Soviet missile installations being con- structed on the island of Cuba. The missiles, once oper- ational, would be able to destroy much of the continental United States within minutes after being launched.

U.S. secretary of defense Robert McNamara presented Kennedy with three possible courses of action. The first was “the political course of action.” This option would involve openly approaching Cuban leader FIDEL CASTRO, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, and America’s key allies to arrange negotiations aimed at resolving the crisis

diplomatically. This option was considered unlikely to succeed. The second option was “a course of action that would involve a declaration of open surveillance” cou- pled with a “blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba.” The third option was “direct military action against Cuba.” This option would have been initiated by a massive conventional air attack against the Soviet missile sites in Cuba.

For most of the day, discussions centered on the third option and the dangerous probability of a Soviet retalia- tion—which included the possibility of a nuclear exchange. “I don’t know quite what kind of a world we’ll live in after we’ve struck Cuba,” McNamara told Kennedy. “And we’ve started it. How do we stop at that point?” In the end, the president opted for a naval blockade around,

cut-out 69

or “quarantine” of, Cuba to prevent Soviet freighters car- rying missile equipment from entering Cuban waters.

On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy announced the establishment of the blockade, and just under 200 warships were dispatched to the Caribbean. U.S. naval commanders received instructions to halt, board, and search all cargo vessels bound for Cuba. Meanwhile, Soviet cargo ships proceeded toward Cuba. As American warships closed with the freighters, tensions height- ened. Both sides were aware that their actions might ini- tiate World War III. The situation degraded further on October 27, when the Soviets shot down a U-2 spyplane photographing missile positions on the island. The pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson, was killed. Almost immediately, the U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENTproposed an attack against Cuba. President Kennedy shelved the proposal.

Like the Americans, the Soviets were desperately seek- ing ways in which war might be averted. Throughout the crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged communiqués through both back-channel proxies and official letters. Khrushchev initially declared to Kennedy that the missiles were for deterrent purposes and that the Soviet Union had only peaceful intentions. The Soviet leader later offered a proposal wherein the missile instal- lations would be dismantled if Kennedy guaranteed that neither the United States, its allies, nor proxy forces would ever invade Cuba. On October 27, the day the U-2 was shot down, Kennedy received another missive from Khrushchev, this time proposing to dismantle the missiles if the United States dismantled its own missile installa- tions in Turkey.

In the end, the Kennedy administration accepted a modified version of the proposals, including a commit- ment not to invade Cuba and a demand that the Soviets also remove several light bombers from Cuba. Months later, the American missiles in Turkey were dismantled.

“In those nerve-wracking days, when it seemed that a military conflict was about to break out, both sides had enough courage and wisdom to begin intensive diplo- matic discussions and make mutual concessions,”

recalled Soviet Air Defense Forces colonel Alexander Orlov. “After the Cuban missile crisis, the tensions of the global secret ‘air war,’ in which the U-2 had played a cen- tral role, began to abate. Incursions into Soviet airspace by reconnaissance aircraft became less necessary with the emergence of U.S. satellites, although U.S. reconnaissance flights along the USSR’s borders continued—and occa- sionally violated Soviet airspace.”

In Russian history and political science textbooks, the Cuban missile crisis is known as the “Caribbean crisis.” The actual crux of the confrontation between the United States and the USSR took place at sea; therefore, the Caribbean is the Soviets’ primary point of reference. Cuban texts, on the other hand, refer to the event as the “Crisis of October.”

See alsoEXCOMM;McCONE, JOHN A.