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DESARROLLOS REGIONALES EN LOS VALLES INTERANDINOS

In document VI EL FORMATIVO EN LOS ANDES CENTRALES (página 143-148)

RUTAS CHINCHA DE INTERCAMBIO ECONÓMICO

DESARROLLOS REGIONALES EN LOS VALLES INTERANDINOS

A former correspondent and editorial writer for the

Chicago Daily News, Wallace Ranking Deuel served with

the CIA’s first two predecessor organizations, the OFFICE

OF THE COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION (COI) and the

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES(OSS). He later served as a

senior employee of the CIA.

Deuel was born in Chicago, Illinois, on June 14, 1905. He graduated from the University of Illinois in 1926 and for the next three years taught political science and inter- national law at the American University in Beirut, Lebanon. In 1929, he returned to his hometown, where he joined the Chicago Daily News as an editorial writer, editorial assistant, and foreign correspondent. The latter position took him to Rome and Berlin.

In Germany, Deuel wrote a scathing profile of Adolf Hitler, People under Hitler. The book earned him the dis- tinction, according to Columbia University Press, of being one of the 15 American authors Hitler would execute first if the Germans defeated the United States.

In 1941, Deuel joined the COI. When COI functions were transferred to the OSS in June 1942, he became a special assistant to OSS director WILLIAM J. “WILD BILL”

DONOVAN. Not cut out for clandestine work, Deuel

took on myriad nonfield responsibilities. At one point, he worked with Walt Disney on a cartoon propaganda project.

After the war, Deuel wrote the initial draft of what would become the official history of the OSS, Records of the

Office of Strategic Services. He then accepted a position as

diplomatic correspondent with the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

In January 1954, having been laid off by the Post, Deuel joined the CIA. There, he held a variety of posts, including chief of staff of current intelligence publications, deputy chief and then chief of foreign intelligence require- ments, and as a staffer with the Agency’s Office of the Inspector General. He also served as a CIA representative to the White House during the administration of Presi- dent John Kennedy.

Tragically, Deuel’s son, Mike—also a CIA officer—was killed in a helicopter crash during the “secret war” in Laos in 1965. Three years later, on August 1, 1968, Deuel retired from the CIA.

Deutch, John Mark 75

Deutch, John Mark (1938– )

Dr. John Mark Deutch, one of U.S. defense secretary Robert S. McNamara’s Pentagon “whiz kids” during the Vietnam War years, would be known in some congres- sional circles during the 1990s as the worst DIRECTOR OF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE(DCI) in CIA history.

Born in Brussels on July 27, 1938, to Michael Joseph Deutch and Rachel Felicia Fisher, young Deutch arrived in America in 1940. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1946. In 1961, he earned a bachelor’s degree from Amherst College, in Massachusetts. That same year, he also earned a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He soon became systems analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In 1965, he earned a Ph.D. in physical chem- istry from MIT. From 1967 to 1970, he served as an assis- tant professor at Princeton University, in New Jersey. He then became a member of the faculty at MIT, eventually rising to full professor, dean of science, and provost. Deutch also earned honorary doctorates from Amherst (1978) and the University of Massachusetts at Lowell (1986). Additionally, he won a Sloan Fellowship (1969 to 1971) and a Guggenheim Fellowship (1974). In 1993, he was named undersecretary for acquisition and tech- nology at the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. From 1994 to 1995, he served as deputy secretary of defense.

On May 10, 1995, President Bill Clinton appointed Deutch as director of central intelligence, a post he would hold until December 15, 1996. His position was elevated to cabinet status. (The office of DCI had been first ele- vated to the cabinet level during the tenure of DCI

WILLIAM JOSEPH CASEY, beginning in 1981. Casey’s suc-

cessors, however, had not been made cabinet members, keeping them out of the White House policy-making loop, until Deutch’s appointment.)

During his tenure, Deutch implemented a number of reforms, including assigning more women to top Agency posts and establishing an open-door policy for junior employees who wanted access to the director—a move that created consternation among senior CIA officers. He also tailored a greater number of the CIA’s intelligence products to military and law enforcement agencies and proposed a

new NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY.

But things began to sour for both Deutch and the Agency days after he stepped down as DCI. A CIA security officer turned up at his Maryland home in order to conduct a routine security inspection of Deutch’s Agency-supplied Macintosh computers. The security officer discovered numerous files containing classified information, many of them secret, top secret, or “Special Access.” Many of the documents were stored as unencrypted Microsoft Word files. Further investigation revealed some 17,000 pages of data, including budgeting information from the NATIONAL

RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NRO), the U.S. INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITYagency that handles spy satellites; highly sen-

sitive details of covert operations; a message to the Oval Office; and a lengthy journal of Deutch’s activities for sev- eral years. It was a shocking revelation.

A report issued by the CIA inspector general’s office found that Deutch had knowingly violated Agency and U.S. government regulations requiring that his government- owned computers be used solely for government-related work. The computers were connected to the Internet via America Online; Deutch’s user name was a recognizable variation of his actual name. Worse, it was revealed that a member of the Deutch family had used one of the comput- ers to access pornographic and other “high risk” websites where hackers would have been able to plant devices that could have monitored Deutch’s online activities and possi- bly gained access to, or stolen, sensitive CIA files. Deutch had also employed as a housekeeper a resident alien whom he had provided a code to his home alarm/security system. The housekeeper thus had unmonitored access to his resi- dence. The Agency had offered to place a 24-hour security officer at Deutch’s home during his tenure as DCI, but he had refused, citing privacy concerns.

Deutch initially denied any wrongdoing. He then arranged to retain the computers by arguing that they

76 Devlin, Lawrence Raymond

contained personal data. Attempting, though unable, to delete the personal files from the computers’ hard drives, he contacted the Agency’s technical support personnel for assistance.

Concluding that Deutch had mishandled national security information on personal computers at his resi- dences in Maryland and Massachusetts, Deutch’s succes- sor, DCI GEORGE JOHN TENET, was forced to act. On August 20, 1999, Tenet suspended Deutch’s security clearance at the CIA. His clearance at the DEFENSE INTEL-

LIGENCE AGENCY(DIA) was also suspended.

Reluctantly, Deutch agreed to testify before a closed- door hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelli- gence on February 22, 2000. He later told reporters, “The director of Central Intelligence is not above the rules,” adding that he regretted his errors.

“While serving as Director of Central Intelligence I erred in using CIA-issued computers that were not con- figured for classified work to compose classified docu- ments and memoranda,” Deutch said in a 1999 interview for the Washington Post. “While it was absolutely neces- sary for me to work at home and while on travel, in hindsight it is clear that I should have insisted that I be provided the means of accomplishing this work in a manner fully consistent with all the security rules.”

Falling on his sword was not enough for congressional committee members like John Millis, staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Accord- ing to Millis, Deutch was the “first, second, and third-worst” DCI in Agency history. In addition to Deutch’s mishandling of national security information, it was discovered that he had made the decision to replace a number of human field operatives with high-tech spy equipment—a revelation that garnered him little sympathy in the wake of the SEPTEMBER

11, 2001,TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THE UNITED STATES.

In document VI EL FORMATIVO EN LOS ANDES CENTRALES (página 143-148)