Descripción del sistema de seguridad basado en el comportamiento (SBC)

According to a report of the World Bank's (1993) - The East Asian Miracle, most of East Asia's extraordinary growth is due to superior accumulation and allocation of physical and human capital. It reaches two conclusions. Firstly, rapid growth in each economy took place primarily because of the application of a set of common, market- friendly economic policies, which got the fundamentals right. Fundamental policies referred to several broad policy areas, such as, ensuring low inflation and competitive exchange rates, building human capital, creating effective and secure financial systems, limiting price distortions, absorbing foreign technology, and limiting the bias against agriculture. Secondly, the institutional basis of the economy functioned well, selective interventions were possible which contributed to growth. Interventionist policies referred to as creating institutional mechanisms to promote growth and to implement fundamental policies, for instance, export push, bureaucratic capacity, and arguably as this report denoted, promoting specific industries, and repressing interest rates and directing credit. This report tries to understand how government policies, both fundamental and interventionist, may have contributed to faster accumulation, more efficient allocation, and higher productivity growth. It has sought to reconcile the debate between neo-classical and statist views on the issues of East Asia's miraculous economic growth.

To explain East Asia's outstanding growth as a result of reconciliation between fundamental and interventionist policy is plausible. But, the 'getting the fundamentals right' policy is the first prerequisite for development. The lack o f such a policy easily leads to failure in economic development. It is extremely important to get the whole economy into a sound orbit of development, and we may suppose that the East Asian

economies could not be in the position in which they are today, without a fundamental policy. However, it still leaves something to be criticised. First, if the fundamental policy was the basic element of economic growth, it could explain any case of growth, rather than being the specific causation of East Asian 'miracles'. A miracle means something with extraordinary features. 'Getting the fundamentals right' may be a prerequisite, but while this is a necessary condition for industrial success it is not a sufficient one.

Second, it is generally accepted that state intervention is characteristic of high growth rate economies, particularly the cases of Taiwan and Korea. However, there is a methodological difficulty since the growth of these economies cannot be observed in the absence of the interventionist policy. Nevertheless, a high degree of state intervention in the detailed operation of the private sector is unique in Korea and Taiwan, and cannot be observed anywhere else. At risk of overstatement, the suggestion is then, that the interventionist view is more persuasive than the fundamentals' view in terms of the specific causation of their success. In addition, it is an essential feature of the export drive and import protection which operates in East Asian countries. Historically, the special circumstances of the process of industrialisation in Taiwan make it very plausible and persuasive to theorise its developmental model as a state- driven one. However, that the policy concerning 'fundamentals' had undoubted effects on rapid industrialisation should not be ignored.

Neo-statist theories of the advocacy of the state to intervene and work through rather than to replace the market are more plausible than the neo-classical theories and traditional Anglo-American economic thought. The combination of policy activism, the strong capacity and the relative autonomy of the state have contributed to produce the institutional pattern of East Asian capitalism. In the neo-statist perspective, this explains the integral dynamics of rapid growth. A central idea that emerges from these studies, including the World Bank's report, is the significant role played by the state. Taiwanese state-led economic/industrial strategy has been deemed to be the main reason for its

successful economic development, in both fundamentalist and interventionist policies. Concerning international competitiveness, most studies have focused on the response of the state in promoting the national interest and in implementing interventionist IP. The studies tend to the view that the state and state-society relations as invariant through time, across society, and across the industrial sectors. They fail to explain the complex interplay between the state and society under the changing structural constraints. Fewer studies have been conducted about other societal actors which may play an equally important role in affecting national policies and in creating their own interests. Therefore, there is a need to explore the interaction between the state, organised interests, and social classes in conjunction with international competitiveness.

The neo-statist perspective tries to use the idea of ‘authoritarian regime’ to explain the origin of relative autonomy. Thus, under the umbrella of authoritarian rule, the state, using its strong capacity, acts in the interests of national economy, rather than that of the private capitalist. This suggests that the private sector is subordinated to the national structure. However, there are many interests within the private sector. The neo­ statists only tell the story of picking up the ‘winners’, but fail to tell the other side of the story--how to comfort ‘losers’. Moreover, it is also in doubt whether ‘the interest and orientation of firms are necessarily convergent with the interests and orientations of states (Weiss & Hobson, 1995)’ in the neo-statist assumption. Since the attention of capitalists follows profit maximisation, it might conflict with the goal of the state. It is right to say that the structure and the operations of the state affect firms’ willingness to undertake long-term investments and their dependence on state agencies in making decisions (Cawson et al., 1987; Grant et al., 1987; Okimoto, 1989; Zysman, 1983). It is debatable, as neo-statists suggest, that the authoritarian use o f power can lead to the compliance of industries without carefully examining the GI linkage. Without voluntary cooperation of the industry any IP will find difficulty in the process of policy-making and implementation. There must be channels to solve the problem when divergence occurred, which is ignored by neo-statist theories.

The statist theories did not provide a clear picture of the interplay between government and industry'. Even some writers, for example, Wade (1990) and Haggard (1990), have emphasised the importance of the links between the state structure, institutions and industry, but there is not sufficient empirical evidence to support either Wade's authoritarian-corporatism or Haggard's coalitional approach. Moreover, most of the neo-statist descriptions of Taiwan's G1 relations are too general, not to mention their very weak empirical background. In particular, GI relations have changed over time and different industries will form different relations with the government according to their economic centralities and the strength of competitiveness. Some sectors might match the authoritarian-corporatist description or coalitional analysis, but others might not. A research finding based on Taiwan’s automobile industry suggests that the state capacity and government relation with the auto industry may not be constant across industry, and the developmental strategy at macro level may be in conflict with that at sectoral level (Arnold, 1989). Another research study conducted by Kuo (1995) on textiles, plywood and the electronic industry in Taiwan also demonstrated the same finding; besides, various type of Gl relations can be traced in different time spans10. This reveals that neo-statist theories not only failed to provide empirical justification for an authoritarian analysis, but also they were too general to reflect sectoral reality.

It is inappropriate to view development as a top-down process through which the state has been able to affect big business, guide investment, and promote exports, in particular, the firms reacting passively to state intervention. The private sector may have an influential capacity to resist state intervention.

According lo Kuo (1995), there arc three main types o f GI relations, namely clicnlclism, Laissez-faire and state corporatism. GI relations in the textile industry presented as dicntdism in the 50s, slate corporatism in the 60s & 70s and lassse/.-faire in the 80s; in the electronics industry, laisse/.-faire with mild dientelism in the 50s, and state corporatism rn the 60s-80s; m the plywood industry, basically. Laissez-faire