Indeed, Côte d’Ivoire’s impressive economic take-off after independence in 1960 was followed by an economic downturn that made it very vulnerable toward the end of the 1980s. Many observers have structured the eras of economic boom and economic downfall in that country with a minor difference. Of the many works produced on this subject, Akindes (2000: 126) has proposed a more comprehensive structure. He has divided the short economic history of Côte d’Ivoire into two main periods. He calls the
first period the growth period (also called economic miracle), and the second period the period of uncertainty (also called economic mirage). He writes that, on the macro- economic scale, Côte d’Ivoire experienced eighteen years of steady economic growth (1960-1978) followed by twenty years of uncertainties (1979-1999).
President Houphouët-Boigny engineered this success never stopped bragging about it. In fact, he did so many times when he was given the opportunity during his puclic appearances. Below is one statement he had made in the past (my own translation):
At independence in 1960, we had two options available to us. The first option, was the immediate africanization of the workforce, replacing foreign nationals with Ivorians, this was the easiest option. The second option, and the most difficult, was to train leaders capable of gradually replacing those expatriates who were in positions of high responsibility. It was the second option that we chose, because Côte d’Ivoire did not want unqualified leaders. We did not want an africanization for the sick of doing so. Therefore, we chose a legitimate africanization that included young ministers and graduates from highly reputed institutions (Koumoue 1994: 33).
Houphouët-Boigny made the above statement during a meeting with the international business community. The president used this medium to defend his economic policies, and vision for Côte d’Ivoire. He had made similar statements in several of his public speeches, including party conventions, national conferences, as well as annual addresses to the nation. Not only he personally took pride of the good reputaion this country enjoyed at that time, but also he wanted to show that he was in fact the main artisan of the relative economic success that country. Houphouët-Boigny and Côte d’Ivoire became a success story both economically and politically in Africa and the developing world from 1960 until the mid-1980s. As a result, this country was highly respected worldwide, especially by the former colonial power, France.
The Ivoirian success was the result of a number of factors including: open-door economic policies that focused primarily on the agricultural sector, along with relatively high levels of industrialization, as well as a model of an “African democracy” that emphasized regional and ethnic inclusion in the management of the affairs of the state.
According to Akindes (2000), the period between 1960 and 1980 constituted the era of economic growth or economic boom in Côte d’Ivoire. The so-called ‘Ivoirian economic miracle’ was characterized by the availability of finances, important
investments, and in general the importance of public spending. That the success was also based on a combination of an opened policy to the outside that consisted of recruiting foreign workers, capital and expertise, and a liberal economy based on the exportation of coffee, cocoa, and timber (see also Amir 1967, Nyong’oro 1987, and Cohen 1974). This period was remarkable for investments by the government in sanitary supplies,
multiplication of infrastructures in the education sector, or training in engineering schools, creation of public enterprises, political granting of government scholarships and recruitment of University graduates to gradually replace foreign expatriates, political clientelism, free access to public education, formation, and healthcare.
However, Akindes (2000: 127) remarks, this distribution of the fruits of economic growth were unequal across communities and regions. The populations of the forest zones were the biggest beneficiaries of this, due to the exploitation of timbers and cocoa and coffee, as opposed to the people from the center and north. The government had tried to fix this unbalance by creating several sugar factories in the north, the opening of the port of San Pedro (southwest), and the creation of a hydroelectric dam in Kossou (center). Abidjan, the economic capital, became the symbol of the politico-economic success, far
ahead of other towns and cities, where people, especially the elites showed luxurious lifestyles, and the political class introduced in the business world. The middle class showed some signs of these lifestyles also. The external signs of this wealth in Abidjan influenced the people in the sub-regions who migrated to Côte d’Ivoire in great numbers in search for better opportunities (2000: 128)
It should be noted that the first two decades of independence had for principal objectives a strong industrial growth, which was characterized by two phases. Until 1975, the industrialization relied on foreigners, namely French-at the end of the 1970s. New public industrial enterprises were put in placed. During those years, the Ivoirians (both public and private) accounted for 1.4% of the industrial sector, and 6.6% of foreigners who were non-French. The enterprises had a social capital of 92%, 90.6% of investments, 94.1% of value added, and 93.8% of the workers, of which 97.5% were expatriates (Chevasu 2001: 10-11).
The strategy of large openness to foreign capital and investments in the industrial sectors stimulated growth respectively from 22% to 23% per year between 1961 and 1971. But, the politics of welcoming foreign investors cost lots of money. Thus, the number of foreign workers had to be reduced by educating young Ivoirians, who did not shine in the sciences (4.7% in the industrial sectors in 1971, 90% of direction personnel, 86% for cadres, and 49% for Agents de Maitrise high salaries), other Africans in the factories accounted for 38%, (Chevasu 2001: 12). Finally, in 1975 and 1977, the prices of Côte d’Ivoire’s products rose significantly (for coffee and cocoa), due to the effects of freezes in Brazil, drought in Colombia, the war in Angola, stagnation of the production in other African competitors, and some Asian countries that were starting industrialization
process (14). An analysis of the industrial sector of Côte d’Ivoire in 1995 showed a reduction of the productivity since 1977.
After this impressive economic growth, the Ivoirian economy began to fall apart in the 1980s, because of an unprecedented economic crisis that resulted in inexcessive foreign borrowing and a huge national debt. The crisis impacted the public and private sectors, as well as the different segments of the Ivoirian society. The so-called economic miracle had now turned to what Akindes and others have called economic mirage, explained next.