In his doctoral thesis (Chapter 4) dedicated to French development aid and
reforms of 1998-2002 to Africa, Richard Moncrieff discusses the changes made to the aid relationship between France and Côte d’Ivoire, and the effects of instability in Côte d’Ivoire on French policy. According to this author, Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed multi-faceted relations with France after independence (Moncrieff 2004: 144).
From the mid-1980s this country suffered a thoroughgoing economic and financial crisis, which made it one of the world highest aid recipients at the end of the decade. Under President Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993) and to some extent the Bédié regime (1993-1999) this country was by far the Francophone African country with most with the most links to France. These two countries nurtured a host of institutional and affective ties and similarities. French aid spending in this small West African nation
aimed to support this relationship by maintaining French influence at all levels-from French language teaching to Seniors Advisors in the presidency (144).
President Houphouët-Boigny knew that his country could not develop by itself. It needed foreign manpower and capital. He never stopped mentioning the importance and role of foreigners (neighbors and the French) in the development of his country. Speaking in 1957, the President announced the following:
La Côte d’Ivoire ne pourrait pas par elle-même avoir les capitaux necessaries a une expansion à la fois rapide et soutenue. Pendant de nombreuses années elle aura besoin d’une aide en capital suffisamment importante pour permettre à ses habitants de franchir les obstacles sérieux que la nature impose aux pays tropicaux. (Quoted by Bach in Fauré et Médard, Etat et Bourgeoisie…p.90, also Monicrieff 2004: 147)
In general, French aid covered infrastructure projects, the presence of coopérants in ministries, the presence of the military base (not a development aid), and plenty of French language teaching (from 1981-1995, 80% of 31,000 French were teachers)
(World Bank 2001). From 1960 to 1980 France provided more than half net development aid receipts, while Côte d’Ivoire was consistently the highest recipient of French aid. The French filled the capital gap in terms of financial and human resources, necessary for this country’s development. The extensive public funds and political stability provided by the French state, as well as Côte d’Ivoire’s attractive foreign investment laws, attracted private foreign investment, which dominated the infrastructure, large-scale retail and important sectors (147).
While this French presence must be understood as part of Côte d’Ivoire’s development strategy, it was also French policy of deriving commercial and political benefit from close relationships with African leaders. Côte d’Ivoire accepted and indeed encouraged French development aid not only for the technical reasons of development
financing, but also because Houphouët-Boigny wanted to encourage political alliance between French West Africa and France, an alliance he rightly saw as a guarantee to the stability of his regime (147).
The key to French influence has been the presence of coopérants at very senior levels of government. The French position may be described as “semi-insider”. Many of these coopertants have regarded themselves as working both for France and Côte
d’Ivoire’s government. Relations with France have therefore played a role in the creation of a large technocratic civil service and political class in French education system, civil and military (148).
One major aspect of this relationship was that many French became personally attached to what they saw as the warmth of the Ivoirian society, while many Ivoirians remained drawn to the symbols of “civilization’ in Paris. For many Ivoirians the presence of the French was seen as an integral part of the power structures of the Ivoirian society. But, French political culture was not fully implemented. Instead a fragment of French political culture was transplanted in Côte d’Ivoire (149).
Côte d’Ivoire became indebted in the 1980s to both public and private borrowers, incapable of repaying its loans because of a huge fall in the prices of its main
commodities (Cocoa and Cofee). In 1987, it announced it could not pay its debts. “The financial crisis changed Côte d’Ivoire relations with donors. Maintaining relations with IFIs became the most urgent issue for the Ivoirian government, leading to the creation of an inter-ministerial committee dedicated to this issue. In 1990s when the IFIs decline aid due to unpaid arrears and blockage in the structural adajustment programs (SAPs), France poured money into Côte d’Ivoire. Around half of the bilateral funds have come from
France” (Moncrieff 2004: 150). Table 6 below shows bilateral disbursements to Côte d’Ivoire for selective years (in million U.S. Dollar).
Table 6: Amount of Bilateral Disbursements to Côte d’Ivoire By France
YEAR BILATERAL DISBURSEMENT
1970 53 1975 102 1980 210 1982 183 1986 164 1988 138 1990 554 1991 439 1992 462 1993 768 1994 982 1995 829
Source: Adapted from (Moncrieff 2004: 152)
This table shows a steady increase in French aid to Côte d’Ivoire from the early years of independence until 1995. It also shows that France has always been on the side of the Ivoirian government continuously. Note also that the period covered in this table were the previods under Houphouët-Boigny and partly Bédié, both of whom were PDCI leaders. Finally, table 6 suggests that although Houphouët-Boigny was died, France wanted to not only keep it interests and influence over Côte d’Ivoire, but also its alliance with the old party and the Ivoirian political class.
In 1994, the devaluation of the CFA Franc was followed by massive development aid transfers, both from IFIs and France to alleviate the country’s immediate balance of payment and debt problem. The massive rise in disbursements by the IFIs was regarded as a reward for the devaluation. The year 1994 and 1995 saw a series of new loan
agreements, including a three-year Enhanced Adjustment Facility (ESAF) loan agreed by the IMF in 1994. The growth of the Ivoirian economy was impressive in 1995-1998, although the debt burden remained massive (153).
The French were of course aware in the early 1990s not that the scale of the financial crisis of Côte d’Ivoire was beyond their means, but also that the political and social model they had helped set up was fracturing. Although increasingly worried by the emergence of a xenophobic political discourse after Houphouët-Boigny’s death in
December 1993, and especially surrounding the elections of 1995, the French in fact had little option but support to Bédié, and try to use behind the scenes influence to moderate political dialogue (Moncrieff 2004: 153).
During that time, The Ivoirians habitually came to the French for financial help and, through the Elysée, and the Cooperation Ministry, tried to use historical and personal influence to persuade the French to bail them out before going to the Inteernational Monetary Find and World Bank. The practice was stopped or seriously curtailed by the Abidjan Doctrine of 1993. In terms, the IFIs-led reform agenda, France played an ambivalent role. With pressure mounting and crisis growing, the French tried to cajole the Ivoirian officials in implementing reform, so Côte d’Ivoire can avoid adopting all the conditionalities (Monicrieff 2004: 154).
The first concrete reform between France and Côte d’Ivoire was the “Commité
Mixte” of December 1998 (to discuss aid relations). The Commité Mixte involved
meeting with the non-governmental sector, and the Ivoirian officials, the results were then fed into the main conclusions. The second aspect was the demise of the rapport de
Commité Mixte, which lays out French intensions, and signed both parties (protocol
d’accord on aid). The Rapport was replaced by the Document Cadre au Parténariat au
Dévélopment (details mutual obligations, French cooperation to Ivoirian policies and
initiatives) (Moncrieff 2004: 155)
1998-99 was a period of increase emphasis given to cooperation with NGOs and local government. In the agriculture sector, for example, French support aimed at creating, financing and supporting professional organizations (unions and cooperatives) to replace the state marketing system. In the health sector, the making of a non-profit medical cooperative away from government control and near the people it is intended to. French also created some pilot projects throughout the country (for instance, Man in the west). The Fond Social Au Dévéloppement (FDS) was created to work closely with local populations in small-scale projects. The French insisted foreign aid must support Ivoirian citizens, and local government policies, but not government initiatives. This happened during much of the 1990s aid from must donors. But, some of these projects have not yet been implemented since 1998, probably because the French want to excercise oversight on all the aid given (158).
There are indications that the development of aid relationship between France and Côte d’Ivoire was facing some serious problems in 1998 and 1999. The Ivoirian
government failed to implement these policies, either for lack of political will, or its
inability to carry out such policies alone, signaling it over-dependence on French assistance. In 1998, frustration started to grow on the French side, for the Ivoirian
government unwilling to implement administrative reforms, and massive fraud within the Ivoirian administration (160).
Frustration became greater in 1999 as Côte d’Ivoire’s economy was going under and it was unable repay its arrears to donors. These problems were exacerbated by the difficulty relationships that existed by between the Bédié regime and French Socialist adminitration. Note also that the visits to Côte d’Ivoire of Josselin in July 1997, and Vedrine in October 1997 were dominated by public and media discussion of France’s “abandoning” Africa, and scale down support for African regimes, starting with the PDCI (160). 1999 was clearly a period of tension in Franco-Ivoirian relations, culminating in Josselin’s public rebuke to Bédié over the jailing of opposition RDR members, which Josselin stated, would inevitable damage Franco-Ivoirian relationship, (AFP 17 November 1999, and Moncrieff 2004: 161).