Diferencias de género en los videojuegos: ¿repensar o reproducir?

This chapter has shown there are claims that the catalyst to the Tunisian uprising was the drastic action of Bouazizi setting himself on fire because this generated a protest of support for him which was staged by hundreds of youth in front of the same government building. Importantly, it has further been claimed that Bouazizi’s cousin, Ali, recorded this demonstration and then put the video out onto Facebook. Over the next few days, spontaneous street demonstrations broke out across the country and the police responded with violence and brutality. Yet, unlike previous demonstrations (such as occurred at Ben Guerdane in 2009 and at Gafsa in 2008) the uprising of 2011 was successful. Some have claimed that Al Jazeera TV was a crucial partner in the success of the Tunisian uprising. The Arabic satellite channel is an emerging giant in global media, and it supported the uprising by broadcasting sympathetic videos, images and stories of the demonstrations. In particular, it broadcast Facebook images of the early protests outside the government building where Bouazizi had set himself on fire. Therefore, one of the objectives of this thesis is to identify whether social media was the reason why the uprising succeeded on this occasion or whether the uprising would have happened anyway because of other factors.

It was further discussed by Lotan et al (2011) that Twitter use in Tunisia from January 12th until January 19th 2011 showed important correlations between Twitter use on the one hand and the demonstrations and activities of the protesters on the

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other hand. Their general conclusion was that Twitter had played a vital part in amplifying and disseminating important information. However, there may be some credibility to the theory of the Dictator’s Dilemma. This is because the Ben Ali regime recognised the need to adopt this new technology in order for the country to develop economically and to participate effectively in world affairs. However, at the same time, the regime was concerned that the Internet (and especially the widespread chatting on social media) might encourage opposition to the regime and political dissent.

With regard to Egypt, it was shown that in March 2008, two young Egyptian activists named Ahmed Maher and Israa Abdel-Fatteh created the ‘April 6 Youth’ Facebook Page. Such social media activists have been described as a small, but influential, group of Egyptian youth who tended to be highly educated, and who mostly came from middle class families living in urban areas. Importantly, however, although the Tunisian uprising started spontaneously following the death of Bouazizzi, the Egyptian uprising was actually pre-planned. The alliance of social media activists, known as the National Coalition for Change, had deliberately chosen to hold a demonstration on Police Day because Mubarak was due to give a speech.

The activists also publicised the proposed demonstration via Facebook. This was then picked up by the world’s media, and so this provided momentum for the movement. For instance, “We Are All Khalid Said” became an iconic rallying call on Facebook. Thus, an objective of this thesis’s methodology was to investigate the role and significance of social media during this period, especially compared to the traditional public sphere. Furthermore, during the first months following Mubarak’s resignation, a group of army Generals took control of the country. This caused the

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activists to engage in cyber-activism (social media warfare) and street activism against the Generals. Violence then erupted at a football match, leading to the murder of 74 people in the stadium. This raises the concern that, even if social media can assist in the transition from dictatorship to democracy, the process of transition may not necessarily be peaceful.

Having evaluated the electoral defeat of the social media activists and secularists in both Tunisia and Egypt, it could be reasoned that social media usage has not yet expanded to the wider Egyptian society. Only a tiny percentage of the population actually saw the arguments that were posted by social media activists. Also, social media may not be suitable for explaining very detailed political opinions and policies. Besides, the revolutionary youth may simply have had opinions and beliefs that were not the same as the majority of the Egyptian people. In addition, the lack of an overall leader for the activists in both countries would suggest that Gladwell’s belief that successful social movements require organized hierarchies (rather than loose networks) is worth exploring. Regarding the role of women, there are claims that both social media and the uprisings have brought about fundamental changes to the traditional perceptions of Arab women. In fact, it has been argued that Tunisian and Egyptian women were directly involved in their countries’ uprisings, both as influential social media activists and as protesters in the street demonstrations. Tunisian and Egyptian women, especially the youth, turned out in numbers never seen before and they are said to have contributed significantly in helping to remove Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak from power.

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CHAPTER FIVE:

FINDINGS FROM THE TUNISIAN AND EGYPTIAN

INTERVIEWS