Algunos intentos por definir el juego

Joseph (2011) explains that the cables of the American State Department (which were leaked by Wiki-Leaks) revealed that the American and Western governments were well aware of the corruption and oppression of the Ben Ali regime. Yet, despite being aware of this corruption and oppression, the American government was content to continue its dealings with him. This is because he supported the policies of America and the West and he was an important ally for them in the region.

‘WikiLeaks stirred simmering Tunisian discontent when, in partnership with The Guardian, it released leaked U.S. State Department cables detailing the United States’ opinion of and dealings with the decades old Ben Ali regime. The cables alleged gross corruption within Ben Ali’s family and systematic oppression by the regime. In fact, TuniLeaks—a site linked with Nawaat, a Tunisian dissident site—released the leaked cables a few days earlier than

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WikiLeaks. The existence of corruption was common knowledge within Tunisia, but publication of the cables brought the issue starkly into the open. This clear evidence of Western complicity in, or at least tolerance of, the egregious conduct of the Ben Ali regime sparked outrage and conversation in both real and virtual communities’ (Joseph, 2011, p.158)

Joseph (2011) also remarks that it was a dissident website (TuniLeaks, which is linked to Nawaat) that first leaked the cables on to the Internet. This suggests that Tunisian opposition activists were well organised and familiar with the Internet long before the country’s uprising. In fact, this is supported by Dellicastelli (2011) who wrote that:

‘In Tunisia, there was a strong culture of dissident bloggers and it was, in fact, posts on a popular blog that contributed to the beginning of that uprising’ (Dellicastelli, 2011, p.54).

Delicastelli (2011) further says that the activists used social media with such skill and effectiveness that the Ben Ali regime was uncertain how to react. The speed with which images and messages were passed between activists, contributing to a sudden and huge uprising across the country, caught the regime unprepared. In just a few weeks, Ben Ali had fled the country with his family.

‘The Director of the Tunisian Internet Agency believes Tunisian leader Ben Ali did not realise the full extent of how the Internet was being used in that nation. And if he had realised, then he would have tried to shut it down’ (Dellicastelli, 2011, p.57).

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It was shown that Facebook penetration in Tunisia was 17.55% of the population in December 2010. Therefore, although this percentage was not as high as a number of oil rich Arab countries from the Gulf, it was by far the highest percentage from among the poorer Arab countries of North Africa, totalling 1.8 million people in all (Dubai School of Government, 2011). Furthermore, this relatively high Facebook penetration in Tunisia was also combined with a poverty headcount of 15.5% in 2010 and GNI per capita of $4,070 in 2010 (World Bank, 2012). In other words, it could be argued that the conditions were ripe for an uprising in the country. There was a very young population that was highly educated and experienced in the skilful use of social media, yet they were also frustrated by unemployment, authoritarianism, poverty, a lack of opportunities, and poor social and economic conditions (Ghannam, 2011).

Importantly, during the first six months of the Tunisian uprising (from December 2010 until June 2011) Facebook penetration in the country leapt from 17.55% to an incredible 27.9% (Dubai School of Government 3, 2011). This suggests there was a strong, positive relationship between social media use on the one hand and the generation of social/political change on the other hand.

A survey by the Dubai School of Government (2011) also found the following percentages of activity by Tunisian Facebook users in March 2011:

• Organizing actions and managing activists (22.31%)

• Spreading information to the world about the civil movement (33.06%) • Raising awareness inside the country on the movement (31.4%)

106 (Dubai School of Government 2, 2011).

From these findings, the Dubai School survey appears to support Shirky’s notion that social media generates social change in ‘two steps’: firstly, by providing information and enabling political conversations; secondly, by transferring activism from online to offline, and helping protesters to plan and organise their demonstrations and activities.

With regard to Twitter penetration in Tunisia, this averaged just 0.34% of the population between January and March 2011 (Dubai School of Government 2, 2011). Interestingly, the graph below (published by the Dubai School of Government 2, 2011), shows that Twitter use by Tunisians increased at the time of demonstrations and important events. For example, there was a peak in Twitter use by Tunisians on the 13th and 14th of January. The latter date was a day of mass protests in Tunisia. It was also the same day that Ben Ali left the country.

There was also an increase in Twitter use between 20th and 27th February. This was a time of more mass demonstrations in the country, and indeed on 27th February the Prime Minister, Mohammad Ghannouchi resigned. He had been the Prime Minister during the time of Ben Ali, and so the people saw him as part of the old regime. He was replaced by Beji Caid el Sebsi. Overall, therefore, this graph suggests a strong link between online and offline activism in Tunisia.

107 Figure 3: Volume of daily tweets in Tunisia

Source: Dubai school of Government, 2011

On this topic, the University of Washington published research by Howard et al (2011) who also analysed tweets during the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings. According to this study, it was found that social media was crucial for a number of reasons.

‘Social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring. A spike in online revolutionary conversations often preceded major events on the ground. Social media helped spread democratic ideas across international borders’ (Howard et al, 2011, p. 2).

Similarly, Lotan et al (2011) analysed Twitter use in Tunisia from January 12th until January 19th 2011. Again, important correlations were drawn between Twitter use on the one hand and the demonstrations and activities of the protesters on the other

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hand. Their general conclusion was that Twitter had played a vital part in amplifying and disseminating important information.

Lotan et al (2011) also refer to the two-step flow theory of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) which (as discussed earlier) was also mentioned by Shirky (2011). Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) found that the biggest influence on peoples’ opinions did not come from traditional mass media, but from individuals (referred to as ‘Opinion Leaders’) with whom people regularly associated. Hence, both Lotan et al (2011) and Shirky (2011) refer back to the two-step flow theory of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) because they believe it supports the idea that personal communications have the greatest influence on our beliefs. In particular, this notion is important in confirming Shirky’s belief that social media represents a new public sphere where debates will persuade people to join street protests (Shirky, 2011).

Although Lotan et al (2011) warn that much news on Twitter is subjectively written by various individuals (such as by bloggers, activists and journalists) it is still claimed that it is opinion-changing information. Lotan et al (2011) further explain that Wu et al (2011) tested the Two-Step Flow Theory on Twitter traffic by using their own Information Diffusion Models. Their results had strong similarities to the findings of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955). However, it could also be argued that the ‘Opinion Leaders’ identified by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) are family members, close friends and work colleagues. In other words, they are the strong ties identified by Gladwell (2010) who can persuade people to change their opinions and to take risky action because they (the strong ties) are known to them personally and they can be trusted. Therefore, Gladwell (2010) and others could claim that communicating via social media does not have the same force as communicating with ‘Opinion

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Leaders’. This is because the people who communicate with each other on social media tend to be distant acquaintances, and these constitute only weak ties that are unlikely to persuade people to take risky action (such as joining street protests). Nonetheless, with regard to the content of social media communications during the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, Howard et al (2011) found that social media was used to spread information about liberty, revolution and freedom. There were also marked increases in revolutionary conversations immediately before major protests and demonstrations. Since messages of freedom, democracy and liberty were being spread (rather than Islamic or economic issues), so the implication is that the activists were hoping for a more Westernised social/political system (Howard et al, 2011).