Ensayos del concreto en estado endurecido

According to functionalist, or as Jonsson terms them situational,^^ explanations, regimes are deemed to emerge:

"as ways to overcome the deficiencies that make it impossible to consummate even mutually beneficial agreements.

As a result of this understanding, functional explanations have tended to concentrate on the choice of individuals between cooperation and defection from common action.^^ This, in turn, has engendered particular theoretical concern with game- theoretical "prisoners’ dilemma" type situations, the theory of collective goods and on how to promote cooperation between egoistic actors in the absence of any superior authority.^In a more general sense the evolution of cooperative strategies amongst egoistic actors with no acknowledged superior authority can be characterised as a dilemma. That is to say, the choice whether to cooperate or to defect is an either/or

Jonsson 1987 op cit p 18 explains that:

"To avoid the ambiguity and teleological implications of the term "function", I shall instead refer to situational explanations. This means that the question I pursue is "What kind of situations trigger the creation and revision of regimes?" rather than "what functions do regimes perform?"

R Keohane After Hegemonv: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economv 1985, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Quote p83.

See A A Stein "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World" International Organisation 1982, 36:299-324, especially pp304-308.

On security dilemmas and the game theoretic approach see, for example: R Jervis "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" World Politics 1978,30:167-214, also Keohane 1985 op cit p82; Stein 1982 op cit discusses collective goods theory specifically in relation to regimes p307, while R Axelrod and R O Keohane discuss how cooperation can be achieved in their "Achieving cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions" 1985, World Politics 38:226-254.

32

33

decision between incompatible alternatives where neither alternative is optimal, and

both have positive and negative effects. |

J

Jonsson posits that in the international aviation issue area the initial dilemma was

j

j

I

I

system.^* |

I

1

If, as Jonsson asserts: |

"actors are more likely to agree on a regime, the more they win and

j

I

the functional model can help explain the type of situations which are likely to trigger the creation or transformation of international regimes. Within the armaments collaboration issue area functionalism can give valuable insights into why the perceived advantages of cooperation and disadvantages of defection change. Stein notes that in a bargaining situation exhibiting a "dilemma of common interests" within an issue-area requiring continuous negotiations, then an international regime may provide a normative and institutional framework for future negotiations.^^

During the liberal hegemonic period discussed below the armaments issue area appears, at first sight, a promising candidate for the establishment of a regime. The United States had an incentive to agree to a regime for the production of armaments in as much as the risk of defecting were high and the benefits low. Had the United States not encouraged the reestablishment of European arms production capacity during the 1950’s, and transferred large amounts of surplus American equipment to Jonsson 1987 op cit pp50-56.

ibidp23.

the western European allies, the perception was that Europe would be destabilized and possibly succumb to direct or indirect Soviet aggression. If Europe fell under the Soviet sphere of influence, or if it collapsed into chaos, this would obviously have an adverse effect on the global security of the United States. Similarly, the United States had much to gain from the establishment of a regime within the issue area. The structural strength of the United States in armaments production terms would provide opportunities for the sale of American weapons systems in Europe, and offered the inviting, and apparently quite realistic prospect of American leadership in the collaborative production of armaments.

j

Similarly, for the European allies, the functional model would seem to promise that j

the prospects of a regime forming in the issue area were good. The risks of ^ I attempting to take an autarchic stance vis à vis armaments production in the 1950’s, | and to reject American aid, particularly military aid in this context, were potentially I high. With the exception of Great Britain, the European allies during this period | were in such dire economic and military straits that their armed forces required I virtually total re-equipment. Without large measures of American aid, both economic

I

and military, the Europeans could not hope to defend themselves. There was little | or no prospect of gains for the Europeans if they decided to defect. Conversely, I there were significant potential benefits for the Europeans in agreeing to an 1 I

armaments collaboration regime. I

i

I

Collaboration, whether within Europe or across the Atlantic, offered the prospect of î a larger market for domestically produced military hardware. Further, such i| collaboration might help offset budgetary constraints by producing savings when j compared to individual development and procurement, and provide access to high j technology areas.^® The risks of collaboration would appear to be rather low, in that

38 _{Dean 1979 op cit passim, especially ppl55-159. The sources discussing these issues are relatively few.}

As it notes in the preface to Dean’s article:

"The actual state of collaboration in weapons acquisition within NATO is too seldom described. Much of the writing on the subject is hortatory, decrying the diseconomies that result from too little collaboration and exhorting NATO allies to do better" ibid pl55

Dean attributes lack of collaboration to the constraints of economic factors and the difficulty in managing projects.

questions of retaining national defence industrial capabilities^® were outweighed, at least in the 1950’s, by the urgent need for American aid.

The 1960’s represent a somewhat different picture. As the rearmament phase of the 1950’s ended, the liberal hegemonic regime underwent change. Facer asserts that:

"It was American unwillingness to pay a price for the cooperation of European NATO countries, coupled with European fears of American commercial domination, which was the primary cause of the failure of NATO interdependence and standardization policies in the 1960’s".'*^

The changing situation of the European NATO states and the United States as hegemon was reflected in the armaments collaboration regime. In functional terms the payoff structure altered as the risks of collaborating appeared to increase and the benefits of defecting also increased. The Europeans became alarmed at the spectre of American domination,'*^ whilst the United States began to push for increased sales of American systems to help overcome balance of payments problems and to offset

39

40

41

Dean, ibid pl56, notes that: "The process of collaboration has been governed by the desire to Umit dependence as much as possible, to ensure that technological progress deriving from collaboration results in the maintenance of national technological diversity, not in rationalization and specialization”. In effect. Dean argues that, during the 1960s in particular, national governments have been willing to pay a premium to avoid permanent dependence on European joint defence projects. See in particular pp156-157 and 162. R Facer "The Alliance and Europe: Part HI Weapons Procurement in Europe, Capabilities and Choices" Adelohi Paner 108. 1975, London: Institute for Strategic Studies p32.

Amongst the most famous examples are Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s The American Challenge 1968, London: Hamish Hamilton and Harold Wilson’s frequently quoted speech at the Lord Mayor;s Banquet at the Guildhall, London on 13th November 1967. The then Prime Minister said:

"diere is no future for Europe, or for Britain, if we allow American business and American industry so to dominate the strategic growth industries of our individual countries that they, and not we, are able to determine the pace and direction of Europe’s industrial advance, that we are left in industrial terms as the hewers of wood and drawers of water while they, because of the scale of research, development and production which they can deploy based on the vast size of their single market, come to enjoy a growing monopoly in the production of the technological instruments of industrial advance... this is the road not to partnership but to an industrial helotry."

i

42 i

the costs of keeping forces in Europe.

Regime choices within the armaments collaboration issue area can be seen, to some extent, as the result of either/or choices made by the participants. These reflected dilemmas between incompatible alternatives as discussed by both Stein and Jonsson.'*^ The basic problem lay in reaching a mutually satisfactory result, and specifically in demonstrating that cooperation was the optimal strategy for aU the parties concerned.^ In the immediate post World War Two period the dilemma was essentially a choice between American participation in the organisation of Europe’s security, or Europe developing as an independent force in its own right. The initial negotiations which established the liberal hegemonic regime are discussed in Chapter 6 below with particular reference to the establishment of the Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTC), and negotiations leading up to the establishment of NATO. In armaments collaboration terms the dilemma at this important juncture can be seen as whether the armaments necessary to equip western Europe were produced by each state, or whether such production was to be organised by another body, whether established specifically for that purpose or in addition to other more general defence and security functions. Indeed, this dilemma was to be a recurrent theme in the armaments collaboration issue area, and remains even today as a central problem in the national security policies of the member states of NATO,'*^

Between the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty and the signature of the North Atlantic

42

43 44

45

Beer 1969 op cit Chapter 4, pp 131-175 discusses the change in American policy from roughly 1958 onwards, and the concerted American export drive of the 1960’s, but see also Facer 1975 op cit pp28-35. Jonsson 1987 op cit ppl8-23; Stein 1982 op cit pp307-310.

For a discussion of the problems of attaining such a result, see K Oye "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." World Politics 1985, 38: 1-24; O Young "Anarchy and Social Choice: Reflections on the International Polity" World Politics 1978, 30: 241-263, and Jervis 1978 op cit. It is at least arguable that economic pressures on NATO members will actually increase demands for armaments collaboration as a result of the strategic charges engendered by the end of the Cold War and changing nature of the defence priorities of member states in the 1990s. If defence expenditures decrease as a result of these changes a major reassesment of present measures may be unavoidable. The current position appears to be one of "wait and see", but it is unlikely that potentially difficult decisions on the future of European, and indeed American, defence related industries can be put off indefrnately.

Treaty, a period of little more than 12 months,'*^ the foundations of the future armaments collaboration regime were laid. Neither structural nor functional/situational factors offer particularly cogent explanations of the type of structures which emerged. Further, they are less than convincing in explaining why a truly integrated armaments collaboration regime was not developed. Chapter 6 below demonstrates, using the process model developed in Chapter 5, how the United States became much more closely involved in Europe’s defence than American policy between 1941 and 1948 would predict. The Europeans were adept at using their apparently weak negotiating positions to achieve outcomes which cannot be accounted for in strictly structural or situational terms.

Similarly, the operation of the liberal hegemonic regime discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 cannot be adequately accounted for with reference only to the extant models. Toward this end Chapter 5 will develop a process model of regime evolution and change, which will be applied in the analysis of different episodes of regime change in succeeding Chapters. The process model does not deny the validity of certain aspects of the structural or functional models discussed above. It does, however, explicitly reject the claims of such models to exclusivity in the explanation of episodes of regime formation and change, highlighting certain potentially important factors not heretofore examined.

^ The Brussels Treaty was signed on 17th March 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty on 4th April 1949. For the detailed discussion of this period see Chapter 6 below.