Procedimiento del diseño de mezcla por el método del ACI 211.

The causes of regime formation and change within a given issue area can be examined from a number of different angles. Perhaps the most basic level contrasts the normative and the empirical approach. The normative explanation of regime formation and change attempts to outline desirable regimes, with a view to encouraging a qualitative alteration in the behaviour of states, international organisations and individuals, and thus promoting the evolution of a world order. This has led to the epithets idealist, evolutionary holist, and world order being applied to proponents of a normative approach.^ The following analysis will prefer the empirical route, concentrating on the identification and explanation of regime evolution and change within the armaments collaboration issue area, to the normative task of suggesting suitable regimes.

Among empirical explanations, the causes of regime formation and change can be broadly separated into either economic or political explanations.^ In an attempt to apply these factors to a specific instance of regime formation or change however, it is useful to posit a number of discrete episodes of such evolution. Toward this end, a "first cut" will be made at reconciling the economic and political explanations which have been put forward. Such discrete episodes are a framework for analysis rather than an ex cathedra classification however. The motivations for change are unlikely to permit clear identification of when one period ends and another begins. In short, the process is likely to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Although it is tempting to suppose that changes in the relative and general levels of power between regime participants will be mirrored by changes in the structure of the

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See for example: R A Falk "Contenting Approaches to World Order" Journal of International Affairs 1977, 31: 171-198; S H Mendlovitz (ed) On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990's 1975, New York: The Free Press. Ernst Haas discusses the evolutionary holists in "Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes" World Politics 1980, 32: 357-405, see especially p359. The two are most clearly discussed by C Jonsson International Aviation and the Politics of Regime Change

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regime, a direct correlation cannot be assumed. The same complex of actors may not always be operative within the specific regime, or the external environment may affect the regime in ways which magnify or diminish changes in hegemonic power. Within the armaments collaboration, or indeed any, issue area, a number of inter­ related and not necessarily complimentary factors must be taken into account. Before proceeding to identify discrete episodes of regime formation and change therefore, it is necessary to examine the main explanations of regime evolution and change, and to ascertain whether these can account for such events. Amongst economic explanations two factors will be examined: Firstly technological change and secondly the existence of surplus capacity. Jonsson notes that:

"Economic modes of explanation see regime evolution as adaptation to new volumes and new forms of transnational economic activity. New regimes emerge, as non-regime situations or old regimes prove inadequate to cope with increased and diversified transactions."^ TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Few other issue areas exhibit as close an association with technological innovation as armaments production. Throughout history defence industries have been intimately linked with the cutting edge of industrial development. This is not to say that a direct correlation can be drawn between military strength and technological development. As Kennedy notes however, the interwar period demonstrates how technological advances in armaments systems presupposed an advanced economy, both in terms of financing military spending and in terms of producing the types of modem weapons required.'^

"Without a flourishing industrial base and, more important still, without a large, advanced scientific community which could be mobilized by the state in order to keep pace with new developments in

ibid pl5. See also R Keohane and I Nye Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 1977, Boston: Little Brown p40.

P Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500- 2000 1988, London: Unwin Hyman, pp291, 295-96. He also discusses advances in the period 1850-60 in pp 183-4, 192. Kennedy pays particular attention in his discussion of technological development to the relative backwardness of Italy when compared with the other Great Powers.

weaponry» victory in another great war was inconceivable. If the future lay (to use Stalin’s phrase) in the hands of the big battalions, they in turn rested upon modem technology and mass production.

Those advances which can be identified in military technology both between the wars, and post 1945, whether in the development of modem fighters and heavy bombers, the use of jet engines, improved ship design, more effective aircraft carriers, the use of radar, radio and navigation equipment, did represent formidable challenges both in cost terms and in production terms.

It is, however, difficult to support the contention that such technological developments in and of themselves precipitated regime evolution or development. Jonsson affirms that the introduction of the first jet aircraft, and subsequently wide bodied long haul aircraft, did not necessitate alteration to existing stmctures of the aviation regime:

"once the new aircraft were integrated the industry seems to have been able to make the necessary adjustments without fundamental regime change.

Similarly, within the armaments collaboration issue area it is not plausible to point to any particular development which led to any demand for the establishment of an armaments collaboration regime. This is not to say that no differences existed

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between the United States and its European allies, or that relative technological

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ibid p291.

Jonsson 1987 op cit pp40-41.

The important point here of course, is that the striking failures in the British procurement process led to the purchase of American systems rather than the promotion of collaboration generally. See C J Harlow The European Armaments Base; A Survey. Part 2 National Procurement Policies. 1967, London: Institute for Strategic Studies pp7-25, especially pp8-17 which examine the defence procurement system. See also

Kennedy argues that uneven growth patterns and the spiralling costs of weapons and armed forces, both of which are driven by the dynamics of technological change, have potentially damaging effects on national economies/ It is impossible to forsee what the future of technological development wiU hold for armaments collaboration. The end of the Cold War has already increased pressures on NATO members to reduce their expenditure on military forces to realise a "peace dividend". The nightmare scenario of decreasing defence expenditure but increasing technological costs may, in future, increase the motivation for collaboration in the armaments issue area. In the period after 1945, however, technological change cannot be seen as either a necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for regime change within the issue area.