Evolución del cerebro

After 2007 Indonesia’s policy shifted on the Iranian nuclear issue. It opted to abstain when the UNSC adopted resolution 1803 on 3 March, 2008, imposing additional sanctions against Iran. The country was alone in taking a different position from the other 14 members of the UNSC (UNSC, 2008b).

Muslim groups, members of parliament and the public at large including intellectuals responded to the decision with varying reactions. Political analyst Makmur Keliat said that abstention was the safest option for Indonesia. Meanwhile, Azyumardi Azra, a leading Islamic scholar, stated that abstention would come across as indecisive. He said that “we should have fully opposed the resolution if we are to comply with our soft-power foreign policy to uphold dialogue. Sanctions as we’ve seen, only groom radicalism” (Hotland, 2008). Muslim groups commonly welcomed the decision. Citing an unpublished poll, Gindarsah (2012b) revealed that 63% of respondents supported the government’s decision to abstain on resolution 1803, 35% disagreed, and 2% abstained. The government’s decision was in line with a larger part of popular opinion, and that of Muslim groups. Many sides argued that the shift of the government’s position was because of public pressure. A researcher from LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) and a Muhammadiyah activist, Dr Riefqi Muna, believes that the shift of the government’s position on resolution 1803 was because of pressure from society, especially Muslim groups and parliament. Indonesian foreign policy makers had used a rational choice approach by considering international and domestic factors to come to the abstention position (interview, 2/12/2013). According to Vermonte (2014), all the political dynamics which had ocurred in and outside of parliament “led the government to adjust its position over the Iranian crisis” (p. 213). In this regard, the pressure and influence of Muslim groups which were supported by the parliament encroached on the government’s domain on a technical aspect of foreign policy making, affecting whether or not Indonesia supported UNSC resolutions (interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, 20/11/2013). Since that time there was an indication that the government seemed to be more cautious and had changed the way foreign policy was to be formulated. The government increasingly involved the wider community in discussing Indonesia’s foreign policy issues, especially concerned members of the public. The shift in the government’s decision on resolution 1803 might be seen through this lens (interview with Abdillah Toha, 11/12/2013).

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However, perhaps not surprisingly, the government was reluctant to acknowledge public pressure as a factor contributing to the change in Indonesian policy. Wirajuda said the decision was taken after considering the IAEA report in February 2008. According to the report, Iran had been willing to cooperate with the IAEA in making its nuclear plans transparent and compliant with the rules of the IAEA (Gindarsah, 2012a). The government saw positive developments on the Iranian side, and regarded further sanctions against Iran as unnecessary. Likewise, the Indonesian Representative to the UN, Ambassador Marty Natalegawa, said that “the IAEA-Iran Work Plan was a platform to restore the confidence of the international community” (Hotland, 2008).

Yudhoyono also rejected the idea that the shift was related to domestic pressure or external interests. The government had independently decided its policy he asserted. Presidential spokesman Dino Patti Djalal said the abstention vote was not designed to avoid the recurrence of the interpellation move of the DPR nor harsh public pressure. He said that “since the inception, we had viewed that this...was [a] technical matter, not politics. We did not want this problem to be politicized because this issue was potentially prone to be politicized” (Okezone, 2008).

The government’s argument that it ignored pressure from Muslim groups and members of parliament seems implausible. Yudhoyono needed their support in running his government as well as retaining power. He likely calculated all political consequences if he did ignore Muslim groups’ aspirations. Pragmatically, Yudhoyono would not have wanted to lose support from Muslim groups in the 2009 election. The fact that almost all members of the governing coalation supported the right of interpellation might have given more push for Yudhoyono to change the position of the government when it came to resolution 1803. The shift of the government’s position according to Abdillah Toha was not separated from domestic pressure (interview, 13/12/2013). The decision to abstain was taken to avoid further protests from Muslim groups and members of parliament including Yudhoyono’s coalition partners, when seeking his re-election in 2009 (Gindarsah, 2012a).

Whatever the government’s motives, the decision to abstain was welcomed by DPR. Indonesia had not followed the US and had shown progressive diplomatic endeavour to implement its independent and active principles of foreign policy (Rajagukguk, 2009). The main sponsor of the interpellation, Abdillah Toha, said that “we saw there was progress on

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the government decision where Indonesia was the only country to abstain on the Resolution 1803. Despite the strong external pressure, Indonesia still opted to abstain. We could regard it as an achievement for us” (Okezone, 2008). Other non-permament members of the UNSC, namely Vietnam, South Africa, and Libya, also experienced strong external pressure in the UNSC to support the resolution. The three countries eventually succumbed to external pressure (Okezone, 2008).

A different voice was put forward by Effendy Choirie, a legislator from PKB. He regretted the government’s decision and suggested Indonesia should have taken a stronger stance. The abstention position on resolution 1803 reflected indecisive diplomacy. Such a decision demonstrated that the country’s president and foreign minister were indecisive leaders (Okezone, 2008).

The government apparently tried to strike a balance between domestic politics and the US and its allies’ interests within the UNSC. Earlier, pursuing domestic political reconciliation and trying to avoid unnecessary domestic upheavals, Indonesia objected to a UNSC statement condemning Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s call for wiping Israel off the map (Gindarsah, 2012a). The country also opted to vote to abstain at an emergency session of the UNGA on a draft resolution putting little pressure on Israel over its action in Gaza (Gindarsah, 2012a). In the aftermath of the domestic upheavals due to the government’s decision on resolution 1747, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted additional closed breakfast meetings on foreign policy. The meetings were attended by concerned groups, especially Muslim group leaders and members of DPR (Rajagukguk, 2009).

To further repair the damage in domestic politics and ‘restore’ Indonesia’s diplomatic relations with Iran, Yudhoyono visited Iran in March 2008. He was received by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khameini, as a brother. Both countries agreed to cooperate in a number of areas. They agreed to build a USD$6 billion refinery in Banten and forged a commitment to supply 150,000 barrels of crude oil for the plant. Indonesian companies were also invited to participate in Iran’s upstream oil industry. As expected, Indonesia’s abstention generated a positive response from Iran (Jakarta-Post, 2008a). Prior to President Yudhoyono’s visit to Iran, the President sent his Special Envoy for Middle Eastern Affairs, Dr Alwi Shihab to Iran on 18-19 June 2007 to explain Indonesia’s decision on the resolution 1747. All these efforts might be viewed as

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an effort to ‘repair’ Indonesia’s bilateral relations with Iran as well as to demonstrate the government’s willingness to accommodate public opinion on the Iranian nuclear issue. 8. Conclusion

It is undeniable that Islam was an important factor that influenced the shift of the Indonesian government’s decision on the Iranian nuclear issue. The Yudhoyono administration had an interest in improving its image among Indonesian Muslims.

Since the beginning of the democratic era, Muslim groups have positioned themselves as among the influential forces in Indonesian politics and in foreign policy, especially on sensitive issues related to Muslim concerns. Pressure from Muslim groups was channelled through political parties and politicians in the DPR and greatly contributed to the change of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the case of the Iranian nuclear issue. Pressure from Muslim groups was quickly embraced by pragmatic politicians. The interests of Muslim groups and members of parliament converged to pressure the government. This combination of interests made the pressure effective. The government’s change of heart in the UNSC on the Iranian nuclear issue was apparently driven by domestic pressure, despite officials’ denials. Abstention was a reasonable option for Indonesia. Although there were harsh critics from Muslim organisations and the public at large, the government apparently still cautiously considered the external pressure of the US and its allies in the UNSC. The government seemed to misread public options when deciding to vote in favour of resolution 1747. The government’s denial of Muslim groups’ pressure was upheld to show that the goverment was the only legitimate agent in deciding and implementing foreign policy. Indeed, the goverment has remained the key player in foreign policy making and implementation. However, this case suggests political forces outside the goverment have gained a more substantial influence on the country’s foreign policy. The influence of Islam has become more important when Muslim aspirations coincide with the interests of politicians in parliament.

It is rare that religious groups and politicians are in concert in Indonesia. This might be the first time the government has faced such a united movement. Muslim groups and members of parliament shared a view that the Yudhoyono government had betrayed Iran. Muslim groups demanded that the government should accommodate their concerns about the

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West’s unfair treatment of Iran. The phenomena of Muslim groups’ pressures can be considered normal. The growing importance of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy coincided with the rise of Muslim groups and the establishment of Islamic political parties in the post-Suharto era. The influence of Islam on the country’s foreign policy became more noticeable on sensitive issues related to Muslim concerns. Indonesian Muslims became more concerned when the ‘Islamic issues’ related to Israel and to some extent, the US. The concern that the US would attack Iran as it had Iraq doubled the pressure on the Indonesian government. At that time, Muslim groups believed that the government had given the US and its allies the opportunity to invade Iran. A possible attack on Iran was one of the main explanations as to why the public, especially Muslim groups, regarded the government as having made a blunder when supporting the sanctions on Iran. Despite the government’s denials, the Iranian nuclear issue suggests that Muslim groups did play a crucial role in shaping a key foreign policy decision.

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CHAPTER FIVE

INDONESIA’S POLICY TOWARDS KOSOVO’S INDEPENDENCE: PREEMINENT NATIONAL INTEREST

1. Introduction

Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 was met with a range of international responses (Boulton & Visoka, 2010). These can be categorised into countries that have either recognised, objected, or stayed silent on Kosovo’s declaration of independence (Almqvist, 2009). Russia and China spearheaded the non-recognising countries, opposing the US and major EU countries such as the UK, France, and Germany which all sponsored Kosovo’s independence. However, the Council of the European Union has left the matter up to each member state to take a position on whether or not to recognise Kosovo (Duic, 2009). Having no common foreign policy, the EU could create no single position. While the majority of members of the EU supported Kosovo’s independence, some members did not recognise it. Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain are among the countries that did not recognise Kosovo’s unilateral independence declaration.

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Kosovo in July 2010 stipulating that the unilateral declaration did not violate international law has not eliminated the debate on the status of Kosovo (Wolff & Rodt, 2013). Debate on Kosovo’s self-determination, secession and statehood have all continued (Pippan, 2010). Despite disputes surrounding Kosovo’s legality, the number of countries that recognise Kosovo has increased over time (Kosovothanksyou, 2015). Indonesia is one of the non-recognising states. This policy has been questioned by Muslim groups and members of parliament. Proponents of recognition believe that there is no reason for the government to not recognise Kosovo. In spite of suggestions and pressures from Muslim groups, especially Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian government has remained firm on its position. The fear of repercussions from separatist movements in Indonesia is widely believed to be behind the country’s policy towards Kosovo. This chapter argues that Muslim groups’ aspirations were less effective in this case as they confronted the ‘perceived fundamental national interest’ in relation to national territorial integrity. Despite strong pressures from Muslim groups, especially Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian government did not entertain their

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pressures to recognise Kosovo’s independence. The consideration of maintaining territorial integrity is paramount to Indonesia’s strategic national interests.

This chapter discusses the Indonesian government’s response to Muslim groups’ aspirations regarding the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. It will also discuss the extent to which the government has accommodated the concerns of these groups. Also highlighted is the debate on the status of Kosovo’s self determination, secession, and statehood. This case will show the shortfalls in Putnam’s approach on the need for the government to set a balance between domestic and international pressures and interests. Instead potential international pressure converged with already existing domestic pressure for Indonesia to recognise Kosovo’s independence but were still unable to change the position of the government of Indonesia.