La evolución de la consciencia

Non-permanent member status in the UNSC in the period of 2007 to 2008 required Indonesia to be involved in debates regarding Kosovo’s issues. Indonesia also sent a representative to join the UNSC mission to Kosovo between the 25th _{and 28}th _{of April,}

2007. The mission aimed to provide the UNSC with first hand information on the situation in Kosovo (UNSC, 2007a). Prior to Kosovo’s independence, Indonesia faced a dilemma regarding its own position. This dilemma was observed by a leading political scientist from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Ikrar Nusa Bhakti. He said that support of Kosovo’s right to independence had been mandated by the 1945 Constitution, noting that Kosovars suffered gross human rights violations. On the other hand, supporting the independence of Kosovo could challenge Indonesia’s own territorial integrity (Jakarta-

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Post, 2007). According to Damien Kingsbury, Indonesia would experience an adverse impact on its two separatist-prone regions of Aceh and Papua if it supported the proposal of Kosovo’s independence in the UNSC. For Indonesia, national integrity has always been a sensitive issue. However, Kingsbury’s comments were rejected by Hikmawanto Juwana, an international law expert from the University of Indonesia. He said that Indonesia’s support for the proposal of Kosovo’s independence would not have a destabilising effect on its own territorial integrity (Jakarta-Post, 2007).

Such a situation led Indonesia to take a very cautious stance during talks on the final status of Kosovo. In early 2007, Foreign Affairs officials seemed reluctant to reveal the country’s position. Wirajuda stated that “we haven’t made any decisions as we are still discussing it” (Jakarta-Post, 2007). Having a dilemma with regard to its domestic affairs, Indonesia showed hesitation when faced with such a complicated situation. Despite its indecisiveness, the country tended to stand on Serbia’s side. This tendency boosted Serbia’s optimism that Indonesia would vote against any plan or proposal for Kosovo’s independence. Indonesia had indicated its belief in the importance of respecting the territorial integrity of states (Ker-Lindsay, 2009, p. 4). A meeting between Indonesia’s Foreign Minister and the Indonesian parliament on 8 October 2007 revealed the country’s recognition of the sui-generis nature of Kosovo’s case, its view on the necessity for dialogues supporting a comprehensive settlement acceptable to all, and its emphasis on territorial integrity as its temporary position until the both parties had reached a comprehensive settlement (Deplu, 2007b).

Indonesia’s undecided position came to the fore when the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari visited Jakarta for consultations with the Indonesian government as a member of the UNSC in April 2007. After the consultation, a presidential spokesperson stated that President Yudhoyono had not given any commitment to Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (the Ahtisaari Plan) that envisioned supervised independence for Kosovo. Indonesia would monitor the situation and listen to other countries’ views whilst waiting for the results of the UN mission visit to Pristina, Kosovo in May 2007 (Tempo, 2007).

In a meeting with the US, EU, and Russian Troika in early 2007, Wirajuda raised the idea of delaying Kosovo’s final status which was linked with a promise to grant EU

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membership to Serbia. According to Wirajuda, it would be a much less sensitive issue if all parties, namely Serbia or Croatia or even Kosovo, became members of the EU. It would be better if the EU did not issue threats but rather offered incentives to Serbia in relation to the country’s desire to join the EU. However, this idea was taken up by the EU. Wirajuda believed that if the Ahtisaari plan had been pushed through, it would likely have been vetoed by Russia (Kemlu, 2010). Eventually, the UNSC declined to endorse the Ahtisaari plan in July 2007 (Weller, 2008)

Soon after Kosovo’s UDI, Indonesia issued a statement containing the following points: First, Indonesia’s emphasis on the importance of respecting the national and territorial integrity of every UN member state as enshrined in the UN Charter and basic principles of international law. Second, Indonesia’s mindfuness on the issue of Kosovo, which it regarded as a unique case considering the territorial and ethnic aspects of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Third, the country’s emphasis on the necessity of dialogue and negotiations to reach a final status for Kosovo, which if agreed by all parties could avoid the possibility of any new conflicts and tensions. However, Indonesia noted its regret regarding the failure of dialogue between conflicting parties which led to the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence. Fourth, Indonesia was not yet in a position to recognise Kosovo’s independence but would follow developments very closely (KBRI- Belgrade, 2008).

The country’s statement reflected its middle-ground position on independence. While Indonesia had not ruled out recognition in the future, it was concerned about the implications of independence and did not wish to endorse Kosovo’s statehood in the meantime. Such a position had been also embraced by countries like China, Brazil, India and South Africa which had refrained from expressing a strong position one way or another (Ker-Lindsay, 2009, p. 4).

As the world’s largest Muslim country, Indonesia had been expected by Kosovo to take its side. During a 2013 Helsinki meeting on strengthening the roles of religious leaders in mediation and conflict resolution, Kosovo’s Vice Foreign Minister Petrit Selimi told Din Syamsuddin, the Chairman of Muhammadiyah, that Kosovo needed Indonesia to recognise its independence. The basis of Kosovo’s plea was the fact that it is a Muslim country like Indonesia. Kosovo viewed Indonesia as a strategic country in the OIC and NAM (Aminah

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& Festiani, 2013). Kosovars believed there were no legal or political reasons for any countries, especially OIC countries, not to recognise Kosovo’s independence (Arabbews, 2013). Besides approaches from Kosovo, Indonesia had also been lobbied by other countries of the OIC. The Organising Committee Chairman of the Asian Parliamentary Assembly (APA), Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed of Pakistan, urged Indonesia to recognise Kosovo’s independence in a meeting with President Jokowi in December 2014, as it was in line with rights of self-determination (Daily-Times, 2014).

In response to such requests, Indonesia usually employs its rhetorical position that it is still following developments in Kosovo and will look closely at Kosovo’s request, and that it is not impossible for Indonesia to recognise Kosovo at an appropriate time in the future. Such a statement was made by Yudhoyono at a question and answer session during his lecture at the London School of Economics (LSE) in March 2009. Wirajuda also expressed similar views to the above statement when meeting with Kosovo’s Foreign Minister in New York in September 2009 (Kosovothanksyou, 2009).

Indonesia’s response to Serbian lobbying has been similar. This lobbying has been conducted not only by the executive but also by parliament and civil society (particularly religious) leaders. After meeting with Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs (2009-2014) Marty Natalegawa on 19 March 2013, the Speaker of the Serbian Parliament, Neboja Stefanovic, said that his country received assurances that Indonesia will “continue to support the resolution of the Kosovo issue through dialogue, peaceful means and in line with international law and UN conventions” (b.92, 2013a). Previously Indonesia also supported the resolution sponsored by Serbia to bring the case to the International Court of Justice (b.92, 2008). During a bilateral interfaith dialogue between Indonesia and Serbia in Jakarta in October 2013, the Serbian delegation urged Indonesia not to recognise Kosovo’s independence. Such a non-political forum was utilised by Serbia to express its political interests (Amrullah, 2013). But Indonesia’s policy favouring Serbia’s position was not solely because of Serbia’s approaches or lobbying. According to Mohammad Fachir, a high-level official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is impossible for Serbia to dictate or influence Indonesia’s policy to support or not to support Kosovo’s independence (Amrullah, 2013).

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Indonesia’s position seemed clearer in a forum like the OIC which has expected its members to recognise Kosovo’s independence. Indonesia had opposed the adoption of a document supporting Kosovo’s declaration of independence during the OIC Summit in Dakar, Senegal in March 2008. This document was proposed by Turkey (TodaysZaman, 2008). At the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kampala in June 2008, Indonesia, together with Azerbaijan, Egypt and Algeria, once again opposed the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state (KosovaPress, 2008). Indonesia supports a peaceful settlement approach to Kosovo’s issue. Indonesia has suggested bringing the problem back to the framework of UNSC resolution 1244, respecting the territorial integrity of Serbia.