Experiencias nacionales

The SALT I Agreements comprise the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) and the Interim Agreement. The two agreements have different duration provisions, the ABM Treaty being of unlimited duration (with a six-month withdrawal provision in the event of a party's supreme interests being threatened by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty)201 The Interim Agreement, by contrast, had only a five-year span. In addition to restricting ABMs to only two sites in each country with a total of 200 ABM launchers on each side, (a later protocol reduced this to one site with provision for 100 ABM launchers on each side202) the ABM Treaty banned the deployment or testing of the inward-looking Large Phased Array Radars (LPARs) required for ABM target acquisition.

200 Ibid.

201 See ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreement: Texts and Histories of Negotiations WashingtonrACDA, 1980, p.135.

99 The ABM system com ponents concerned, included those which were:

a) operational

b) u n der construction c) undergoing testing

d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or e) m othballed

U nder Article V, p aragraph 1, only immobile land-based ABM systems and their com ponents are perm itted and authorised, each party having undertaken to not develop, test or deploy ABM system s or components th at are sea, air or space based, or mobile land based system s. There w as also a provision (Paragraph 2) that launchers were to be single-use item s, an d th a t d e v elo p m e n t, testin g or d e p lo y m e n t of sem i­ autom atic, or rapid reload launchers w as prohibited.

Article VI prohibited the adaptation of existing non-ABM system s or radars to ABM use, and the testing of such system s in an ABM mode.

To assure com pliance, verification w o u ld be by n ational technical m ean s (NTM s) a n d d e lib era te co n cealm en t or in te rfere n ce to verification by NTMs was prohibited.

F u rth er A greed Statem ents com m on u n d e rstan d in g s and unilateral statem ents were added, as was an Interim A greem ent designed to limit the com petition in strategic

100

Table 3.2 SALTI Interim Agreement Ceilings

U n ited States S o v iet U n io n

ICBMs SLBMs ICBMs SLBMs

’re-SA L T Ia 1054 656 1618 494

b a se lev els^ 1054 656 1530 740

c e ilin g s0 1000 710 1320 950

a) includes operational or under construction. The US had none under construction, the USSR had 1060 operational and 558 under construction.

b) US had 656 SLBM launchers based on 41 submarines, the USSR had 740 SLBM launchers. c) these ceilings were only permitted by replacing older ICBM or SLBM launchers which must be dismantled or destroyed.

Sources: US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements 1980/148 IISS The Military Balance 1968-72

and Greville Rumble The politics of Nuclear Defence Cambridge: Polity 1985

offensive arm s in order to provide tim e for fu rth er negotiations.203 p en d in g a m ore com prehensive agreem ent to be negotiated w ithin five years. The freeze w as so m ew h at asym m etrical, h o ld in g the n u m b er of strategic offensive launchers to existing levels, be they operational or u n d er construction, p erm ittin g an increase in SLBM launchers only w ith the dism an tlin g of co rresp o n d in g nu m b ers of o ld e r ICBM or SLBM la u n c h e rs. T hese la u n c h e rs c a n n o t be significantly enlarged or 'light' or older ICBM launchers cannot be replaced by launchers for m odern 'heavy' ICBMs u n d er m odernization provisions. This provision p rev en ted the Soviets from su b stitu tin g light ICBMs w ith the new SS-9 heavy m issile. Table 3.2 (overleaf) sum m arises the Interim A greem ent ceilings, show ing the extent to w hich increased levels of SLBMs are available only at the expense of

202 3 ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations Washington:ACDA 1980/148

land-based ICBMs. The levels reflect the extent to w hich a structural im balance w as codified (as some SALT critics have noted) to favour the Soviets.

Significantly absent from SALT I was the issue of long-range bombers. O th er issues, discussed b u t n o t com m itted to treaty were: m obile m issiles, cruise missiles, forw ard-based system s and the enhancem ent of m issiles w ith m ultiple ind ep en d en tly -targ etab le re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). These issues were to be left for SALT II and their definition to the SCC.

b) SALT II Provisions

SALT II negotiations began in N ovem ber 1972 follow ing the signing of SALT I. The SALT II Agreem ents differed in several im portant respects from the SALT I agreem ents. Article VII of the Interim A greem ent co m m itted the US an d the Soviet U nion to co n tin u e to p u rsu e negotiations on strategic offensive arm s.204

The A greem ent, b ased on the u n d e rsta n d in g s of the V ladivostok accord comprises three parts:205

i) A Treaty based on the V ladivostok accord [5 years, until 1985].

ii) A Protocol covering specific system s (cruise m issiles, m o b ile ICBMs a n d q u a lita tiv e re s tra in ts on ICBMs,

2^4 j.l George makes the point that SALT I was deliberately an interim agreement in order to foster ongoing negotiations as provided by Article VII of the Interim Agreement. See J.L. George The New Nuclear Rules: Strategy and Arms Control After INF and START. London:Pinter 1990/87.

205 US ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and histories of negotiation. Washington:ACDA 1980/202

providing for further negotiation on these issues in SALT III) [3 years].

iii) A Joint Statem ent of Principles being an agreed set of guide-lines for future negotiations.

A g reed S tatem en ts covered d efin itio n al m atters rela tin g to the definition of SLBM launchers, heavy bom bers, long range Air-Surface Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), launchers developed and tested for MIRVs and other p rocedural m atters. Later assessm ents raised som e doubts ab o u t the value of the associated u nilateral statem ents, follow ing a sh ift in perception of Soviet com m itm ent to the agreem ents. These

Table 3.3 show s the aggregate limits established w ithin the Vladivostok accord under which, the principle of equal ceilings for strategic delivery vehicles was established.

Table 3.3 SALT II Numerical Limits on Delivery Vehicles206

Category Ceiling

a) Launchers of MIRVed ICBMs 820

b) Launchers of MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs 1200 c) Both (a) and (b)+ heavy bombers equipped for long range cruise missiles 1320 d) (a)-(c)+launchers of unMIRVed ICBMs & SLBMs + heavy bombers not

equipped for long range cruise missiles: aggregate limit to apply from Jan.1,1981 to be achieved by Dec. 31,1981

2250