Marco jurídico comunitario

82 Lowenthal, Mark M. and Joel S. Wit "The Politics of Verification." Verification and Arms Control. Ed. William C. Potter. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1985. 153-168. p.163

51

if not actually an obstruction, has been irrelevant to the outcom e."83 This view of the relative irrelevance of the ratio n ale b eh in d the bargaining positions can be explained insofar as this occurs betw een actors th at them selves have to be constituted and em pow ered so that they can actually strike such bargains. M oreover, insofar as he argues for negotiation on force posture and defence doctrine, rather than for som e technical fine-tuning perform ed w ith all the theoretical aplom b of horse traders, he is also arguing th at arm s control is m ore correctly rep resen ted as a political, rath er than m erely technical, process that perform s the function of defining in overt term s the relations betw een nations. Once again it is the sy m b o lic/d iscu rsiv e (articulated as the political) asp ect of arm s co n tro l, n o tw ith s ta n d in g the technical lim itatio n s p laced u p o n actual w eap o n s system s, th a t form s the d riv in g force behind arm s control. By concentrating on the defence doctrine and force posture, Bull strikes at the heart of the intentionality of the treaty parties. W ith respect to SALT, he asks:

[slhould questions of strategic and arm s control doctrine (e.g., defence vs m utual deterrence as a goal) and questions of the c o m p u tatio n of a p p ro p ria te force levels e n ter in to the substance of the negotiations? It is important that SALT

should be an exchange of strategic ideas and a process of mutual education about the bases of strategic thinking84 in the two countries. ... the issue is ... to explore by negotiation w h eth er there is com m on g ro u n d betw een tw o positions arriv ed at by necessarily separate processes of decision.85 [em phasis mine.]

83 Hedley Bull "Strategic Arms Limitation: the Precedent of the Washington and London Naval Treaties" in Morton Kaplan (ed.) Op Cit. in note 50, pp.26-52. p.50 84 Here, Bull is suggesting that SALT can be more than the mere limitation of arms - it can also become a forum for greater transparency at the level of strategic doctrine. 85 Ibid, p.50

Indeed in the SALT SCC there is precisely the m echanism for such discu ssio n an d negotiation. U n d er the term s of the ABM Treaty, Sections (d) and (g) of Article XIII state that w ithin the SCC's area of competence is the ability to:

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation w hich have a bearing on the Treaty. [Andl (g) consider, as a p p ro p ria te , p ro p o sa ls for fu rth e r m ea su re s aim ed at lim iting strategic arms.

A nd in the M em orandum of U n d erstan d in g w hich established the SCC its term s of reference state in part: "The C om m ission m ay also consider changes in the general strategic situation ..." and "Related to this is the C om m ission's au th o rity to consider p roposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty..." In o th er w ords, the term s of reference granted to the SCC upon its establishm ent by the ABM Treaty and the Interim A greem ent allow the SCC to 'exchange strategic ideas and engage in a process of m utual ed u catio n'86 about the bases for strategic thinking in the tw o countries. The decision to do so or not is a political one, and presents a set of options that arguably have not as yet been utilised. [I shall explore the political uses of the SCC in subsequent chapters w hen dealing w ith specific com pliance questions raised, and the responses to them , by different adm inistrations.]

N evertheless, the fact rem ains that, interw oven w ith the institutional structures of the Regulations and designated 'areas of com petence’ the SCC represents a rem arkable political achievem ent given the climate betw een the su p erp o w ers at its inception. Form er SALT negotiator, G erard Smith, characterised the pre-SALT U.S.-Soviet relationship as

"not unlike tw o boxers in a rin g."87 The SCC, beyond clearing up am biguities in the im plem entation of the SALT Treaties, has, arguably, an im p o rtan t political role as a conduit for addressing m isperceptions an d de-fusing tensions betw een the Parties. G erard Smith m akes this p o in t:

[I]f talk is a prim e tool of international politics, [the SCC] is an ev er-read y in stru m e n t for talking things out, not just about clarifying the past, b u t also about how to avoid future dangers. In p a st years the U nited States has often tried to signal the Kremlin, through speeches, budgetary actions and private com m unications betw een W ashington and Moscow, about its interest in m utual restrain t and its concern about certain Soviet m oves. This has been a so m ew h at random process w ith o u t clear results. The S tanding C onsultative C om m ission could be u sed for this p u rp o se, p erm ittin g a degree of precision an d continuity not possible in ad hoc co m m u n ica tio n.88

This point is taken u p by Strobe Talbot,89 w here he em phasises that, n o t only su b s ta n tiv e ly , b u t sym bolically too, the SCC rem ains im p o rtan t to the extent to w hich it is able to raise m atters in ways unavailable to traditional diplom atic means. He describes the SCC as:

[a] u n iq u e forum in w hich m ilitary officers, intelligence officials, and diplom ats from the tw o sides could sit dow n w ith each other on a regular basis and talk about subjects that used to qualify as m ilitary secrets-and, in other contexts, still d id.90

87" Smith, Gerard. Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. N ew York: Doubleday, 1980.

88 Ibid, p.463

89 Strobe Talbot Deadly Gambits The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in