Formación de todos los agentes implicados e investigación en el

U ntil Septem ber 25, 1979, the U nited States had raised eight issues concerning Soviet compliance w ith SALT I.213 Table 3.4 outlines these eight issues briefly. C om parable issues w ere raised by the Soviets regarding US compliance w ith the SALT I agreem ents. These, outlined in table 3.5 give som e indication of the extent of reciprocity w ithin the

212 Ibid p.252-3

213 Testimony of Sydney Graybeal in R.W. Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 p.16

lim inal space of the SALT SCC ongoing negotiations process. This section discusses some aspects of that reciprocity and the consequences of em phasising legalism over relatio n alem in term s of the aims and objectives of arm s control and related compliance questions.

Of the charges of non-com pliance that follow, it m ay be noted that four of the eight issues raised w ere not identified as definite violations. Indeed, it needs to be em phasised th at the politicality of compliance issues rests p rin cip ally on the am biguities of m arginal com pliance behaviours and on the am biguities of the data on non-com pliance. Of the rem ain in g fo u r technical violations, tw o resu lte d from poor estim ates on the tim e needed to dism antle certain launchers, and one from the use of 'w eather protection' yet, since the agreem ent limits the num ber of launchers, tem porary shelters did not preclude verification by NTMs. The rad ar at the Kamchatka Peninsula, appears ultim ately to be a m arginal issue, given th at the Soviets have agreed th at it be considered an ABM test range as p erm itted u n d e r Article V of the ABM Treaty.

O ne Soviet view argues th at m any of the am b ig u o u s com pliance activ ities ra is e d by th e U n ited S tates w ere a re s u lt of p o o r co m m u n ica tio n b e tw e e n the S oviet b u re a u c ra c ie s, p a rtic u la rly betw een the Foreign M inistry and the Defence D ep artm en t of the M ilitary In d u strial C om m ission.214 The argum ent was that the Soviet SCC D eleg atio n w as co n sisten tly m isin fo rm ed by the D efence D ep artm en t of the M ilitary In d u strial C om m ission about activities w ithin the Soviet Union. This was said to result in situations in which the SCC w o u ld have n eg o tiated a pro ced u re, and th at established

procedure was sim ply ignored or garbled by the bureaucratic process. This position could be argued if the SCC was staffed solely, or even principally by Foreign M inistry officials. This is in fact largely the case u p

Table 3.4 U.S. Charges of Soviet Non-Compliance with ____________ SALT I as at September 25,1979.____________

Charge Issue Agreement

Potential violation

Hardened silo

construction Interim Agreement Art I

Legal & political violation Concealment measures impeding NTM verification ABM Treaty,XII.3 Interim Agreement,V.3 Defeating object &

purpose of agreement

Conversion of

launchers from light to heavy ICBMs

Interim Agreement, II

Possible Violation

Possible testing of air defence radar (SA-5) in ABM mode

ABM Treaty,VI

violation

Excess ABM test launchers

ABM Treaty

violation

ABM Radar on Kamchatka Peninsula

ABM Treaty ,VI; Common Understanding C

violation

Exceeding numerical ICBM launcher limits

Interim Agreement,II

violation

deliberate concealment at test range

Interim Agreement,V,3

Sources: US State Dept Bureau of Public Affairs Special Report No.55,July 1979, and G. Duffy Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University, Global Outlook, 1988, Appendix A, p.211 and Testimony of Sydney Graybeal in R.W. Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 Washington:US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

to the D ep u ty com m issioner of the SCC, b u t the C om m issioner him self is ap p o in ted from the Defence D ep artm en t of the M ilitary In d u s tria l C o m m issio n.215 This being the case, it seem s to stretch credibility that there could be a total b reak d o w n in com m unication

b etw een the SCC n eg o tiato rs an d the activities of the D efence D ep artm en t.216

W hat is interesting about the treatm en t of these questions, w ith o u t denigrating their technical im plications, lies in the interp retation of their political m ean ing. That is, the legal perspective, the SALT SCC perspective, and that of the Com m ittee on the Present Danger, all held specific and w idely differing views as to the m eaning of these questions w hen read as political signals. The intersection of these

Table 3.5 Soviet Charges of US Noncompliance w ith SALT I ___________ as at Sept 25,1979_____________________________

C harge Issue Agreement

V io latio n Shelters over M inutem an Silos

Interim Agreement, V Common U nderstanding C

V io latio n Testing Shemya Radar for ABM purposes

ABM T re a ty ,1.2 a n d V I(a)

V io latio n Privacy of SCC

Proceedings

ABM Treaty XIII, SCC Regulations

V io latio n C reatio n of Large scale ABM D efen ce sy stem : PAVE PAWS R adar statn .

ABM Treaty, 1.2

P otential V iolation Exceeding numerical launcher lim its

(M inutem an II, Titan II)

Interim Agreement, V.1,2,3; Common Understanding C Possible Violation D ism antling of R adar at

M alstrom AFB

ABM Protocol on Procedures Possible Violation Exceeding sublimit on

MIRVed ICBMS

ABM Treaty, V.l

Sources: US State Dept Bureau of Public Affairs Special Report No.55July 1979 and G. Duffy

Compliance and the Future of Arms Control Stanford University, Global Outlook, 1988. p.211 and

S. Graybeal in R.W. Buchheim Briefing on SALT I Compliance 1979 Washington:US Senate