Sensibilidad del componente Socioeconómico

When the Caribbean States came to the negotiating table along with the African and Pacific State one the one side, they were united, not only were they well prepared, they had built up a pool of experience in international relations and had earned some degree of respectability as a unit and was supported by a very well qualified technical team. At the start of the negotiations there were six factors which the region was going to rely on for their strength, (1) Britain had made it conditional for entry to the EEC that the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which it had with the Commonwealth sugar producers be respected and would have wanted for sugar to be treated separate; (2) Britain’s interests in sugar spanned the three regions and its investments in the sugar industry across these regions was vast, also all its refineries depended on the product

for survival and Britain was itself a major consumer of refined sugar; (3) Britain had investments mainly in energy resources in Nigeria while its market for British exports was vital; (4) Britain was supporting most of the positions taken by the region because of the multiplicity of its own self interest¹¹¹; (5) Europe was vulnerable because they were divided and that division was because they were unsure. They were unsure because never in its history had Europe had to confront a group of such proportion, so united and purposeful and (6) Europe therefore was on the defensive.

The EEC’s Memorandum published in April 1973,¹¹² explained the need for

“partnership” and shied away from the previous usage “association”. It also reflected a change from the earlier position of limiting the selection of options under the protocols of Part IV of the Treaty of Rome as preconditions. It made a proposal for a stabilization scheme for the fluctuation of commodity prices and also addressed aid for developments projects even more so for the least developed countries, but pressed the question of reciprocity.

The Caribbean’s short-term interest was to protect its exports, develop its industries and deepen its regional integration. However, its long-term objectives were to effect a lasting change in the construct of the global political economy in terms of the existing North-South relations and so the negotiations with Europe were one aspect of those objectives¹¹³. What was enshrined in the Lomé regime was therefore not an end in and of itself but a part of a wider initiative underpinned by the basic tenets of the call for a New International Order (NIEO). In the international outlook of the Caribbean, Lomé was just a step in a longer journey¹¹⁴.

111 Interview‐ P. J. Patterson March 3, 2009. 

112  The Deniau MEMORANDUM 4^th April, 1973, also defined the type of cooperation which Europe wanted. 

113 Ibid. 

114 Interview‐ Sir Shirdath Ramphal, Bridgetown, Barbados June 8, 2009.

For Africa, their short-term interest was to develop their industries and shape their own destiny without interference while the long-term objective was African Unity. However, for the Pacific, their short-term interest rested in stabilization of prices for their main export and building a lasting relationship with Africa and the Caribbean.

When the Preliminary Round opened on July 25th 1973 at the Egmont Palace in Brussels in attendance were forty six ACP States to include; thirty four African countries, to included nineteen Associable, twelve Commonwealth Associable, in addition to Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sudan, all Members of the OAU. From the Caribbean, there was the Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and the twin island state of Trinidad and Tobago and from the Pacific were Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa. In the capacity of observers were the North African States of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The deputy Secretary-General of the OAU represented that organization.

The Caribbean Spokesman was confident of the technical and political support he had both in the region and the wider ACP, the OAU by then had elected Wenike Briggs, the Nigerian Commissioner for Trade to be lead Spokesperson for Africa, Nigeria, being one of the most populous and influential State in the Continent and had been a keen actor in leading and maintaining African unity. Europe also had a preoccupation with African mineral resources including energy, Nigeria was of particular interest to the British. The Caribbean team was lead by Shirdath Ramphal, Guyana’s Foreign Minister while the Pacific was lead by Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara of Fiji. The nine Member States of the EEC namely; Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic) Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom were present.

Three opening statements were prepared for delivery by the ACP which had required considerable coordination and collaboration to ensure consistency. Firstly, within each region and secondly, among the three separate groups covering all participating Member State. To have completed those processes and to have gotten the groups to agree to the Caribbean’s proposal that only one presentation should come from each

region was extremely difficult, indeed “to achieve that consensus was a feat in itself”¹¹⁵. The policy positions of the ACP were enunciated in these three opening statements.

The four opening statements were very important in different respects, all of which exposed the space needed and the intention of the parties which set the tone of the negotiations. The Ivar Norgaard, the Danish Minister of Economic Affairs and President of the EEC Council of Ministers spoke first. He emphasized the importance of the various choices that countries could take under Protocol 22. On the question of trade he specifically offered free entry into the EEC for most of the commodities requested.

Winike Briggs, the Nigerian Trade Commissioner who spoke for African went next¹¹⁶, and he stressed the importance of the event which allowed Africans for the first time to speak with Europe with a singular voice. He spoke about the need for an agreement to reflect conditions in the global economy with financial and technical support. On the question of trade, he spoke of the need to reach an agreement in the context of justification for preferential treatment for Africa in particular and developing countries in general.

The next statement came from Shirdath Ramphal¹¹⁷, the Guyanese Foreign Minister who articulated the Caribbean’s position. He spoke to the historical importance of the linkages between the Caribbean and Europe which had shaped the destiny of its people but emphasized the regions commitment to the integration process and the need to negotiate as a group. He used the occasion to point out the differences in political status of the Associated State, and argued their freedom to choose to remain under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. While expressing disappointment at the vagueness of the EEC’s position, he gave his own interpretation to the options that the EEC was not bound by past approaches and should be willing to formulate new models better suited for the       

115 Interview‐ P. J. Patterson, March3, 2009. 

116 Interview‐ Sir Shirdath Ramphal Bridgetown Barbados, June 8, 2009. 

117 Ibid.

future and argued for trade and economic development that would be just. In doing so, he rejected reciprocity and pressed for sugar and bananas to be given special considerations as the main export earners for many countries in the Caribbean and that CAP should not be an instrument of impediment for Caribbean agricultural products.

He argued that while aid was important it should not be used to establish relations which are neither just, enlightened nor effective or in furtherance of substitute for fair remuneration for commodity prices. Further, that the region wanted to be part of the decision making process for European Development Fund (EDF) spending and finally, he called upon Europe to make its 1972 summit Declaration a practical experience.

Ramphal had used the occasion also to articulate the case of the Associated States in the regions and the dilemma facing the region because; at the beginning of negotiation the Commonwealth Caribbean as a group was beset by a political difficulty. The fact that some Sates were independent and therefore were competent to negotiate in their own right and others were merely Associated States and dependencies. In respect of the latter group both the Commission and Britain maintained that they could not be present during the negotiations and further pointed out that they had no real need to be.

Indeed, the seating arrangement at the conference had excluded the Caribbean Associated States, but the region insisted that the arrangements be changed and Europe agreed

The position was taken that since they were already guaranteed association under Part IV, the Associated states were far from happy but could not make any further headway on the matter. Moreover they operated under a thinly disguised British threat that if the associated states should decide to reject Part IV they should bear in mind that what was not negotiable was a different arrangement for them alone¹¹⁸. The Associated States of the Caribbean were obligated to rest upon the “goodwill” of the independent Members of the region and in the spirit of cooperation and the good offices of Guyana and the more       

118 Interview‐ Sir Shirdath, Bridgetown Barbados, June 8, 2009. 

direct intervention of William Demas, the CARICOM Secretary-General the representative from the Eastern Caribbean Community sat with the official Caribbean delegation of the region throughout the negotiation to safeguard their interest. After Ramphal spoke, Britain did not pursue the matter of their status any further.

The Caribbean had gone to the negotiations determined to underscore the point and signalled their intention to Britain on the question of their position of the Associated States in the region and how the United Kingdom was addressing the concerns of the region with respect to the dilemma and the invidious nature of the Associated States . The region had to express its recognition of the crucial difference between formal and effective sovereignty by arguing that the former is more symbolic than substantive, for its main focus centres on acquiring such ceremonial badges of independence as diplomatic recognition by other states, admission to the United Nation and other similar manifestation of acceptance into the international community.

In contrast however, the latter refers to circumstances where a country and its people truly control their own destinies. They are in other words exercising their right of national self determination in the fullest sense of the term. Establishing and especially sustaining these conditions was not a simple matter. Therefore, constant vigilance must be maintained against any attempt by outside elements to usurp a nation’s power to make and implement its own decisions concerning its political, economic and social affairs¹¹⁹. The Associated States presence at the negotiating table through the representative of the CARICOM secretariat and Ramphal’s intervention seemed to have made the points because throughout the negotiations the matter of their presence and status was never revisited. Since then only the island of Montserrat has not gained independence from Britain and all the territories are now full Members of CARICOM.

Ramphal’s presentation had clearly articulated to Africa, Europe and the Pacific what had become the hallmark of Caribbean international perspective. The region had built       

119 Demas, William. Op.Cit.

up an international reputation as “bridge builders” between North and South and within the South between Africa, Asia, and Latin America¹²⁰. The region believes that its international mission is to strive for consensus and so, even where wide disagreements exist, the parties must keep the lines of communication open as talking represents a continuous dialogue and engagement in order to resolve difficulties.

Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara was the last to speak. He too, spoke of the historical linkages between his regions made Europe and the need for Europe to begin to repair the damages of colonial spoilage and emphasized the importance of the unity and need for continued relations with African and the Caribbean. He premised his denunciation of reciprocity on the asymmetry between the two negotiating parties and also called for sugar to be treated especially as it was the main export earner for the Pacific States. He wanted all the products from the Pacific to be included in the stabilization scheme. In the area of aid and cooperation he argued for the inclusion of the other non independent Pacific countries.

The positions of the Caribbean and Pacific States were very clearly articulated.

However, there were problems within the African grouping particularly on the question of reciprocity, the Francophone Africans wanted it while the Anglophone rejected. Signs of dissention were emerging which had to be checked¹²¹. The ACP seemed to have read “through the line” of the EEC statement which confirmed their uncertainties, so much so that at the close of the session, the EEC chief negotiator thought he had secured some agreement on the guiding principles going into the next rounds and requested that it be set out. Ramphal responded that only exploratory talks were completed and that there was no agreement¹²².

120 McIntyre, Alister: The Caribbean after Grenada: For challenges facing the Regional Movement. – Caribbean  Regionalism Challenges and Options. Pamphlet Institute of International Relations U.W.I St. Augustine. p. 8. 

121 For details of the difficulties see. Akosa, Mabel Op. Cit pp. 72‐76. 

122 Interview‐ Sir Shirdath Ramphal, June 6, 2009. Barbados. 

But, so it was also, that the obvious disquiet in the Africa group was identified by the European and the French were particularly pleased that the Francophone Africans were holding out on the vital question of reciprocity. The EEC strategy started to coalesce around this weakness in the coalition and therefore was further confounded, because in as much as the Europeans were well aware of the importance of African unity or its disintegration in terms of the outcome, so too were the ACP States. If Africa disintegrated, the entire negotiation would have collapsed and this possibility would seem to operate in the interest of Europe. For the ACP States however, it would be a colossal disaster, the possibility of which they had to guard against.