FUNCIONES DE PROTECCIÓN

Neither Saudi nor expatriate ConstructCo employees show many signs of direct contestation. However, Saudis are observed indirectly resisting through absenteeism, finding ways of leaving the workplace, and delaying their work. This is in contrast to their expatriate counterparts, who show a high level of compliance.

Among all the Saudis interviewed, only those with expatriate managers complained about the way in which they were supervised, thus indicating their resistance. However, this conclusion could be challenged, as Saudis may resist purely because they are being managed by migrants, especially as foreigners occupy most supervisory and senior positions. Additionally, it was observed that Saudis have better interpersonal relationships with their Saudi managers than they do with their expatriate managers. For example, some Saudi managers were observed socialising with their Saudi subordinates during break times and outside the workplace.

However, none of the Saudis managed by migrants, including the Saudi supervisors, expressed any discontent over being managed by migrants per se, but rather referred to the unequal application of rules, which led to widespread inequality between staff. For example, one Saudi marketing supervisor stated:

As for me, I am not disciplined in terms of attendance, but I have my reasons. I have no problem with the fingerprint system, but only if there is justice. However, because of the absence of justice and equality between workers, I purposely do not comply with the fingerprint system.

Moreover, there would seem to be an absence of clear policies for organising work and in addition, a strong motivation for Saudis to use wasta to avoid punishment and/or assert their rights. In many cases, the Saudi clerks stated that they used their personal connections to defend themselves against their supervisors. The following statements represent an example of a Saudi clerk being managed by a Pakistani supervisor:

My supervisor is a dictator and he loves controlling everyone and everything. For example, it is impossible for me to sign a normal paper from the HR manager, which is a routine thing; he says I have to bring it to him first, before I sign it and take it to the manager. This is not just about me; he is a dictator with everyone in the department. I will give you a simple example: the Firm gave me a laptop to do

some work on it. The supervisor told me I could not take it home, but I talked to my father-in-law [the HR manager] and now I can take the laptop home.

However, since not all Saudis are privileged with powerful wasta in the firm, they are left with limited options to demonstrate resistance, such as leaving the workplace whenever they want, delaying their work or resigning. The following is an example of the Saudi electrician being managed by a Moroccan supervisor:

I can do nothing without his direct permission. He asks me to call him before I do the work and after I finish it. Also, he sometimes asks for a report at the end of the day… He gives me more work than anyone can bear and sometimes I do other people’s work. I want to move from this building to another one as soon as possible.

Nevertheless, it was witnessed that Saudis tend to collaborate with each other, in order to reduce effort by illicitly leaving the workplace. Generally, workers were observed leaving to escape both heavy and light workloads. For example, one Saudi clerk claimed:

The manager just pops in at any time during the day to see whether we are here or not. You have to be here all day. He needs to see you each time he passes by… I really feel bored here. Sometimes, my supervisor doesn’t allow me to leave the workplace, but me and my colleague organise things… I leave and he covers for me without telling the manager, because he won’t discover I have left the office if nobody tells him. If he asked about me, my friend would tell him that I was in the toilet or outside, smoking.

Furthermore, an extreme case of resistance among Saudis is resignation, which is common behaviour among security guards. It is worth highlighting here that security guards work the longest hours in the firm, namely six days a week of eight-hour daily shifts (8.00 am-4.00 pm, 4.00 pm-12.00 am, or 12.00-8.00 am). These shifts change for each security guard every month. In contrast, clerks and technicians work five days a week (Sunday to Thursday) from 8.30 am-4.00 pm. I personally witnessed the hiring and resignation of Saudi security guards on a daily basis during the field work. The Palestinian HR supervisor claimed that this was the norm in the firm and one statement made by a Saudi security guard confirmed it was the case:

It is only the supervisor who has been here for four years… The rest stay here for just a few months.

Similarly, some manual workers, such as janitors, are obliged to work an extra two hours per day and are asked to work on weekends.Nevertheless, although both migrant and Saudi workers are expected to accept overtime hours in the above-mentioned positions, only expatriates tend to do so without notable resistance through resignation or avoidance strategies. The interview with one Indian janitor revealed that he had spent around 16 years working for ConstructCo and he was satisfied with his current situation. Neither was his case exceptional, since I also met four other manual labourers, who had worked for over 10 years at ConstructCo. In fact, during the interview, the janitor appeared to consent to his working conditions and most interestingly, expressed attachment to the Sheikh, stating:

Yes, I am happy here. I love Sheikh [the owner’s name].

It could be argued that the above-mentioned janitor was not being sincere in this expression of affection, but rather felt that he had no choice but to show his loyalty to his sponsor (the Sheikh), especially as he was so firmly controlled under the Kafala system. Nevertheless, considering the fact that he had worked for 16 years in the firm, had travelled to his home country several times during that period, and most importantly, was able to terminate his employment contract whenever he wished, he was most likely to be demonstrating a high level of compliance. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that a migrant worker in Saudi Arabia may display a high level of compliance, where alternative means of selling his labour are almost diminished, whether in his home country or Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it would seem that the absence of alternatives available to expatriate workers can force them to accept an exploitative employment contract, which is one aspect that ConstructCo is aware of.

In light of the above, it would therefore seem that although some foreign workers in ConstructCo are forced to work extra hours, they may accept this on the basis of two main reasons: firstly, it is paid, which is the main reason for them coming to Saudi Arabia, and secondly, they do not wish to challenge the management, because they know that they are easily replaceable. The interviews with the expatriate manual labourers revealed that they accepted their working conditions, as long as there was no breach of the employment contract they had signed. I asked the HR manager about the compulsory overtime imposed on and accepted by personnel and he explained:

This is what the contract says. These workers know about it before they come to work here and they accept it. I think it’s the same in all other companies.

Resistance among sponsored migrant workers at ConstructCo was hard to detect and even if it exists, it is clearly unlikely to be critical. None of the interviewees mentioned any past strike action or acts of sabotage. In contrast, the free visa workers brought in by subcontractors seemed to have more power to resist, as shown below.