PUERTOS DE COMUNICACIÓN

It was evident during the field work that the free visa workers suffered the worst working conditions of all, in terms of their working hours and environment. However, in the workplace, they experienced less managerial control than ConstructCo’s directly sponsored workers, since they willingly chose to come and work for their respective subcontractors. Their powers of resistance consisted of simply refusing to continue with the work, whenever there was any disagreement with a subcontractor. However, although they could show resistance in these ways, they were still highly controlled outside the workplace by their sponsors/kafeels.

Free visa workers choose to enter Saudi Arabia under this type of illegal sponsorship arrangement, in order to gain greater freedom of movement within Saudi Arabia, for as long as they make the monthly payment of 500 SAR to their kafeels. For example, they can travel home for up to six months per year almost whenever they wish, as long as they meet the monthly payments to their kafeel. Nevertheless, in rare cases, the Saudi kafeel may refuse to provide a migrant worker with an exit visa. For instance, one Pakistani worker reported:

Yes, you can go home; you just need to pay him the 500 [Saudi riyal] each month, but some kafeels do not allow you to go. One of my friends wanted to go to Pakistan, because his daughter had died, but his kafeel refused to allow him. When you come to this country, it is no longer your decision; it is the kafeel’s decision. Therefore, it is evident that free visa workers are still tightly controlled by their Saudi sponsors, who are in turn empowered by the Kafala regulations. However, the free visa arrangements do give such workers more freedom and power in the actual workplace, compared to their migrant counterparts being sponsored directly by a firm.

The free visa workers observed in both of ConstructCo’s current construction projects, worked around 10 hours a day, starting at 7:00 am and finishing around 5:00 pm, from Saturday to Thursday. However, some subcontractors imposed longer working hours using various strategies. For example, the Pakistani subcontractor stated:

After 5:00 pm, I do not come straight away. When they call me, I tell them I am nearby until it is almost six o’ clock. Contractors like me have to make excuses and play games, so the workers work more hours and accomplish more. This is the system here in Saudi; we are not in America.

Free visa migrants are paid a daily rate of around 150 SAR (40 USD) for skilled work and 100 SAR (27 USD) for unskilled labour. Since they are paid on a daily basis and are not under contract, they can opt out from work whenever they decide to. Additionally, they may be offered extra work on weekends by their migrants subcontractors, which they are free to reject if they wish. Nevertheless, free visa migrants are under some pressure to show their commitment to the subcontractors concerned, or they may lose working opportunities or be dropped altogether at any time. The free visa migrants interviewed were aware of being easily replaceable. One Pakistani worker stated:

If I stopped before 5:00 pm, the next day, the contractor would not take me to work; he would replace me with someone else. We are not paid by the hour like in Britain [laughs].

In fact, workers’ power to opt out from working with a particular subcontractor depends on whether they can find work with other subcontractors. Therefore, migrant free visa workers operate in communities and rely on personal connections to find work with different subcontractors.

On construction sites, it was observed that expatriate subcontractors do not monitor their workers very closely, but it is rather agreed in advance between all concerned what should be accomplished each day. For example, when completing flooring work, the subcontractor needs to see around 30 m" _{of floor laid per day, which is a measure of an acceptable rate of} progress. Therefore, free visa workers can generally work at their own pace, so long as they cover the specified task within the daily timeframe.

Nevertheless, free visa workers are unable to take collective strike action, since they do not wish to draw the attention of the Saudi authorities. In most cases, however, they stop working

if their daily wages are delayed. Normally, they receive their salary on a weekly basis, but they can wait longer if they trust the migrant subcontractors hiring them for a site.

The interviews revealed that many of the free visa workers had left their home countries in 2016 due to a lack of work opportunities and it was clear that this had occurred following the economic slow-down, which had impacted the construction sector with particular severity. On the other hand, some free visa workers returned to their home countries after bad experiences with their kafeels. For example, one of those interviewed expressed regret over coming to work in Saudi Arabia, stating:

My father told me to come. He said I would go to the Holy Mosque to say prayers and go on pilgrimage. This is a major reason for many like me… I don’t know... I have no brain… it was a big mistake. Also, I spent a lot to come here, I took out loans and so I have to pay them back.

7.9 Summary of Key Findings

Researching this firm involved the investigation of an illegal concealed business (tasattur) that is owned by high-rank Police personnel but run by a Pakistani entrepreneur. This Saudi kafeel, sponsors 120 migrants, who are known by ‘free visa migrants.’ Those workers pay this sponsor a fixed monthly payment of 500 SAR. For conducting its construction projects, ConstructCo relies on free visa migrants, sponsored by different tasattur subcontractors. The key consideration here is the size of the workforce brought through subcontractors, which is estimated to comprise around 1,000 free visa (illegal) workers. Moreover, ConstructCo completely rejects hiring any women. The two main reasons for this approach is that: 1) The management believes the presence of women workers would reduce male workers productivity; 2) Hiring women is associated with extra costs regarding accommodation and workplace arrangements.

The firm breaches Kafala regulations in two ways: firstly, by hiring 74 migrants without sponsoring them and secondly, by sponsoring 85 migrants who work for other companies. Saudisation is circumvented through three methods: 1) Hiring migrants on HR managerial positions through establishing a bogus training centre and register them as consultants; 2) Hiring migrant on HR specialist positions through registering their work permit on different

occupation; 3) Reliance on free visa migrants through subcontracting. Notably, bribery and wasta are used with the Ministry of Labour to facilitate manoeuvring some regulations. There are no in-house training programmes offered, and workers are not sent for off-the-job training. The firm actively chooses not to enhance the Saudis’ skills through off-the-job training, since it implies that more demands will be made from workers to increase their pay. Although the governmental body of HRDF compensates the firm for the cost of training the Saudis through off-the-job training, the HR manager stated that he is aware of this fund and is considering claiming it in the future by sending Saudis to training courses.

Pay in ConstructCo is related to the position of workers; however, pay within positions is more determined by wasta rather than competence, which has resulted in an inefficient salary grade system. As with the salary grade system, ConstructCo has an appraisal system that is wholly neglected the absence of clear criteria for appraising workers’ performance seems to be a strong mechanism in forcing workers to be consistent in accomplishing whatever work they are given. Therefore, ‘good’ workers need to show complete obedience to their managers to prove that they are competent.

Neither Saudi nor expatriate show many signs of direct contestation. However, Saudis are observed indirectly resisting through absenteeism, finding ways of leaving the workplace, and delaying their work. The high turnover among Saudis indicates dissatisfaction. Resistance among sponsored migrant workers at ConstructCo was hard to detect; it is unlikely to be critical. None of the interviewees mentioned any past strike action or acts of sabotage. Resistance for free visa migrants consisted of refusing to continue with the work whenever there was a serious disagreement with a subcontractor. Free visa migrants are unable to take joint strike action since they do not want to draw the attention of the Saudi authorities.